Forward from the editors:
While the following is highly informative without understanding such finer subtleties as the difference between realism and neorealism, etc. we recommend the following Wikipedia entries for the curious: Liberalism; Neoliberalism; Realism (note: the article on realism discusses “maximum realism,” which is neorealism.
Foreword from the author:
This paper presents a series of simplistic game theory models to describe US-Russia relations both ante and post September 11th. Many people have written about the changing nature of US-Russia relations; I am merely seeking to provide an alternative framework for analysis, and show that realism has not been abandoned even if simple game theory models show that neoliberal cooperation is preferable to realist competition. The models created are my own; any relation to other models is coincidental.
Introduction
For many Americans, September 11th changed the manner in which they viewed security within their own country and brought about a new reality for which they were not prepared. No longer would remote areas of the globe be unimportant or distant, nor would terrorism be an unfortunate consequence of living outside America’s secure borders. The effect on America’s foreign policy has directly manifested itself in the current war in Iraq and the alienation of former close allies, Germany and France, by excluding their cooperation, by ignoring their voice in the United Nations, and by limiting their prospects for economic cooperation in the rebuilding of Iraq. This practice of unilateral action has been met with considerable criticism domestically and abroad. [i] Yet there is one country that has managed to both criticize and support the United States and parlay the effect of September 11th to its advantage with regards to its relationship with the US: Russia.
The only three points of the last century when US-Russian relations could be thought of as cooperative were: (1) the first few decades of the 20th century when the growing might of Germany and Japan made cooperation necessary; (2) the détente in the 1970’s when the prospect of Mutually Assured Destruction made cooperation preferable to annihilation; and (3) following communist collapse when the Yeltsin-Clinton partnership was supposed to lay the foundation for a democratic and free-market Russia that would inevitably evolve into one of the United States’ greatest allies.[ii] Unfortunately, all three periods disintegrated because of misperceptions about the meaning of ‘cooperation’ from both sides and realist ambitions that evolved even when they were not necessarily practical.[iii] The most recent partnership fell apart when good relations between the two ideologically compatible leaders (Yeltsin and Clinton), were superseded by the enmity of other bureaucrats and politicians on both sides, effectively nullifying the leaders’ will to foster good relations and leading the two countries into further conflict. By the time Vladimir Putin emerged from the post-Yeltsin election free-for-all as President of Russia, US-Russian relations were decidedly frosty, and looked to either remain in a stagnant and unprogressive equilibrium or continue to regress. President George W. Bush’s election to the White House in November of 2000 was thought to be the ‘final straw’ in the demise of US-Russia relations; a government dominated by such strident realists and students (or former members) of the Reagan administration would be hard pressed to view Russia as anything but an adversary, especially since it seemed Russia’s attempt to reform seemed on the brink of collapse following the 1998 financial crisis. Russia was becoming an increasingly marginal actor in world affairs. However, September 11th brought about a change, and while it was not a complete reversal, it seemed as though a new course of 21st century cooperation between the 20th century’s two great superpowers had been set.
Neorealism vs. Neoliberalism [iv]
On the contrary, neoliberal institutionalists believe that anarchy inhibits cooperation but that states can work together with the help of international institutions.[v] Essentially, the theory of realism presupposes a zero-sum game, in which the gains of one nation-state actor must be balanced by the losses of another; or, to paraphrase Thomas Hobbes, the realist system is a brutish struggle in a competitive state where survival supersedes cooperation.[vi] Conversely, neoliberalists such as Keohane and Nye challenge realism because of its over-emphasis of conflict and the under-emphasis of multi-lateral international institutions that can foster cooperation.[vii] My task will not be to champion one theory. Rather, I will show through a game theory framework that elements of both neorealist and neoliberal actions by the Russian and American governments affected the relations between the two countries. These two post Cold War superpowers have not limited themselves to specific realist or specific liberal actions, but have incorporated both.
A Framework for Conceptualizing US-Russia Relations
The main difference between the philosophies of the realists and the neoliberalists revolves around the question of conflict and how conflict shapes the responses of one government to policies enacted versus the other. For realists, an inability to maximize power results in the balance of power.[viii] Neoliberalists see entropy as a result of the lack of a common government and view ‘cheating’ as an inevitable result of an anarchic system, but believe that international institutions can create a barter system wherein cheating is mitigated through the iteration of strategic games. Thus, the ill effects of asymmetric information are mitigated, creating a ‘better’ equilibrium with higher utility values (payoffs) for each actor. It is possible to view both theories through the use of simple game theory matrices; for realists, states choose their ‘best responses’ to the other in a zero-sum game even when repeated, whereas the liberals see the game as positive, with benefits increasing as the game is iterated. For realists, each side will choose the strategy that maximizes their payoff, which in this case is a less quantifiable utilitarian notion of power, until a Nash equilibrium balance is reached. As seen below, I believe this balance to be a sub-optimal solution for all countries involved.
Figure 1:
Simple Realist Game Theory Matrix:
Balance of Power System
| 1/2 | Cooperate | Cheat |
| Cooperate | B,B | A,D |
| Cheat | D,A | C,C |
A>B>C>DPreferences are strictly preferred.A+D=0 (Zero-Sum Utility Function)Optimal Result is (Cooperate, Cooperate)Equilibrium result is always (Cheat, Cheat) even with an iterated game.Note: In all models, the action (Cheat) refers to maximizing power absolutely, while (Cooperate) refers to acting within multilateral institutions
In this realist example, two countries—or, as I will propose later, one country and a coalition of other countries in an oligopoly power structure—do not cooperate in the anarchic world system, and therefore reach a Nash equilibrium at the solution (Cheat, Cheat) with payoffs of {C, C}. In this case cheating is an attempt to maximize power since there is no possible cooperation. [1] The neoliberal ‘non-iterated’ result is similar. However, when the game is iterated within international institutions, thereby creating a foundation for cooperation rather than confrontation, the possibility of a first quadrant, or (Cooperate, Cooperate) solution with payoffs of {B, B} can be achieved with greater probability:
Figure 2:
Simple neoliberalist Game Theory Matrix
| 1/2 | Cooperate | Cheat |
| Cooperate | B,B | A,D |
| Cheat | D,A | C,C |
A>B>C>D Preferences are strictly preferred A+D≠0 (can be greater than zero within neoliberalist framework) Optimal Result is (Cooperate, Cooperate) Non-iterated solution is (Cheat, Cheat) Optimal Solution in the iterated game is (Cooperate, Cooperate)
[ix] One reason why realist policies exist is because of the quest for absolute power maximization:
Figure 3:
Simple realist iterated Game Theory Matrix:
Realist Victory or Imploding Hegemony?
| 1/2 | Cooperate | Cheat |
| Cooperate | B,B | |
| Cheat | A, D |
A>B>C>DA + D = 0 The solution is at (Cheat,Cheat) Preferences are strictly preferred
In this case, the iterated game produces a hegemony in which one actor has played its optimal strategy (Cheat) and has won the zero-sum game at the expense of other countries involved. The solution is still at (Cheat,Cheat) but the payoffs have changed to show that country 1 has gained absolute dominance. Thus, the game produces a result where one country (or group of countries if one sees an oligopoly power structure)[2] has completely won the game. Neoliberalists would argue that this fundamental disparity in power could only lead to future disruptions when the countries now bereft of utility seek to regain the power they once possessed. They would argue that the only solution to this game would be to create institutions so that every country has positive utility. Unfortunately, as is seen from the game matrix, the creation of these institutions does not lead to maximum utility; that is, A is the maximum utility, A>B, and a country seeking to achieve utility A will find it difficult to accept utility B even if a more secure power structure is created. Increasingly, the United States has been seen as a country seeking to act unilaterally in order to achieve their maximum utility (A) at the expense of other countries; they are seen as power-maximizing realists seeking a hegemonic position in perpetuity rather than a country who cares about the welfare of others. The question that other countries have been asking themselves recently, including Russia, is how they should act in order to counteract American unilateral—and increasingly realist—behavior so that the result is not an American hegemony that relegates their roles to inconsequentiality.
Russian Foreign Policy since the Cold War
It is impossible to understand the nature of pre-September 11th US-Russian relations unless the underlying security concerns and goals are examined. Barry Buzan argued that the end of the Cold War also ended the traditionalist, military-specific view of security, but also that traditionalist theories of security are still deeply entrenched in the minds of foreign policy decision makers.[x] He argues that increasing economic globalization and the worldwide adoption of capitalist market systems has widened the scope of security’s definition, beginning a new era in security studies even while it diluting its intellectual coherence.[xi] For the United States and Russia, the end of the Cold War meant new relations, couched within the historical legacy of each country. Henry Kissinger wrote:
Nations are formed by their history, by their geography, by cultural legacies. If a nation has done something for 400 years, it indicates a certain proclivity; it means that for 400 years its actions have appeared reasonable to successive generations of the leading people of that society. [xii]
Thus, US-Russia relations in the 1990’s did not evolve in a vacuum; they were based on nearly a half-century of ideological and other hostilities and were shaped from within by centuries of tradition. Moreover, as with any country, the Russia’s foreign policy is interconnected with its domestic political situation, and even under Soviet times could not completely be attributed to a few elite actors or institutions.[xiii] The question is then: What type of equilibrium existed just prior to the collapse of the USSR and during the first years of the Russian federation when the Yeltsin-Clinton relationship was at its apex, and what changed towards the end of the Clinton administration so that Russia moved from a principal opponent to a marginalized actor?
Russia’s post-communist foreign policy is best described as paradoxical. On one hand it seeks integration with the west into the institutions that would help to foster neoliberal cooperation, while on the other hand it continues to attempt to preserve its superpower past through realist policies abroad.[xiv] In its quest to be both ‘normal’ and ‘unique’ Russia has succeeded in creating a precarious domestic and international position that has the potential to cause both internal discord and strained international relationships.[xv] Russia’s hybrid policy in the 1990s did little to improve US-Russia relations that were becoming increasingly strained due to disputes such as the wars in Kosovo and Chechnya. To be fair, it must be noted that the increasing tension between the US and Russia was exacerbated by Clinton’s “…unwillingness to make clear choices or provide a coherent vision”[xvi] and attempt to treat Russia both as a potential ally and as an enemy.[xvii] Therefore, US-Russia relations were a ‘vicious circle’, with both actors seeking better relations at a soft-security level while simultaneously pursuing conflicting hard-security agendas that undermined soft-security progress. When George W. Bush took office, the preexisting arms control regime which had been in place for 50 years was declared, along with the existing bilateral treaties between the US and Russia, no longer relevant.[xviii] Figures 4 and 5 show a game theory analysis of the situation.
Figure 4:
US-Russia relations in the early 1990’s: Goodwill, Cooperation, and Money
| 1/2 | Cooperate | Cheat |
| Cooperate | B,B | C,C |
| Cheat | D,A | A,D |
A>B>C>D Preferences are strictly preferred A+D≠0 The United States is actor 1, Russia is actor 2Optimal Result is (Cooperate, Cooperate) Non-iterated solution is (Cheat, Cheat) Optimal Solution in the iterated game is (Cooperate, Cooperate). The arrow indicates the declining value of B as it becomes preferable to cheat.
In this time period, I would argue that there was sometimes the equilibrium of (Cooperate, Cooperate). However, it must be noted that this equilibrium was dependent on the goodwill of the US, and that Russia was increasingly embarrassed by the US assessment that Russia was no longer a superpower and should not be treated as such.[3] As these realistic assessments of Russia became more accepted, this equilibrium became less and less appealing to realist elements in the United States who saw cooperation with Russia as unnecessary and, ultimately, ineffective because of continued corruption and anti-democratic practices within Russia. Realist factions in Russia, notably followers of Zhirinovsky and other nationalist leaders, also undermined cooperation. This increased the US incentive to ‘cheat:’ to pursue a realist unilateral and hegemonic agenda with regards to Russia, thereby creating more incentive for Russia to ignore cooperation and pursue realist agendas of its own in ‘rogue’ states such as Iran, North Korea, and Iraq. This led to further deterioration of relations. Unfortunately for Russia, it could not prevent a US cheating strategy from overwhelming its own cheating strategy. Therefore, instead of a (Cheat, Cheat) equilibrium being reached with payoffs of {C, C}, the (Cheat, Cheat) solution in figure 5 was instead reached. This solution is similar to the realist solution where one country (or coalition o f countries) is dominant.
Figure 5:
US-Russia relations in the late 1990’s and early Bush regime:
realism overwhelming neoliberal cooperation. Was Russia being lost?
| 1/2 | Cooperate | Cheat |
| Cooperate | B,B | |
| Cheat | A,D |
A>B>C>D Preferences are strictly preferred The United States is actor 1, Russia is actor 2 A+D=0 Solution is (Cheat, Cheat) Russia has negative utility
[xix] Moreover, the 1998 financial crisis and the stagnation experienced by the majority of Russians were blamed on America’s influence and its international banking arm, the IMF.[xx] The perception of America as an arrogant hegemony determined to maintain a weak Russia was widespread within Russia. Shortly after the relationship had reached a post Cold War low, September 11th and the prospects for a more equal and friendly relationship arrived. But did the fundamental nature of the US-Russia relationship change, or did Putin simply use the events to portray the relationship in a more positive light even when the infrastructure of the relationship remained strained because the tendency of members within each government’s bureaucracy was to view the other within a realist framework?Russia’s Westward Shift: A ‘Tacit Bargain’
Following September 11th, the United States introduced a controversial interpretation of the concept of jus ad bellum (the law on the recourse to force), which was tacitly agreed to by everyone from its NATO allies to Russia.[xxi] The United States made it very clear that it would, “make no distinction between the terrorists who committed [the acts of September 11th] and those who harbor them.”[xxii] While there were legal challenges to such a position via article 51 of the UN Charter, by in large there was agreement by the international community that the position of the United States was justified, which was shown by NATO’s invoking Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and by support from a variety of states such as the ‘rogue’ state of Iran.[xxiii] Although states felt that they could challenge the United States jus in bello (conduct of war) doctrine, they were left little room to challenge its jus ad bellumposition especially after President Bush announced that, “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.”[xxiv] Russia and Putin decided to actively support the US course of action. Putin found that following the events of September 11th he could support the United States’ military actions by providing intelligence and allowing a US presence in CIS states while simultaneously criticizing the war itself.[xxv] Putin believed that such support could be used to both strengthen Russia’s international position, which had been on the decline, and help to force integration into the West through acceptance to multilateral institutions such as the G8 and WTO. Improving bilateral relations with the United States was seen as the first step towards real integration with the West. Also, it can be argued that Putin’s newly created foreign policy position was also an attempt to consolidate his domestic power by propagating Russia’s quasi-democratic political system and his powerful role in it. As in the US, the War on Terror could serve as a means to force the centralization of power. Indeed, the United States found it easy to forget Russia’s relations with its newly defined Axis of Evil states (Iran, North Korea, and Iraq) and Russia’s conduct in the Chechen War as long as Russia cooperated in the War on Terror. The United States created this ‘tacit’ or ‘limited’ bargain so that its short-term goals in the War on Terror could be accomplished.[xxvi] Unfortunately, such a short-term tactical assessment of the situation can be detrimental to both sides, for it perpetuates the US assessment of Russia as a strategic ally rather than an ideological, long-term ally.[xxvii] The US managed to ignore the fact that Russia does not equate the ‘West’ with the United States, nor does Russia accept the presence of America as a unilateralist force and has officially elucidated a policy to counteract the presence of American hegemony in its Foreign Policy Concept.[xxviii] A failure to create more ideological ties will only lead to the same strategic short-term partnerships that occurred in the 20th century.
Who are Russia’s allies?
It is important to note that Russia’s structural and cultural identification has always been with Europe and not the United States.[xxix] Alliances made with America have traditionally been tactical and strategic, rather than cultural and structural. Vladimir Putin speaks fluent German, not English, and has often stressed the need for closer ties between Europe and Russia in more concrete terms than with the United States. Of the $55 billion invested in Russia by 2003, European companies invested almost two-thirds and only 12 percent came from the U.S.[xxx] Recent energy talks between Europe and Russia have advanced, while U.S. forays into the dialogue have been effectively dissolved.[4] Moreover, the foreign policies of both the EU and Russia explicitly outline detailed prospects for economic and military cooperation, while barely a paragraph of the Russian Foreign Policy Concept is dedicated to the United States. The U.S. National Security Strategy mentions only broad goals for its relations with Russia.[xxxi] Russia’s relationship with Europe is more functional and structural which therefore creates better prospects for long-term cooperation, but in the immediate aftermath of September 11th, concerns in the short-term outweighed long-term goals of integration into Europe and closer ties were forged with the United States. However, the outbreak of hostilities in Iraq showed how quickly this alliance could be disrupted and Russia’s international position quickly shifted.
Game Theory Analysis of the Situation in Iraq [xxxii]
While the first Gulf War and the operations in Kosovo provided some opportunity for a new world order to form, this did not completely occur; indeed, the ante September 11th world order was an indeterminate system built around major states’ mutual distrust of each other.[xxxiii] Despite the chaos created, September 11th should have been an opportunity to realign the international order. Anatol Lieven makes an analogy between the post-September 11th world order and the Holy Alliance of 1815. He sees alliances forming for the protection of states with a principal policing actor (here the United States).[xxxiv] He acknowledges that a conflict in Iraq had the potential of uniting Russia and her European neighbors in a coalition against American unilateralism (the article was written before the US invasion of Iraq), and that Russia was (and is) too weak for such an alliance to fundamentally upset the balance of world power.[xxxv] Although Lieven’s analogy is strong, to equate the Holy Alliance with the existing world order is problematic, giving too little credit to America’s overwhelming power in relation to the rest of the world. Russia’s weakness is coupled with the EU’s unwillingness to fully integrate Russia into western institutions such as NATO and the EU, and bilateral relations between EU states and Russia are congenial but produce little action. Neither possesses a strong military, and Russia’s economic weakness and lack of democratic institutions makes it a less than perfect ally. Most importantly, while the EU sees Russia as a potential ally to counteract America’s recent disassociation from international norms and laws, it would never choose Russia over America because the EU and the US are interdependent in both hard and soft security issues. However, if the George W. Bush is reelected and a military quagmire develops in the Middle East, a greater strengthening of EU-Russian relations may occur, and whatever US-Russia goodwill gained after September 11th will vanish. The Iraq situation did create a German, French, and Russian coalition against America, but it is difficult to determine exactly how this has affected US-Russia relations. Figure 6 offers a simple game theory model with a brief note on how such a game can be viewed in an oligopoly or duopoly competition framework.
Figure 6:
The Game Between the US and the France, Germany, Russia coalition:
Oligopic competition and the potential for hegemonic failure
| 1/2 | Cooperate | Cheat |
| Cooperate | B,B | A,D |
| Cheat | D,A | C,C |
A>B>C>D Preferences are strictly preferred The United States is actor 1, the opposition coalition is actor 2 A+D=0 Solution is (Cheat, Cheat): Payoff is {C,C} (or is it {A,D}, with the US[5] receiving {A}?) Does the European Bloc (France, Germany, Russia) have negative utility?
Domestic Discord Within Russia and the US
If Russia had not allied with America in the operations against Afghanistan it would have seriously undermined its own national security interests. Not only did the Taliban regime undermine Russian interests in the CIS by destabilizing the entire region, but it was also the only government to officially recognize Chechen independence. In fact, avoiding an alliance with the United States would have been tantamount to ‘lunacy’ because the actions of the United States could only improve the relative security of the Russian Federation.[6] It can be argued that the avoidance of lunacy, while very important in international diplomacy, does not result in what can be considered a true ‘partnership’ in the same vein that, say, the United States and the United Kingdom have a partnership.[xxxvi] Moreover, Russia was in no position to deny the US concessions regarding WMD, NATO expansion, or increasing influence in Georgia and the Ukraine if Russia wanted to be integrated into the West. Pragmatism had to outweigh traditional security concerns. The relationship between the U.S. and the U.K. is built around economic and ideological interdependence, while if one were to (very) generously interpret U.S.-Russia relations it would only be possible to say that America and Russia have economic interconnectedness. Both the so-called neo-conservatives and the neo-chekists, in the United States and Russian governments respectively, continue to pursue realist policies and promote realist ideologies, both of which fundamentally undermine prospects for cooperation.[7] The actions of these domestic actors hurt the international positions of their respective states because they promote zero-sum ideologies and traditional realist tactics. In effect, this means that for Russia the enemy is the West and domination of the former Soviet Republics is the first goal of its foreign policy.[xxxvii] Cooperation with the West is not seen as a positive goal and the Expansion of NATO eastward cannot be viewed as anything but a threat to Russian sovereignty. These views can only hurt the prospects of future US-Russia cooperation, but as long as Putin and Bush maintain good relations, the views of these domestic actors can be mitigated.
Conclusion: A View of the Future
Russia has managed to increase her international prestige since the events of September 11th. Prior to September 11th, Russia was thought of more as a ‘lost cause’ by American leaders rather than as a potential ally. Following the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, Russia managed to become an ally in the War on Terror and press for acceptance into western institutions while at the same time stabilizing its domestic political situation by centralizing power and stopping the creation of democratic institutions. The future of US-Russia relations remains ambiguous. Good relationships between the two countries’ leaders and the inevitable partnership in the War on Terror have improved the relationship that was declining in the waning days of the Clinton administration and the early days of Bush’s tenure in office, but as demonstrated in the recent confrontation in Iraq, this relationship is not synonymous with complete obedience to American dictates. Moreover, the close structural, economic, and ideological ties between Europe and Russia will undermine relations with America if America continues to treat Russia as a short-term strategic ally rather than fostering broader ideological relations. Furthermore, unwillingness by American business and government to create stronger economic ties also undermines the prospects for a long-term relationship.[xxxviii] While Russia’s current economic and military weakness forces it to be a ‘price-taker’ in the present world system, if its power increases and if presented the opportunity to have closer ties with Europe both in security issues and in economic markets, the strategic alliance with America will likely be broken. Although the current relationship between America and Russia seems superficially altruistic, if the United States continues its solipsistic and unilateral behavior the tenuous ties between the US and Russia will be easily broken, and the real potential for long-term cooperation following September 11th will have been lost.
Notes
[1] Cooperation does exist in a realist system. I am referring to a situation when two countries are in competition. [2] An example of this would be how the Muslim world often perceives the West. For realist muslims, the ‘West’ is an oligopoly which, in the zero-sum game of world power, has maximized its utility and has created negative utility for them. This is the situation in figure 3. [3] An example is the incident over arms sales to India where the US strong-armed Russia as it had previously to many insignificant powers. This did little to stem anti-American sentiment within Russia during the mid-1990’s. [4] The arrest of Yukos head Mikhail Khordokovsky ended any potential deal. [5] Here I use the US to mean the US and her allies. I recognize that this is a US led coalition in Iraq, however, the US is providing the vast majority of money and resources to the operation. [6] This is in line with realist theories of international security. As the security level of the Taliban was decreased, Russia’s would increase in the zero-sum game. [7] This is the equilibrium reached in figure 1; a non-optimal solution to the game as a result of realism.Footnotes
[i] For a recent example of such domestic criticism please see: The New York Times, December 12, 2003: Editorial section. Sources from abroad are plentiful and daily. [ii] Goldgeier, 2002, pg. [iii] Ibid. pg., 282 [iv] Chung, pg. 252 [v] Ibid. [vi] See Hans Morganthau’s Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (1948), or alternatively, Joseph M. Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism (1988). [vii] Keohane and Nye, Transnational Relations and World Politics: [viii] This is not to say that states are not trying to maximize their power. What this means is that states, that is non-hegemonic states, realize that complete maximization of power is not possible and therefore power is balances amongst different actors. See: Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 126-127. [ix] See both the 2002 United States National Security Policy and the 2001 Russia National Security Policy for more details. The relationship between realist and liberalist policies will be further explored later in the paper. [x] Buzan, pg. 7-8 [xi] Ibid. pg. 10-11. See also Edward N. Luttwak, From Geopolitics to Geo-Economics: Logic of Conflict, Grammar of Commerce, for a good description of the increasing weight of economics in foreign policy doctrine. [xii] Kissinger, pg. 2 [xiii] Of course I recognize that under Stalin it may be the case that one principal actor determined Russian foreign policy. Under Soviet times and in the first decade of the new Russian states it is impossible to say that only a few actors determined all foreign policy. See: Leon Aron, The Foreign Policy Doctrine of Postcommunist Russia and its Domestic Context and Cyril E. Black, The Pattern of Russian Objectives. Postcommunist Russia does have more actors than the communist USSR did in influencing foreign policy. [xiv] Stent and Shevtsova, pg. 122. [xv] Ibid. [xvi] Yegor Gaidar, A View from Russia [xvii] Stent and Shevtsova, pg. 122. [xviii] Ibid. pg. 123 [xix] Ibid. [xx] George Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents, “Who Lost Russia?” (2002) [xxi] Steven R. Ratner, Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello after September 11th, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 96, no. 4 (October, 2002), pg. 905-911. [xxii]George W. Bush: Address to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks (Sept. 11th 2001) [xxiii] See: John Ward Anderson, Iran Vows to Rescue U.S. Pilots Who Crash on Its Soil, Washington Post October 18th, 2001. See also: Statement by NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson (October 2nd, 2001) available at http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/sw011002a.htm. [xxiv] Steven R. Ratner, Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello after September 11th, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 96, no. 4 (October, 2002), 905-921. Also, Bush September 20th, 2001 speech to the Nation. [xxv] Stent and Shevtsova, pg. 123. [xxvi] Ibid. [xxvii] Renee de Nevers, Ponars Policy Memo 275, pg. 4. [xxviii] See: The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (2000). [xxix] Ted Hopf, Ponars Policy Memo 300, pg. 4. [xxx] Ibid. pg. 3 [xxxi] See: The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (2000) and The National Security Policy of the United States (September 2002) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf. [xxxii] Kissinger, pg. 1. [xxxiii] Anatol Lieven, The Secret Policemen’s Ball: the United States, Russia, and the international order after September 11th. Pg. 251-253 [xxxiv] Ibid., pg. 249 [xxxv] Ibid., pg. 257 [xxxvi] Ibid. [xxxvii] Andrei Piontkovsky, Neo-Cons and Neo-Cheks, The Moscow Times, December, 22, 2003. [xxxviii] Renee de Nevers, Ponars Policy Memo 275, pg. 5
