

Katarzyna MANISZEWSKA
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Vanessa TINKER Editors

SECURITY AND SOCIETY



IN THE INFORMATION AGE

Volume 5



Collegium
Civitas

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Dear Reader,

We are pleased to present the fifth scholarly volume bringing together a series of research papers by participants in the Security and Society in the Information Age program held at Collegium Civitas, university in Warsaw, Poland.

During the academic year 2021/2022 the program was held online and it was composed of a fully-fledged online course and the online research internship seminar at the Krzysztof Liedel Terrorism Research Center (TRC). Krzysztof Liedel Terrorism Research Center is a leading think-tank and a research unit within Collegium Civitas.

This volume presents the result of the internship held in the summer of 2022, after the Russian invasion on Ukraine in February 2022. The security issues explored in this volume include war and peacebuilding – perhaps the most relevant topics in today’s security. The participants analyzed among other issues – topics relating to cybersecurity, special services, effectiveness of economic sanctions, terrorism and famine, and peacebuilding, and solutions to some of those problems they defined and described. The papers show how interconnected and interdependent the world is and that education is a pillar of the solution to global challenges.

The issues discussed in this volume include “A Constructivist Survey of Ukraine’s Ethnolinguistic Divisions in Historical Perspective” (Daniel Markovic); “Famine and Boko Haram Terror The Unexpected Spoils of Russia’s War in Ukraine” (Julia Stevermer); “Economic Sanctions and Factors Inhibiting Success: An Analysis of Recent Sanctions Against the Russian Federation” (Olivia Sessum); “Ukraine’s Security Service, SBU; Security Sector Reform, SSR in the post-Soviet bloc and role in Eastern

European Security” (Lénka Villela); “Cybersecurity Lessons from Estonia” (Heaven Sullivan); “The Tribal Circle Process and the Potential for Positive Peace: A Focus on the Native American Experience in the United States” (Wendelin Hume, Ph.D.); “U.S. Gun Policy Framework with a Focus on Mass Shootings” (Erick Cortes) and “Environmental Security: the Case of the Pacific Island Countries and Dependent Territories” (Kateryna Hashuta).

The leadership and team members of the program Security and Society in the Information Age stand with Ukraine.

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A Constructivist Survey of Ukraine's Ethnolinguistic Divisions in Historical Perspective

Daniel MARKOVIC

Abstract: This article seeks to fill a general gap in the literature on the Russo-Ukrainian conflict by analyzing the ethnolinguistic circumstances that have prefaced the outbreak of war. Starting with the Rus', the origins of the East Slavs and their divergence into the modern Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian identities are traced in reference to historical geopolitics. The rise of nationalism and the mobilization of populations by elites along identity concerns are argued to have turned ethnolinguistic issues into a subject of state security for the first time. The Russian Empire and the Soviet Union are found to have employed Russification towards the end of internal security and modernization, whose outcomes have led to the divisions faced by Ukrainian society today.

Keywords: Ukrainian history; Russian history; Russification; identity policy; securitization

Introduction

As media outlets increasingly began to cover the buildup of Russian forces on the eastern borders of Ukraine towards the end of last year, few expected that the geopolitical situation there would erupt into the first major international conflict on European territory since the breakup of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. The unpredictability of the future is a problem for any expert of current events, especially in contexts where the presence of various complex factors contributing to the evolution of any given social or political issue make an earnest analysis even more challenging. The events transpiring in Ukraine certainly reflect that complexity, and various experts focusing on Eastern European affairs have dedicated immense intellectual effort into making sense of the totality of circumstances that have led Ukraine, Russia, and the world into the conditions that they face today. While many analyses focus on aspects such as security policy, grand strategy, resource conflicts, and weaponized nationalism, this work seeks to employ the cultural dispositions of the two main ethnolinguistic identities in Ukraine as its primary unit of analysis. Unlike in the case of Yugoslavia, for example, where one's ethnic signifier usually corresponded to religion, "Russianness" and "Ukrainanness" in Ukraine are divided across both language itself and ethnic identity as determined by ancestry over generations. For historical and other reasons, these two factors often do not overlap with each other and therefore pose a certain difficulty that, when considering the Ukrainian state's borders and the complicated makeup of its citizens within these abstract borders, reflects the broad basis of this present analysis.¹

Questions of ethnic identity and their formalization into national schemas are first and foremost questions about communities of people brought together along a variety of similar characteristics that exist over long periods of time.² Understanding why such characteristics converge and, in the

¹ More precisely, given that so many self-identified ethnic Ukrainians are bilingual in Russian and Ukrainian from an early age, the traditional conception of ethnicity being directly tied to language is not totally reliable in this case.

² Here I essentially take the so-called "revisionist" position of scholars Serhii Plokhy, John A. Armstrong, Anthony D. Smith, Adrian Hastings, and others. See the introduction to Serhii Plokhy's *The Origins of the Slavic Nations: Premodern Identities in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus* (2006) for a more detailed account of theoretical distinctions.

context of the East Slavs, diverge also reflects an understanding of why two separate nations may come to exist in the first place. While basically all nations are artificially constructed by some empowered actors, if the basis for a nation's formation is either forceful enough, convincing enough to its purported people, and/or based on some valid phenomenon, then it is at least possible for that nation to exist unto itself. With enough time, that constructed nation can, instead of merely reflecting some general qualities among a people from its initial point of creation, begin to actively create its own cultural forms that bind a people together under a civic and/or ethnic national identity. Ukraine does not only need to reproduce its own inertia for national existence, however, but also contend with a larger and stronger neighbor potentially linked to its own history. Indeed, across the Ukrainian nation-state's vast borders, are people who are either at least partially non-Ukrainian linguistically, non-Ukrainian ethnically, or both. This work seeks to survey these complicated cultural circumstances through an analysis of the concrete historical past and resulting sociocultural dispositions that lie firmly in the background of the massive armed conflict that is happening in Eastern Europe today.

Given the relatively limited scope of this analysis, the contemporary political dimensions of this conflict, such as the NATO-Ukraine-Russia dynamic and the breakdowns of international diplomacy, will be avoided. However, it may be assumed from a primarily cultural perspective of this kind that if the Ukrainian state and/or population seeks a certain political direction, then that likely derives from sociocultural concerns relative to its neighbors, i.e. Russia. This same logic, therefore, reflects Russia's military ambitions in Ukraine. Nevertheless, it is evident once again that various factors help define the existing conflict between these states and their peoples, more than what is or could possibly be covered from the foundational perspective of this work. A more precise discussion of cultural and policy nuances is recommended for a much longer publication; shortened presentations of this kind always suffer from some manner of incompleteness. Here it is hoped that the policy perspectives derived from the basic phenomena outlined here may assist in generating positive peace in Eastern Europe long after the final bullet is fired.

On the Origins of East Slavic Identities

The Rus' Dominion

The first state from which virtually all East Slavic people emerged was called the Kievan or Kyivan Rus'.³ According to a key chronicle from the 12th century, the Rus' was founded by the Varangian Prince Oleg.⁴ This ruler of Novgorod and its surrounding land conquered the cities of Kyiv/Kiev towards the south before consolidating his territorial gains into one entity around 882.⁵ Due to the future Ukrainian capital's advantageous strategic and economic position on the Dnieper River, Oleg formally changed his capital from the city of Novgorod to Kiev/Kyiv.⁶ This new Eastern European state would quickly establish itself as a major power in the region. Under Oleg and later his son Igor, the Rus' would expand further into its surrounding territories and establish diplomatic and trade relations with the Byzantine Empire in 911.⁷ Little is known about the demographic composition of the Rus's territories, but various Scandinavian influences seem to have permeated the early history of this state due to the viking background of its leaders as well as the alike makeup of the population that Oleg ruled around Novgorod.⁸ However, likely due to the increasingly Slavic demographics of the areas that the Rus' conquered over time, Igor's son Sviatoslav would abandon the Scandinavian traditions that characterized the ruling dynasty up to his leadership.⁹ By the ascension of Sviatoslav's own son Vladimir/Volodymyr the Great in 980, Slavic traditions dominated the rulers of the Rus'.¹⁰

³ Originally *Росѹь*; "Kievan" or "Kyivan" was added after the fact. The Anglicized *Rus'* will be used herefrom.

⁴ Paul Bushkovitch, *A Concise History of Russia* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 3.

⁵ The Old East Slavic spelling is *Кыѥвъ*. Since the modern Russian and Ukrainian languages differ from this original form, "Kyiv" and "Kiev" will be used together for contexts before the East Slavic languages diverged.

⁶ Bushkovitch, 1.

⁷ "Kievan Rus," *Encyclopedia Britannica*, accessed July 2022, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Kyivan-Rus>.

⁸ Bushkovitch, 4.

⁹ "Kievan Rus," *Encyclopedia Britannica*.

¹⁰ The original Old East Slavic spelling of this ruler's name is *Володимѣръ*. See the third footnote for the approach used to reference this historical figure.

Volodymyr/Vladimir's rule marked the beginning of a golden age for the relatively young state established by his recent ancestors. Less than a decade after assuming power, in 988 he formally converted himself to Orthodox Christianity through a baptism performed in a Greek colony in what is today Crimea.¹¹ This conversion occurred, far from purely religious reasons, as part of a political arrangement between Vladimir/Volodymyr and Byzantine Emperor Basil II for the marriage of Basil's sister to the Rus' ruler as well as military assistance that deepened the ties between these two powerful nations orbiting the Black Sea.¹² In only one generation, Rus' elites changed a nominally Scandinavian-Slavic pagan country into a purely Slavic pagan one before finally settling on Orthodox Christianity.¹³ Indeed, a sociocultural criterion as basic as Orthodoxy to most Eastern Europeans today was far from inevitable and actually rested upon the temporary political circumstances of this time, not to mention the fact that the final decision was decided upon by a single person. However, the deed was done. Traditional Slavic paganism soon became supplanted by the Rus' authorities in favor of Byzantium's gospel. Religious services were still given in Slavic speech since Cyril and Methodius, the inventors of the Cyrillic script, had already translated the bible into Old Church Slavonic a century earlier.¹⁴ Due to Volodymyr/Vladimir the Great's conversion to Orthodox Christianity, he not only solidified a formal religion for the East Slavs but also introduced a literary foundation through Old Church Slavonic that would act as the written template for all East Slavic languages.¹⁵ Following his death, Vladimir/Volodymyr's eldest son Yaroslav the Wise would continue his father's profound legacy.

¹¹ Ishaan Tharoor and Gene Thorp, "How Ukraine became Ukraine, in 7 maps," *Washington Post*, 9 March 2015, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/03/09/maps-how-ukraine-became-ukraine/>.

¹² "Kievan Rus," *Encyclopedia Britannica*.

¹³ Due to the lack of evidence detailing how local populations reacted to elite edicts about cultural and linguistic norms, the distinction between state policy and public sentiments cannot be explored in detail until the modern era.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* Furthermore, it should be noted that Old Church Slavonic was foreign to the East Slavs and that it was created largely with the intention of converting Slavic peoples across Europe to Orthodox Christianity.

¹⁵ Lack of evidence suggests that there was no earlier writing system developed in the Rus' before Orthodoxy.

Map 1: Kievan Rus



Source: Britannica

Yaroslav became the ruler following a power struggle among his brothers. Sviatopolk, the eldest of the bunch, managed to kill all but Yaroslav himself; with the support of Novgorod and its population as well as various Varangian mercenaries, he defeated his eldest brother before formally coming to power in 1019.¹⁶ Under Yaroslav's rule, the Rus' continued to flourish as it did under his father. Continuing this trend, Kyiv/Kiev became the most populous and one of, if not the most significant city in Eastern Europe. Along with this power came a cultural explosion that injected Orthodox ideas, art, and architecture into the East Slavic consciousness on a massive scale for the first time; the literary policy established by Yaroslav's father through the adoption of Orthodox Christianity also expanded with attempts to import and translate various texts that he found significant.¹⁷ While Yaroslav succeeded in spreading culture across the East Slavic world, he was not as successful with ensuring the strength of the Rus' after his own death. Yaroslav's proposed schema for succession failed. Although no bloodshed took place between his sons, the Rus' domains were split among them.¹⁸ The decentralization caused by this division weakened the foundation created by past leaders and these circumstances consequently assisted in the East Slavs' inability to resist the Mongols once they crossed the Eurasian steppes in the middle of the 13th century. Although some western territories of the Rus' remained independent from Mongol rule, these would eventually be absorbed into Poland and Lithuania during the 14th century.¹⁹ It was the Khans that inadvertently produced the first and most important divide between the East Slavs—between the Muscovite Russians and the Ruthenians.

Eastern Europe after the Mongols

The vaguely common culture and language of the East Slavs was split after the Mongol invasions. While the state power of the Rus' was far less centralized than in the Russian Empire, language and culture generally

¹⁶ "Kievan Rus," *Encyclopedia Britannica*.

¹⁷ Bushkovitch, *A Concise History of Russia*, 12.

¹⁸ "Kievan Rus," *Encyclopedia Britannica*.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

remained consistent across the wide Rus' domains. It was only once various foreign entities began to exert their unique influences upon the people of the Rus' unevenly that the divisions between Belarusians, Russians, and Ukrainians now seen today took form. Since the vast majority of East Slavs remained Orthodox Christians, language thus became a primary signifier of the distinctions between East Slavic peoples.²⁰ Historically, this division took shape at first with the eastern half of the Rus' becoming dominated by the Khans under the Golden Horde and later through the annexation of the remaining Principality of Galicia-Volhynia by Poland and Lithuania during middle of the 14th century.²¹ The territories held by this moderate principality originally stood at an uncertain border between the Rus', Poland, and Lithuania up to the 11th century when the Rus' firmly established control during the reign of Yaroslav the Wise. By the beginning of the Mongol invasions, Galicia-Volhynia was one of the only entities of the fractured Rus' domains capable of resisting outright domination.²² This principality acquired nominal independence by its ceding sovereignty to the Golden Horde and reluctantly assisted the Khans in their expansion westward into Poland, Hungary, and Lithuania.²³ However, when ruling elites turned against the Golden Horde with the help of Poland and Lithuania by the beginning of the 14th century, Galicia-Volhynia entered a severe political decline. After its two kings died in battle against the Mongols in 1323 with no heirs remaining, the rulers of Poland and Lithuania gradually absorbed this fledgling Rus' domain directly into their own territories by the beginning of the 15th century.²⁴ It would be within these and other lands conquered by Poland and Lithuania that the Old East Slavic spoken there would ultimately evolve into the Ruthenian language.

²⁰ Other contributing factors will be discussed as well, though language is emphasized due to available evidence.

²¹ Many smaller Rus' states existed during this dynamic period but this one held the most influence at the time.

²² "Galicia-Volhynia, Principality of," *Internet Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, accessed July 2022, <http://encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CG%5CA%5CGalicia6VolhyniaPrincipalityof.htm>.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Ibid.*

Map 2: Partitions of Poland



Source: Britannica

Meanwhile, East Slavs under the direct control of the Golden Horde gradually regained their political independence under the growing power of the Duchy of Moscow. Across the two centuries following the conquering of the Rus', from around the middle of the 13th century to around the middle of the 15th, Moscow gradually unified the disparate East Slavic entities under the Mongols to form a highly centralized state that eventually became the Russian Empire. This centralization proved significant

in overcoming the internal decentralization that had allowed the Rus' to be conquered so swiftly by the superior Mongol forces during the past and in creating an independent power base for East Slavic elites while standardizing local dialects into the future Russian language.²⁵ But even as Moscow succeeded and crystallized into a Tsardom under the rule of Ivan the Terrible during the 16th century, territories that were once key parts of the Rus' remained firmly out of Moscow's dominion. The massive expansion eastward seen under future Tsars did not translate to comparable territorial gains towards the west for centuries as Poland, Lithuania, and later Poland-Lithuania proved to be powerful adversaries that checked Russian power in Eastern Europe. Over time, a combination of instability within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the rise of Prussia towards the west, the intensification of Russia's involvement in European affairs after modernization under Peter the Great, as well as various other factors, Poland-Lithuania and its dominion over former territories of the Rus' populated by East Slavs began to weaken.²⁶ This process culminated in 18th century when a series of partitions took place between Prussia, Russia, and Austria that gradually absorbed the Commonwealth into their own territories. By the final partition at the end of this century, Poland-Lithuania ceased to exist as an independent entity, with Ruthenia (compromising Belarus and central Ukraine today) annexed by Russia and Galicia (eastern Ukraine and southeastern Poland today) annexed by Austria.²⁷

Between the collapse of the Rus' as a result of the Mongol conquests and the annexation of East Slavic groups in Poland-Lithuania by the Russian Empire, the Ruthenian and Russian ethnolinguistic identities independently emerged from Old East Slavic over a period of roughly 400 years. Ruthenian is the term generally given to both the East Slavic literary language and the people who spoke it that lived under Poland, Lithuania,

²⁵ Denis V. Kadochnikov, "Languages, Regional Conflicts and Economic Development: Russia," in *The Palgrave Handbook of Economics and Language*, ed. Victor Ginsburgh and Shlomo Weber (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 541, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-32505-1_20.

²⁶ "Partitions of Poland," *Encyclopedia Britannica*, accessed July 2022, <https://www.britannica.com/event/Partitions-of-Poland>.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

and the succeeding Commonwealth; it is also the common ancestor of both Ukrainian and Belarusian, where the division appears to have emerged by the beginning of the 19th century as the partition of Poland-Lithuania concluded.²⁸ Conscious attempts to influence the ethnolinguistic dispositions of the East Slavs in Ruthenia and Galicia (“Ruthenians”) by the new elites were apparent as scholar Ludvik Nemeč details:

*The westernization of old social institutions and the Polonization of cultural life was very effective in Galicia, especially under Polish Supremacy from the time of Casimir IV (1333-70). Although the Poles promised to respect the religious and national traditions of Galicia, Polish influences were strongly felt there. The feudal system made inroads and Latin gradually replaced Old Slavonic in official documents... In 1433, the Roman Catholic nobility obtained the same privileges as the Poles, and in 1438, Galicia was divided into three administrative provinces. This was practically the end of autonomous life in Galicia, especially when in the sixteenth century, the Polish language in turn replaced Latin in official use.*²⁹

Over time, as the Russian Tsardom became a legitimate threat to Poland and Lithuania, attempts to bring the Ruthenians in line with the Catholic faith were also advanced but found little success and even resistance, especially with the imposition of Catholic institutions and education on the Orthodox Christians of Poland-Lithuania following the Commonwealth’s creation in 1569.³⁰ As religion played a primary role in the lives of Ruthenians, this situation actually encouraged some of them to seek political help from Moscow; ironically, constant exposure to western influences caused the Ruthenians to be even more cautious of their faith, even if their linguistic and cultural lives had already been permanently altered by centuries

²⁸ Daniel Bunčič, “On the dialectal basis of the Ruthenian literary language,” *Die Welt der Slaven* 60, No 2 (2015): 278, <https://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/7496/>.

²⁹ Ludvik Nemeč, “The Ruthenian Uniate Church in its Historical Perspective,” *Church History* 37, No 4 (Dec., 1968): 370, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3162256>.

³⁰ *Ibid*, 371.

of separation from those eastern relatives that many sought assistance from.³¹ Others, however, turned to the Tartar Cossacks for salvation.

As social pressures mounted for ethnolinguistic, economic, and other reasons, Ruthenians from across Poland-Lithuania fled southward to the Wild Fields between the Commonwealth, the Crimean Khanate, and the Russian Empire. Here, across the untamed steppes of today's southern Ukraine, the Cossack movement "helped to build a national awareness among the Ukrainians" and "bearing a singular social character, the Cossacks who helped the peasants to consolidate, establish their rights, and defend their property, became determined defenders against the Tartar invasions [from the Crimean Khanate]."³² This influx of Ruthenians from Poland-Lithuania (and Russian serfs to a lesser extent) was so significant that the Cossacks formally adopted Orthodox Christianity and dedicated themselves to the defense of a Ruthenian identity that, separated from the future Belarusians further north, marked the beginning of the distinct Ukrainian identity seen today.³³ Meanwhile, the Ruthenian language also flourished beyond Cossack lands to the north:

[W]ritten texts obeyed certain norms that were more or less uniform all over the Ruthenian lands. Up to the beginning of the 16th century, these norms existed almost exclusively in the chanceries. However, the Reformation brought about an increase in the production of texts of various genres (e.g. Skaryna's Bible translations), so that Ruthenian became a truly polyfunctional [both spoken and written] language.³⁴

While the expansion of the Ruthenian identity caused by the Protestant Reformation's effect on the availability of literature and by diversification through mixing with Cossack culture marked a high point for this ethnolinguistic identity, political circumstances would lead to a major decline.

³¹ *Ibid.* This process of conscious opposition known as "othering" is a main means of group identity construction.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ *Ibid.*, 372. The individualistic tendencies of this identity would conflict with the authoritarian values of Moscow.

³⁴ Bunčić, "On the dialectal basis of the Ruthenian literary language," 279.

Map 3: Russian Empire's Westward Expansion

Source: Gene Thorp, The Washington Post.

In the 17th century, the Cossacks would find themselves assisting the Commonwealth against Russian incursions. However, after their rights were restricted, a major uprising occurred that became an ethnic struggle. Nearing defeat, however, the Cossacks turned to Russia for help and managed to secure a high degree of autonomy in exchange for their military skills.³⁵ The printing of Ruthenian texts across the Commonwealth diminished as a result, and the decreased circulation of Ruthenian writing likely contributed to the eventual rift between Ukrainian and Belarusian by the start of the 19th century.³⁶ Meanwhile, the skepticism of some Cossacks against Russian authority generated a period of turmoil that divided Cossack Ukraine into one half managed by Poland-Lithuania and another by Russia along the

³⁵ "Cossack," *Encyclopedia Britannica*, accessed July 2022, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Cossack>.

³⁶ Bunčić, 279.

Dnieper River.³⁷ Attempts to establish an independent Ukraine free of external domination through revolts during the 18th century ultimately failed.³⁸

The Rise of European Nationalism and Beyond

From Russian Imperial Dominance to Revolution

The emergence of nationalism as a social and political phenomenon in the 18th and 19th centuries fundamentally changed how people across Europe and the world perceived themselves relative to their lived experiences. Indeed, the conceptual shift captured by this period gave birth to the discipline of history as we know it today, speaking to the manner in which the ideas of past, future, and even progress too are largely recent outcomes of modernity. In this context, within a Europe afflicted by chronic conflicts and the constant erasure of states, history became a treasured science of empowered actors, particularly elites, to justify the existence of their states by appealing to events that could legitimize these states' existences to not only their own people against the threat of foreign domination in the present but also to various spectators across time.³⁹ Fusing the countless array of communities across a state's territory with the interests of that state became possible through the emergence of advanced bureaucracies that assisted the construction and propagation of national mythologies where earlier systems did not have the organizational or technical prerequisites necessary to do so. The possibilities for identity construction multiplied in comparison to previous historical epochs. Here it became advantageous to create a status quo in which individuals did not fundamentally identify themselves in terms of a concrete family, clan, region, or even religion, but in terms of an abstract narrative created by the state and enforced by its authority.⁴⁰ Indeed, is along this general trend that the Russian Empire operated as well.

³⁷ "Cossack," *Encyclopedia Britannica*.

³⁸ *Ibid*. The fact that many Cossacks valued Orthodox principles in association with the Russian Empire more than their individualism contributed to this split significantly.

³⁹ Serhii Plokhy, *The Origins of the Slavic Nations: Premodern Identities in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 3.

⁴⁰ *Ibid*, 7.

In contrast to the Ruthenian language, which was often molded by forces beyond its own speakers and cultural producers due to political subjugation, the variant of Old East Slavic that would evolve into the Russian language would do so according to the political requirements of the increasingly centralized system of Moscow that was largely free from foreign interference after the defeat of the Golden Horde.⁴¹ However, the fragmentation that occurred during Mongol rule posed significant challenges that required new linguistic standards which resolved internal miscommunications while distancing the emerging Russian language from Old East Slavic.⁴² Old Church Slavonic, originally introduced with the conversion of the Rus' to Orthodox Christianity, proved to be insufficient for a variety of reasons despite its central role in both education as well as religious life. The South Slavic base of Church Slavonic was too distant from the language of the average Russian and complicated such that everyday terminology could not be retroactively implemented without severe confusion.⁴³ The inconsistent mixture of colloquial Russian and Old Church Slavonic in society also produced its own series of problems, encouraging an active push for a standardized secular language independent of the archaic gospel of the church.⁴⁴ Until the beginning of the 18th century, much focus was placed on ensuring internal linguistic consistency for the effective management of the enlarging Russian bureaucracy; and following the reforms of Peter the Great, further changes in the written language encouraging simplification occurred as the complexity of new information injected by modernization called for straightforwardness.⁴⁵ French among elites, assisting western knowledge transfer, also shaped Russian significantly.⁴⁶

With the partition of Poland-Lithuania concluded by the beginning of the 19th century, the Russian Empire extended ethnolinguistic principles first employed for its eastern subjects. While Russian authorities encouraged

⁴¹ Kadochnikov, "Languages, Regional Conflicts and Economic Development: Russia," 541.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 540.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 577.

⁴⁶ The period in which French and other foreign languages permeated Russian elite circles also happened to be the same era where some of Russia's greatest cultural works were produced, speaking to the impact of Westernization.

the spread of the Russian language within imperial borders as its frontier in the east expanded, active policies of identity formation associated with nationalism did not begin to take place until the middle of that century. Scholar Elena Shelestyuk describes the general changes to everyday life that occurred in the east following Russia's conquests:

*The 'foreigners' (indigenous peoples of Siberia and the Far East) had to pay yasak, less than state tax, with furs and cattle, as a sign of allegiance and for the Russian tsars' protection. They had special rules to be governed and judged by their customs, their elected elders and superiors; general courts had jurisdiction only in more serious crimes. Serious economic development of these territories began in the 18th century.*⁴⁷

This relatively liberal approach to the empire's non-Russian subjects politically also extended to its ethnolinguistic policies, characterized by toleration and cultural exchange among peoples.⁴⁸ As Shelestyuk details,

*Under Peter [the Great], Arabic was taught in religious schools in Muslim areas of Russia. In Estonia and Livonia, German dominated. They also served as languages of official communication. Russian tsars showed curiosity towards local peoples, arranging fancy-dress carnivals in national ethnic costumes, admired the Malorussian tongue [today Ukrainian] etc. Under Catherine [the Great], the Educational Commission was created, which recommended that schools in indigenous areas should use native languages and cultures in teaching. Catherine ordered the collection of data on all the languages and dialects of the Russian Empire...*⁴⁹

This status quo continued well into the 19th century with the treatment of territories gained after the Napoleonic Wars, such as Finland, Napoleonic Poland, and Lithuania, where the languages and traditions of these

⁴⁷ Elena Shelestyuk, "Review of Literature on the Language Policy of Imperial Russia and the Modern Linguistic Situation," *Quaestio Rossica* 7, № 3 (2019): 941, <https://doi.org/10.15826/qr.2019.3.416>

⁴⁸ *Ibid*, 942.

⁴⁹ *Ibid*.

territories generally remained intact through both legal and educational systems; meanwhile, the 1822 Charter on the Governance of Indigenous peoples, one aspect of ongoing reforms in Siberia, reinforced the government's existing policies.⁵⁰ But with the rise of nationalism in Europe, revolts in the empire's west caused reciprocal repression by the state.

The Russian Empire's response to the spread of nationalist ideology from both western and central Europe led to the creation of its own nationalist outlook. For reasons of both politics and history, this nationalism was largely reactive and represented a concrete shift from the more tolerant position of the past.⁵¹ The relationship between the creation of national mythologies and the upholding of elites' states that proliferated them was more pronounced in territories that were subject to frequent conflicts that often threatened the basic survival of states. While this process of conflict had been ongoing for centuries, it was the French Revolution that arguably gave birth to nationalism as it is understood today. Various liberal intellectuals central to the revolutionary elite as well as the Coalition Wars that placed them against most of Europe's major monarchies inspired a massive social mobilization dependent upon an ideological narrative to generate the popular support necessary for the revolution and its ideals to survive. A fusion of this kind was simply unseen during past historical epochs, and with the rise of the Industrial Revolution in the decades after Napoleon's defeat that reoriented social structures to the state level as opposed to local power centers as in feudal times, the template innovated by the French would soon become typical across European affairs. But these conditions that defined the French situation were alien to the Russian Empire, which enjoyed existential stability and growth that gradually incorporated a vast array of peoples into its borders over time and limited the imperative to form a mythology for its people that helped to uphold the state's existence; indeed, the strong centralized power of Russian authorities served

⁵⁰ *Ibid*, 942-943.

⁵¹ For an alternative account supporting this general position from the perspective of Russification, see Theodore Weeks's "Russification: Word and Practice 1863–1914" (2004) <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1558142>: Russification was usually a culture-neutral policy that often intersected with Russian nationalism, an ideology specifically catered towards the East Slavic peoples of the western parts of the empire against the influence of other nationalist views.

that role when needed. There was essentially no historical precedent for nationalism to emerge organically among Russian elites, and the mythology that did during the 19th century appeared to be an attempt to “fight fire with fire” against an alien phenomenon.

The Polish uprisings of 1830-1831 and 1863 proved to be the first series of events that encouraged flirtations between the Russian Empire and nationalist ideology. Consistent with the general model described above, it was the Polish and Lithuanian elites, or *szlachta*, that pushed forward these revolts with some support from their local populations; the optimistic end goal was the full restoration of Poland-Lithuania with pre-partition borders.⁵² The 1830-1831 uprising led to one of the first major examples of ethnolinguistic repression in modern Russian history.⁵³ According to Shelestyuk,

*After the 1830–1831 uprising, Russia proclaimed Poland its part, the Sejm and the Polish army was disbanded and voivodeships were replaced by administrative provinces. Russia’s coinage, weights and measures were adopted. The administration of local schools was devolved to the Ministry of National Education. The teaching of Russian was introduced. Outside the Kingdom of Poland, Polish was banned from schools and publications. In Lithuania, from 1833, Lithuanian was promoted as the language of education.*⁵⁴

The 1863 uprising featured essentially the same goal as the first but its failure ultimately led to even more ethnolinguistic setbacks for the Russian Empire’s western subjects. Russian elites had come to the conclusion that continuing their liberal ethnolinguistic policies for groups

⁵² Shelestyuk, 944. Russian ethnolinguistic repression as a reactive phenomenon is also supported by the example of Finland, which enjoyed some of the highest levels of autonomy in the Russian Empire; see Kadochnikov, 549.

⁵³ The status of a Polish-Lithuanian national consciousness prior to the Commonwealth’s partition is unclear to this author, though given that the French Revolution was ongoing, it is more likely that nationalism expanded among Polish and Lithuanian elites after the partition than before. However, the Polish Uprising of 1794 that prefaced the final partition indicates that some kind of nationalist tendencies were already present there at the time.

⁵⁴ Shelestyuk, 944.

influenced by nationalism was counterintuitive given that the Russian state effectively supported institutions that were undermining its own internal security.⁵⁵ As a result, the Polish language was suppressed in official use, state support for entities determined to have contributed to nationalist sentiments was revoked, and Russian language education was made mandatory for all primary schools in Poland and the Baltics.⁵⁶ This new policy outlook would also impact other East Slavs as well.

In addition to the negative approach exemplified by policies against the Polish identity, Russian elites would also develop their own positive ideological response for western subjects of the empire in the interest of security, particularly Russian nationalism towards the East Slavs. In the decades first leading up to the rise of nationalism, Cossack elites under the Russian Empire gradually began to merge with the imperial elite, transmitting the notion of Ukraine or Maloruss (“Little Russia”) as connected to the traditional “Great” Russian core of the empire in terms of a common faith and ruler without a historical or ethnic dimension.⁵⁷ Generally, “Little Russia” was not secondary in the sense of ethnic identity relative to “Great” Russia; instead, the term served a geographical purpose to demarcate the new territories annexed from Poland-Lithuania in which East Slavic (*Rus’*) people lived.⁵⁸ The Cossack elite, which by this point was largely congruent with the imperial elite, birthed a Malorussian identity that became dominant in major cities such as Kyiv.⁵⁹ Since the western half of modern Ukraine, including significant Cossack territory, was under the Russian Empire shorter than the eastern parts gained before the partition, this partially organic identity did not spread as much there. In competition with

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 945.

⁵⁶ Kadochnikov, “Languages, Regional Conflicts and Economic Development: Russia,” 550-551.

⁵⁷ А.Л. Котенко, О.В. Мартынюк и А.И. Миллер, «„Малоросс“: эволюция понятия до Первой мировой войны», *Новое литературное обозрение* 108, № 2 (2011), <https://magazines.gorky.media/nlo/2011/2/maloross-evolyucziya-ponyatiya-do-pervoj-mirovoj-vojny.html>.

⁵⁸ The ethnic or national element associated with Maloruss would emerge in the middle of the 19th century in the All-Russian Nation concept that built upon the linguistic argument that East Slavic languages were closer than apart.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.* This identity basically reflected the geographical, religious, and imperial ideas defining “Maloruss” itself.

the Malorussian identity was the “Ukrainophile” identity that found more reception in areas less connected to imperial power and the Russian language such as this western part of Ukraine, the countryside, and places with significant anti-imperial sentiments overall.⁶⁰ A class divide was evident between Russian and Ruthenian or Ukrainian, and those on the weaker side of that divide, not too dissimilar from the French revolutionary elites, would be most responsible for developing Ukrainian nationalism.

As Ukrainophilia was targeted in a negative manner by imperial authorities following the events in Poland, the basic principles of the Malorussian identity would be consciously employed positively to create a Russian nationalist ideology. The Ukrainian national consciousness largely developed within the social context of the Russian Empire after both the partition and the French Revolution.⁶¹ It was in this context during the 19th century that the written forms of the Ukrainian and Belarusian languages emerged under the Russian Empire's liberal policy, marking the formal end of Ruthenian as an organic ethnolinguistic identity.⁶² Elena Shelestyuk describes further:

Theoretical Ukrainophilia appeared, at first ‘of an archaeological colour’ (meaning the study of folklore, legends, songs etc.), then as a social political trend, producing Ivan Franco’s party... In the spirit of Slavic revival, Ukrainophilia was embraced by many Russian and Polish intelligentsia. [Various thinkers] propagated Ukrainian, compiled histories of Ukraine, engaged in education, literary work, ethnography and folklore. [M. S. Grushevsky] was especially instrumental in the development of “ukrayinska mova” and wrote an eight-volume history of Ukraine, separating Malorussian facts from common Russian history. Ukrainian books were freely published, Sunday schools set up and plays put on stage. Ukrainophiles engaged in politics.⁶³

⁶⁰ Shelestyuk, “Review of Literature on the Language Policy,” 943-944.

⁶¹ Kadochnikov, “Languages, Regional Conflicts and Economic Development: Russia,” 548.

⁶² Shelestyuk, 944.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

However, after the Polish uprisings, this tolerant posture of the Russian state began to diminish. The policies of ethnolinguistic repression designed to promote state security in the Polish context were preemptively extended to Ukraine, where requirements were introduced for historical and educational books, the importation of literature from Ukrainian Galicia in the Austro-Hungarian Empire was restricted, and the Ukrainian language was temporarily banned from theaters.⁶⁴ But these preemptive measures actually encouraged greater national consciousness among Ukrainian elites, believing that their identity was gradually being liquidated under Russian control.⁶⁵ This repression in the early days of the Ukrainian project continues in nationalist narratives today.⁶⁶

Meanwhile, as the Russian Empire continued its liberal policies for its eastern subjects, the basic principles of Russian nationalism were formed. The Polish uprisings of 1830-1831 and the spread of the doctrine of nationalism more broadly encouraged scholar and statesman Sergey Uvarov, the Minister of Public Education, to develop the Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality triad that proliferated under the rule of Nicholas I.⁶⁷ While the first two points were clear to all observers, the vagueness of “nationality” eventually encouraged two general interpretations: the first, a conservative reaffirmation of existing imperial structures as represented by the Romanov dynasty, and secondly a romantic nationalist perspective that envisioned Russia and its people on a metaphysical mission to dominate the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires, unite all Slavic people, and bring order to a restless world represented by its European neighbors and their more liberal ideals.⁶⁸ The more extreme and “revolutionary” views of the latter romantic idea, despite retaining high levels of popularity among the

⁶⁴ *Ibid.* Internationally, these measures were also a response to Austria-Hungary’s suppression of Russian speakers in Galicia; this policy was a result of the Balkans rivalry, speaking to the role of identity in great power conflicts.

⁶⁵ Kadochnikov, 548.

⁶⁶ The large movement of Russians into areas annexed after the partition is also an important point of contention.

⁶⁷ А.Л. Котенко, О.В. Мартынюк и А.И. Миллер, «Малоросс».

⁶⁸ Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, “‘Nationality’ in the State Ideology during the Reign of Nicholas I,” *The Russian Review* 19, № 1 (Jan., 1960): 40-41, 44-45, <https://doi.org/10.2307/126191>.

Russian intellectual elite, found little favor among Nicholas I's statesmen and even some disdain as Sergey Uvarov's flirtations with both narratives, culminating in his ambivalence to the Revolutions of 1848, led to a forceful resignation from his position as Minister of Public Education.⁶⁹ Despite the positive nature of Russian nationalism in imperial policy, it ultimately served a negative purpose in addressing the spiritual or ideological holes left by suppressing more organic nationalist tendencies in western parts of the empire that projected ethnic and romantic projects as some Russian elites did. The tendencies characterized by the nationalist projects of western and central Europe challenged both the Russian system and the careful maintenance of its status quo prized by the imperial leadership. Here the empire was arguably intended to exist as a domain of various *peoples* but simultaneously of no *nationalities*. Indeed, nationalism has largely proved fatal to most multiethnic empires, i.e. Austria-Hungary.

While this nationalist policy largely persisted until the end of the Russian Empire, much would change with the economic modernization spurred by capitalism and later socialism during the Soviet era. Most of these ethnolinguistic concerns were initially administrative, establishing the groundwork for further economic reforms, as scholar Denis Kadochnikov details:

*[R]uling the empire as if it was a conglomerate of different nations with varying legal and administrative systems as it had been in the 18th and early 19th centuries was no longer a viable option, primarily for political and economic reasons... Central authorities sought greater control over developments in the periphery of the empire and the expanding of the use of Russian in administrative and social affairs was part of this trend.*⁷⁰

The introduction of universal conscription in 1874, a response to the growing great power rivalry assisted by the Industrial Revolution's "shrinking" of the world due to technological innovations, also encouraged a common

⁶⁹ *Ibid*, 42. The link between this era and today's Russia with thinkers like Aleksandr Dugin should be explored.

⁷⁰ Kadochnikov, "Languages, Regional Conflicts and Economic Development: Russia," 556.

language across the empire.⁷¹ But it would be economic concerns that encouraged Russification the most. New transportation infrastructure allowed for the creation of an integrated internal market that connected various parts of the empire to both itself and foreign markets, increasing the pace of Russia's late industrialization.⁷² The existence of local laws and customs enabled a competitive advantage for regional and local producers but were challenging for the new class of capitalists based in major centers of power that formed strong ties with the traditional elite given their importance to the future of the Russian Empire's power in the global arena.⁷³ Russification played a key role in accommodating these interests, encouraging common standards across the empire that were good for business but marginalized various ethnolinguistic groups through the elimination of local customs in favor of Russian law.⁷⁴ As political discontent grew into the 20th century, Russification was targeted by nationalists and revolutionaries alike.

From the Soviet Era to Present Day

The Bolsheviks under Vladimir Lenin opposed the outlook of Russia's imperial elites, arguing that economic development would bring the various ethnolinguistic groups in the empire closer and that a forceful policy would only make adoption less appealing for the non-Russian population while encouraging divisive sentiments.⁷⁵ This outlook would reflect the policy of the early Soviet Union as well.⁷⁶ Literacy education in native languages was promoted, policies for translating official decrees into local languages were introduced, and the republics of Ukraine, Belarus,

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 556-557.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 573. Alienated intellectuals and elites in Ukraine began to more frequently distance themselves from the Malorussian identity in favor of the Ukrainian one. As the empire weakened, so too did its identity battle in Ukraine.

⁷⁵ Kadochnikov, "Languages, Regional Conflicts and Economic Development: Russia," 558.

⁷⁶ Although an analysis of Ukrainian independence movements is worthwhile, this will be avoided due space issues as well as the fact that the intellectual project of Ukrainian identity was largely completed by the early 20th century.

and Transcaucasia (Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia today) in addition to Russia were created within the USSR.⁷⁷ However, this outlook changed in the 1930s. With the optimism of global revolution under Moscow faded, the logic underpinning the independence of the republics of the USSR shifted from a global orientation to a national one, leading to centralization and less national autonomy for the internal republics.⁷⁸

Map 4: Borders before and after 1917



Source: Gene Thorp, The Washington Post.

Especially important to Ukrainian national identity is the Holodomor, which took place in the Ukrainian SSR during the Soviet Famine of 1931-1934 and was precipitated by the transition from the state capitalist New Economic Policy under Lenin to the five-year plan doctrine under Joseph Stalin.⁷⁹ Similar to the manner in which ethnolinguistic repression in the Russian

⁷⁷ *Ibid*, 559-560. Of particular note here is the “korenizatsiya” (indigenization) policy, existing until the 1930s, that sought to bring national minorities into Soviet sociopolitical life by accommodating their ethnolinguistic identities.

⁷⁸ *Ibid*, 562-563.

⁷⁹ Anne Applebaum, “Holodomor,” *Encyclopedia Britannica*, accessed July 2022, <https://www.britannica.com/event/Holodomor>.

Empire partly took place for reasons of economic modernization, so too did this famine and the policies surrounding it. The collectivization of agriculture was a primary target of Soviet elites during the early 1930s, and given that Ukraine is one of the major bread baskets of Europe, it is no surprise that any agricultural policy enacted by the USSR would disproportionately affect Ukraine. Since Ukrainian was typically the language of the countryside, and people in the countryside tended to be peasants, it is not surprising that the lines between class and ethnic identity were blurred by these conditions. Soviet statesmen emphasized the class dimension due to communist ideology; ways of life related to economic activity reflected historical processes and did not have the level of ethnolinguistic or cultural importance as in, for example, a nationalist perspective. Those who align closer to the latter outlook almost unanimously refer to the process of collectivization and the crushing of resistance against it, unique to Ukraine, as a genocide; preemptive suppression against Ukrainian elites to quell possible nationalist sentiments, resembling that of the Russian Empire, took place to ensure internal security for the completion of collectivization and assists claims of genocide.⁸⁰ The breakdown of production caused by collectivization policies proved to be the main reason behind the deaths of around 4 million Ukrainians, most of whom were in the countryside where these policies were most significant; due to suppression by Soviet elites, it would only be around the collapse of the Soviet Union that these events reentered the national consciousness of most Ukrainians, promoted by the Ukrainian state with a nationalist outlook.⁸¹

Despite the decrease in republics' autonomy under Stalin, the 1936 Soviet Constitution propagated their existences and no official state language was declared. In 1938, however, the Russian language became a required subject in Soviet schools with the expectation that all Soviet graduates would have at least a working knowledge of it; this development marked another key divergence from the optimistic revolutionary vision of the

⁸⁰ *Ibid.* Fears over nationalist sentiments overall also precipitated the end of the “korenizatsiya” policy in this time.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

Bolsheviks.⁸² Like with English today, Russian language education provided a *lingua franca* for Soviet citizens across the increasingly interconnected country in which they lived and minority languages were still supported.⁸³ And as in the Russian Empire, a common language was necessary for the Red Army, which would soon face the biggest land invasion in history from Nazi Germany.⁸⁴ The Great Patriotic War erased negative stigmas around Russian language use in intercultural communication and the Soviet Union's newfound position as a global superpower after the Second World War solidified the use of Russian further.⁸⁵ As the importance of Russian in everyday life grew during the postwar period, policy changes that allowed it to be taught as a primary language oftentimes displaced local ones; this trend was encouraged by some minority populations that saw Russian as a key factor in social mobility while others prioritized native languages against Russification.⁸⁶ By the end of the Soviet Union, over 80 percent of the population spoke Russian fluently, satisfying the needs of modernization; in Ukraine, around 52 percent of students were taught in the Russian language.⁸⁷ Although media in minority languages proliferated, leaders of Ukraine and some other republics prioritized theirs before the realization of independence.

In the background of linguistic Russification during the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union was also the gradual movement of ethnic Russians into areas that now comprise Ukraine. Ethnic Russification generally occurred in areas that are now part of the modern Ukrainian state but were either initially part of the Russian Empire, i.e. the Donbas region, or areas

⁸² Kadochnikov, "Languages, Regional Conflicts and Economic Development: Russia," 564.

⁸³ *Ibid*, 565. For another account of this intermediate policy approach between ethnolinguistic decentralization and Russification, see Peter Blitstein's "Cultural Diversity and the Interwar Conjunction: Soviet Nationality Policy in Its Comparative Context" (2006) <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4148593>.

⁸⁴ *Ibid*. The deportation of various ethnicities without national representation also occurred in response to the war.


⁸⁵ *Ibid*, 566. Meanwhile, areas with Ukrainians first annexed by Austria were given to Soviet Ukraine from Poland.

⁸⁶ *Ibid*, 566-567. However, Russian became *de facto* necessary as students advanced to higher levels of education.

⁸⁷ *Ibid*, 568-569. Russian was certainly learned through other means besides public education in Ukraine.

that neither Russia, Poland-Lithuania, nor the Cossacks occupied, i.e. the Crimean Khanate largely inhabited by Tartars and other Muslims as a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire until becoming conquered by Russia in 1792.⁸⁸ Under imperial elites, this territory became the Novorossiia region that has now been reconstructed by the Russian Federation following its invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The fact that settlements founded under the Russian Empire in largely unpopulated areas became key cities in modern Ukraine with most of Ukraine’s Russian speakers and pro-Russian population contributes to the Russian state’s claims over this region.⁸⁹ However, the fact that Ukrainians are still the primary ethnolinguistic group besides Crimea supports the Ukrainian state’s dominion. It is primarily the convergence of both Russification during modernization and the simultaneous entrance of former Muslim territories into the modern histories of Russia and Ukraine that has laid the groundwork for Ukraine’s division along ethnic, linguistic, and national lines today.

Map 5: Ukraine’s Ethnic and GDP Distributions



Source: Laris Karklis, The Washington Post.

As Ukraine turned from a constituent state in a federal system to an independent country, its ethnolinguistic circumstances would be inherited by

⁸⁸ Ishaan Tharoor and Gene Thorp, “How Ukraine became Ukraine, in 7 maps.”

⁸⁹ Adam Taylor and Laris Karklis, “Novorossiia, the latest historical concept to worry about in Ukraine,” *Washington Post*, 18 April 2014, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/04/18/understanding-novorossiia-the-latest-historical-concept-to-get-worried-about-in-ukraine/>.

centuries of interconnected history with the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. While the project of Ukrainian identity was primarily formalized by 1917, the effects of Russification on this identity as it simultaneously proliferated under the Soviet project largely gave birth to existing dispositions. Although modern Ukrainian elites have persistently tried to make Ukrainian the country's main language both *de jure* and *de facto*, forces in civil society have continued to favor Russian in everyday life, reflecting Lenin's relationship between Russian language adoption and modernization; the resulting outcome is a fundamentally bilingual society in the post-Soviet era.⁹⁰ In politics, the Ukrainian government has pursued an inconsistent language policy due to the majority vote swinging in favor of pro-western and pro-Russian governments on a pendulum, speaking to the country's divided nature; pro-western governments have actively encouraged Ukrainization policies during their time in power, while pro-Russian ones have encouraged the policies of bilingualism and blocked further attempts at Ukrainization.⁹¹ The leading pro-Russian Party of Regions that legalized the regional use of Russian in 2012 sparked a series of intense debates that revealed this divide even further:

*Ukrainian society was literally subdivided into two 'camps': on the one hand, lamentations about 'discrimination' against Ukrainian and the 'threat' posed by Russian as the second state language, on the other hand, claims about Russian-speakers' 'vulnerable' position and their unequal status to Ukrainians were also widespread in Ukraine.*⁹²

These mutually contradicting views of oppression reached a climax in the Euromaidan of 2014.

⁹⁰ Ksenia Maksimovtsova, "Ukrainian vs. Russian? The Securitization of Language-Related Issues in Ukrainian Blogs and on News Websites," *East European Politics and Societies and Cultures* 34, No 2 (May 2020): 375-376, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0888325419870235>.

⁹¹ *Ibid*, 376.

⁹² Maksimovtsova, 376.

Map 6: Unrest in Ukraine after the Euromaidan



Source: National Geographic.

After years of conflictual relations between these two general camps in Ukrainian society, tensions would help spark a massive wave of protests against President Viktor Yanukovich of the Party of Regions over his rejection of an EU trade deal for a Russian one lacking politically risky austerity measures and upholding the status quo.⁹³ Despite the attractiveness of the Russian offer at that time, this rejection happened in the midst of gradual

⁹³ Jamila Trindle, "The Loan That Launched A Crisis," *Foreign Policy*, 21 February 2014, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/02/21/the-loan-that-launched-a-crisis/>.

successes by pro-western forces to bring Ukraine closer to the European Union; those opposed to Yanukovych and his party viewed this as a major setback, leading to, alongside valid evidence of corruption, the beginning of protests in late 2013 that escalated in violence until pro-western forces in Kyiv successfully deposed the government in early 2014.⁹⁴ Unsurprisingly, the western half of Ukraine, namely areas with nationalist, pro-western, and anti-communist views that were annexed by the Soviet Union after the Second World War, disproportionately propagated the Euromaidan movement.⁹⁵ Indeed, prior to crackdowns on protesters that damaged the credibility of Yanukovych's government, research conducted by an NGO based in Kyiv found that only half of Ukrainian citizens supported the movement overall.⁹⁶ It is thus also unsurprising that pro-Russian groups inside Ukraine protested and even revolted against the new government, consistent with the historical and ethnolinguistic trends outlined above.⁹⁷

Conclusion

From the collapse of the Rus' as a political entity following the Mongol invasions, the East Slavs became ethnolinguistically divided along the shifting borders of the Golden Horde, Poland, and Lithuania. Over a period of around 400 years, two separate identities in the form of the Russians and the Ruthenians developed from Old East Slavic. Although the former identity largely became uniform due to the centralized nature of the Russian state, the latter formed under persistent external pressures due to its subjection to Poland-Lithuania. These pressures of both passive and active assimilation gradually produced the Ruthenian language. Furthermore, the lack of its formalization by institutions, demographic instability, and

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹⁵ Dan Peleschuk, "How western Ukraine is driving a revolution," *The World*, 28 January 2014, <https://theworld.org/stories/2014-01-28/how-western-ukraine-driving-revolution>.

⁹⁶ "Half of Ukrainians don't support Kyiv Euromaidan, R&B poll," *Interfax-Ukraine*, 30 December 2013, <https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/184540.html>.

⁹⁷ Eve Conant, "A Cease-fire Takes Hold in Ukraine as Territorial Questions Linger," *National Geographic*, 6 September 2014, <https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/article/140905-ukraine-cease-fire-russia-invasion-geography-history>.

repression tied to political circumstances contributed to the further generation of the Ukrainian and Belarusian languages out of Ruthenian by the start of the 19th century. Here the evolution of the Cossacks to the south of Poland-Lithuania and Russia between the 16th and 18th centuries assisted offshoot of Ruthenian that would become inherited as the Ukrainian identity. Once the “Wild West” period of the Cossacks ceased with the conquests of the Russian Empire and the partition of Poland-Lithuania, nearly all of the East Slavs (excluding Galicia until the 20th century) would be reunited again under a single political entity for the first time, though with uneven ethnolinguistic development from earlier centuries that had created notable differences within the East Slavic population in aggregate. And with the rise of nationalism on the horizon, the view defining Poland-Lithuania’s treatment of Ruthenians would later resemble the Russian Empire’s policies towards Ukrainians.

As nationalism emerged across western and central Europe during the late 18th century, this element of modernity would lead to ethnolinguistic identities becoming a matter of internal security for the first time. The attempt to connect the fate of individuals and communities within a state with the interests of elites that controlled it began an irreversible process that states such as the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and its former constituents contended with and still do to this day. Here the organic Cossack identity fused with nationalism among new Ukrainian elites to create the Ukrainian national project, competing with the semi-nationalist Malorussian identity of pro-imperial elites that unified modern Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. As imperial power faded, so too did the latter identity which led to the propagation of the Ukrainian national idea. Meanwhile, in order to promote security, imperial elites reacted to nationalist revolts in western territories such as Poland through repression and revoking the empire’s liberal ethnolinguistic policy to replace it with the promotion of their own “Romanov” nationalism that challenged romantic alternatives. The preemptive extension of this reactive stance to Ukraine backfired, encouraging intellectuals’ national project that would become increasingly popular as confidence in the empire diminished into the 20th century. Russification represents one object of this diminished confidence

that was also motivated by modernization. In order to compete with its industrializing adversaries, imperial elites imposed Russian customs across the empire over local ones towards standardizing administrative processes and promoting the growth of industrial capitalism. Lenin criticized the ethnolinguistic effects of these policies, promoting inclusivity over economic needs. But as the internationalist goals of the USSR crumbled, Soviet elites after Lenin mostly returned to stances of the Russian Empire to consolidate their gains and compete internationally. Both ethnic and linguistic Russification that continued in areas now held by the Ukrainian state ultimately led to its present divisions.

In contrast to suggestions from figures such as United States President Joseph Biden, this analysis will proceed from the assumption that both negative and positive peace in Ukraine may be established without modifying its existing borders.⁹⁸ This first of all requires a recognition of the interests of the Russian ethnolinguistic identity's stakeholders by the Ukrainian identity's stakeholders and vice-versa. With the elimination of the Donbas region as a voting party in the Ukrainian government in 2014, the balance of power has shifted entirely towards pro-western forces that have made reconciliation with pro-Russian separatists as well as the pro-Russian political opposition more difficult.⁹⁹ Since 2020, Donbas separatists have banned the Ukrainian language from official use.¹⁰⁰ And since the Russian invasion began, the Ukrainian government has banned all major pro-Russian and socialist parties.¹⁰¹ Besides obvious threats to democracy in Ukraine, this deterioration of ethnolinguistic relations is not sustainable if the state is to remain intact in its current form. If policy continues to be

⁹⁸ Steven Nelson, "Biden says Ukraine might have to give Russia land in 'negotiated settlement,'" *New York Post*, 3 June 2022, <https://nypost.com/2022/06/03/biden-says-ukraine-might-have-to-give-russia-land/>.

⁹⁹ The failure of both Minsk agreements leading up to the Russian invasion contributes to this position.

¹⁰⁰ Halya Coynash, "Ukrainian stripped of official language status in Russian proxy Donbas 'republic,'" *Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group*, 11 March 2020, <https://khpg.org/en/1583536107>.

¹⁰¹ Michael W. Chapman, "Ukraine Bans Main Opposition Political Party, Assets and Property Seized by State," *CNSNews*, 22 June 2022, <https://cnsnews.com/blog/michael-w-chapman/ukraine-bans-main-opposition-political-party-assets-and-property-seized>.

conducted along such parameters, then ethnic cleansing or genocide is possible. The rejection of ethnic nationalism is necessary in favor of the civic nationalism that defined Ukrainian politics before the Euromaidan, especially of the zero-sum thinking that reflects this worldview. The idea that the Russian and Ukrainian identities are in existential opposition to each other is not supported by historical evidence and recognizing their mutually supporting nature may be the only way for Ukraine as we know it to survive.

Famine and Boko Haram Terror: The Unexpected Spoils of Russia's War on Ukraine

Julia STEVERMER

Abstract: The Russian invasion of Ukraine has caused supply-chain disruptions and driven inflation and that threaten to plunge vulnerable regions into famine. The resulting famine is projected to disproportionately impact Nigeria, increasing the threat posed by Boko Haram. Existing literature on Boko Haram terrorism has been reviewed in addition to reports from non-governmental organizations, such as the World Food Programme and intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations. The famine is projected to facilitate domestic recruitment, weaken public faith in the state, and enable transnationalization. Domestic and international policy should be aimed at ensuring vulnerable populations remained fed while preempting and containing security threats. Aid may involve food distributions, cash transfers, and the provision of food in school programs. Domestic peacekeeping measures may include securing roadways and strengthening law enforcement and intelligence-gathering institutions. International peacekeeping may involve monitoring terrorist activity in cyberspace, developing intelligence-sharing structures, and coordinate border control efforts.

Keywords: Boko Haram, War in Ukraine, Nigeria, famine, terrorism

Introduction

When the Russian army commenced its unsanctioned invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, it was clear that the impacts would be time-transcendent and far-reaching. Aside from displacing over nine million Ukrainian civilians and violating the principle of national sovereignty that has governed European politics since World War II, the invasion has caused a food crisis that threatens to plunge millions worldwide into famine.¹⁰² Russia and Ukraine together account for roughly one-fourth of global wheat exports and 12 percent of the calories consumed worldwide.¹⁰³ However, the Russian blockade of key Ukrainian port cities in the Black and Azov Seas has stalled the delivery of 22 million tons of grain bound for the Middle East, North Africa, and the Sahel.¹⁰⁴ These constitute the largest wheat-importing regions worldwide. In addition to causing global market disruptions, the war has driven over 50 percent of the oil price increase and almost 40 percent of the wheat price increase.¹⁰⁵ These price hikes will drive inflation rates and make purchasing foodstuffs prohibitively expensive for the countries most reliant on food imports.

The impending famine is projected to disproportionately impact developing countries, many of whose economies are still recovering from the COVID-19 pandemic. As the fourth largest importer of grain, Nigeria is particularly vulnerable.¹⁰⁶ The World Food Programme reports that as of May 2022, over 77 percent of Nigerian households experienced crisis-level food deprivation.¹⁰⁷ Food scarcity is evaporating household savings

¹⁰² “Global cost-of-living crisis catalyzed by war in Ukraine sending millions into poverty, warns UN Development Programme.” United Nations Development Programme. July 12, 2022.

¹⁰³ “Global cost-of-living crisis catalyzed by war in Ukraine sending millions into poverty, warns UN Development Programme.” United Nations Development Programme. July 12, 2022.

¹⁰⁴ Addressing the Cost-of-Living Crisis in Developing Countries: Poverty and vulnerability projections and policy responses.” United Nations Development Programme. July 2022.

¹⁰⁵ “The Russian War in Ukraine and Its Impact on Africa.” Eurasia Review.

¹⁰⁶ “Wheat in Nigeria.” The Organization for Economic Complexity. <https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-product/wheat/reporter/nga>.

¹⁰⁷ “WFP Nigeria Situation Report #71.” World Food Programme. May 6, 2022.

and forcing individuals to borrow money.¹⁰⁸ Hunger is particularly acute in the northeast, which is located in the Sahel. Climate change has caused droughts that have destroyed crops and made over two-thirds of households “highly vulnerable” and over one-fourth “moderately vulnerable” to extreme hunger.¹⁰⁹ Market disruptions and price shocks threaten to exacerbate the food shortage and leave millions in need.

The high potential for extreme regional food deprivation is disconcerting because famine endangers not only the health of individuals, but the stability and security of their communities. In the northeastern Nigerian states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa – three of the states most susceptible to food insecurity – Boko Haram has been operating as a terrorist organization since 2002.¹¹⁰ The group became infamous in 2014 when its members kidnapped 276 mostly Christian girls from a state secondary school and published a video of the kidnapping online.¹¹¹ Members use radical Islamic ideology to fuel territorial aspirations, the objective being to implement Sharia law in captured areas. Violent crimes such as suicide bombings, drive-by shooting, and arson have evoked terror in civilian populations and highlighted the inefficacy of governmental response. In 2015, Boko Haram outpaced the Islamic State as the deadliest terrorist organization in the world.¹¹² The United Nations reports that by the end of 2020, Boko Haram, whose Hausa-language name translates to “Western education is sacrilege,” had killed over 350,000 people, and caused indirectly the death of 314,000 many of whom were children.¹¹³ Boko Haram insurgency has contributed

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Bohm, Vera. “Boko Haram.” Boko Haram in 2020. International Institute for Counter-Terrorism. August 1, 2020.

¹¹¹ Campbell, John. “Latest Boko Haram Kidnapping Recalls Chibok in 2014.” Council on Foreign Relations. February 22, 2018.

¹¹² Elkaim, Zachary. “Boko Haram: The Rise, Success, and Continued Efficacy of Insurgency in Nigeria.” International Institute for Counter-Terrorism. 2012.

¹¹³ Sanni, Kunle. “Boko Haram: 350,000 dead in Nigeria – UN.” June 28, 2021. <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/470476-insurgency-has-killed-almost-350000-in-north-east-undp.html>.

immensely to the ranking of Nigeria as the sixth most heavily impacted by terrorism in the Global Terrorism Index.¹¹⁴

Although counterterrorism efforts have helped contain their operations, the looming famine is likely to trigger key socioeconomic risk factors for increased terror activity, such as mass migration, disrupted education, and unemployment. While the impacts of poverty and climate change on terrorist activity are well-researched, the relationship between famine and terrorist activity is less explored. Existing literature frames famine as an outgrowth of the above phenomena rather than a direct causal factor. The following analysis will explore how the famine caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine may increase the threat posed by Boko Haram in Nigeria and the broader Lake Chad region and examine which policies will be most effective in preventing and containing the security crisis. A description of the rise, self-perpetuation, and past governmental response to Boko Haram will be given. This will be followed by a forecast of how the famine will facilitate its domestic and international operations and recruitment strategies. Lastly, a cost-benefit analysis of national and international policy options will be conducted and recommendations made.

The Roots of Boko Haram

Boko Haram attacks became deadlier and more frequent following the extrajudicial killing of leader Mohammed Yusuf by state forces in 2009.¹¹⁵ The continued existence of Boko Haram speaks both to the ineffectiveness of government-led armed intervention and the failure to address the underlying socioeconomic factors driving recruitment. Motivations to join are diverse. However, personal testimonies show common themes: low education, limited economic opportunities, and group grievance¹¹⁶. These factors are side

¹¹⁴ "Global Terrorism Index 2022: Measuring The Impact of Terrorism." *Institute for Economics and Peace*. <https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/GTI-2022-web-09062022.pdf>.

¹¹⁵ Elkaim, Zachary. "Boko Haram: The Rise, Success, and Continued Efficacy of the Insurgency in Nigeria." *International Institute for Counter-Terrorism*. 2012.

¹¹⁶ Adelaja, Adesoji O., Lebo, Abdullahi, Penar, Eva. "Public Opinion on the Root Causes of Terrorism and the Objectives of Terrorists: A Boko Haram Case Study." *Perspectives on Terrorism*, vol. 12,

effects of the cultural, economic, and political divide between southern and northern Nigeria.

Several factors account for these regional disparities. Firstly, British colonial rule left a greater handprint upon the economic, cultural, and political institutions of the south, while northern Nigerians were allowed to remain more or less subject to emirs and their interpretation of Islamic law.¹¹⁷ As a result, standards of education and governance differ across regional boundaries. This has created a foundation for uneven development. For example, UNICEF reports a disparity between attendance rates between southern and northern Nigerian children.¹¹⁸ Only 53 percent of northern Nigerian children attend school.¹¹⁹ Another roughly 30 percent attend Quranic school, which does not include literacy or numeracy requirements.¹²⁰ Lack of education severely curtails economic opportunities, which in turn drives desperation, fuels group grievance, and deprives youth of the critical thinking skills that would otherwise protect them from radical ideology.

Furthermore, southern Nigeria benefits from oil reserves concentrated in the Niger Delta, while northern Nigeria remains even more dependent upon subsistence agriculture.¹²¹ This increases the demand for service-sector industries in the south which tend to be more lucrative than agriculture and animal husbandry. Social factors also drive poverty, and the north leads the south in household size while offering less social welfare protection to citizens.¹²² In addition, climate change drives desertification,

no.3, June 2019. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26453134.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A5af85409a6e7fa84df3608227bd813a&ab_segments=0%2F5SYC-6451%2Fcontrol&origin=&acceptTC=1.

¹¹⁷ Elkaim, Zachary. "Boko Haram: The Rise, Success, and Continued Efficacy of Insurgency in Nigeria." International Institute for Counter-Terrorism. 2012.

¹¹⁸ "Education: Nigeria." UNICEF. <https://www.unicef.org/nigeria/education>.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Fenske, James and Zurimendi, Igor. "Oil and Ethnic Inequality in Nigeria." <https://www.ed.ac.uk/sites/default/files/imports/fileManager/Oil%20and%20Ethnic%20Inequality%20in%20Nigeria.pdf>.

¹²² Dupel, Zuhamman. "Poverty in Nigeria: Understanding and Bridging the Divide Between North and South." Center for Global Development. April 6, 2018. <https://www.cgdev.org/blog/poverty-nigeria-understanding-and-bridging-divide-between-north-and-south>.

which disproportionately disadvantages northern Nigeria, a part of the Sahel. Disruptions in rainfall and diminishing water levels in Lake Chad have resulted in crop failure and reduced fish harvests, endangering the livelihoods of farmers and fishermen.¹²³

Poor border protection has enabled Boko Haram to transnationalize. The failure of government-driven border closures to stem smuggling in 2019 and 2020 belies the fact that the state has yet to implement effective border control measures. The effects of weak border security are spilling over into neighboring countries. Nigeria shares a 1,227-mile border with Cameroon and a 999-mile border with Niger, both of which are highly porous.¹²⁴ This has allowed militants to traffic arms and people. Illegal border crossings connected Nigeria to Libya through Niger, and in 2015, militants were discovered using this highway to join the Islamic State.¹²⁵ In addition, Boko Haram attacks have become more frequent in Cameroon. In 2020, Cameroon experienced a 90 percent increase in attacks, likely attributable to clashes along the border between Boko Haram insurgents and Nigerian security forces.¹²⁶ During this period, Niger experienced about 92 such attacks, and twelve occurred in Chad.¹²⁷

The organization used the internet to spread anti-government and anti-Western propaganda. Their videos focused more on inspiring global terror than on promoting recruitment. Interestingly, it should be noted that during this period of transnationalization, the language in which then-leader Abubakar Shekau addressed the public shifted from the local Kanuri and Hausa languages to Arabic, ostensibly to voice support for ISIS.¹²⁸ In turn,

¹²³ "Fighting Famine." World Food Programme. <https://www.wfp.org/fight-famine>.

¹²⁴ Eveslage, Benjamin S. "Clarifying Boko Haram's Transnational Intentions, Using Content Analysis of Public Statements in 2012." *Perspectives on Terrorism*. October 2013.

¹²⁵ Ogbuogu, Jennifer. "Analysing the Threat of Boko Haram and the ISIS Alliance in Nigeria." *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses*. September 2015.

¹²⁶ "Boko Haram Violence Against Civilians Spiking in Northern Cameroon." *African Center for Strategic Studies*. November 13, 2020. <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/boko-haram-violence-against-civilians-spiking-in-northern-cameroon/>.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

¹²⁸ Mahmoud, Omar. "Local, Global, or in Between? Boko Haram's Messaging, Strategy, Membership, and Support Networks." *Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point*. 2018.

the Islamic State recognized Boko Haram as the West African arm of its terrorist apparatus in 2015.¹²⁹ However, the organization splintered into different factions after ISIL attempted to replace then-leader Abubakar Shekau with Abu Musar al-Barnawi. Boko Haram recruitment was not reported to expand broadly outside of Nigeria, but these events demonstrate that members are politically savvy and capable of utilizing on-the-ground resources to gain tactical advantage and the media to support its territorial aspirations. Although Boko Haram operations remain largely domestic, a global famine, whose effects will be enumerated below, is likely to engender sufficient instability to allow members to cross borders easily and reclaim its space in online media rhetoric.

Impact of Famine on Boko Haram Terror

It has been claimed both that food insecurity either does not factor into armed conflict or is but one link in a network of interlocking causal elements. However, as seen in the Arab Spring, price-hike induced food scarcity directly engenders an array of social and political challenges that prime countries for destabilization and conflict. These challenges exacerbate the threat posed by Boko Haram by facilitating the recruitment of new militants, decreasing faith in the state, and enabling transnational activities.

The famine will drive up recruitment by incentivizing new militants to join and provide current militants with opportunities to recruit. Hunger drives desperation, and vulnerable youth have historically joined Boko Haram as a bread-winning measure.¹³⁰ A student affiliated with the Nigerian branch of American University, when asked why he participated in the school program, responded, "It was this or Boko Haram."¹³¹ Youth facing adversity are often allured into joining by the promise of a better afterlife.¹³²

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Onuoha, Freedom C. "Why Do Youth Join Boko Haram?" US Institute of Peace. 2014.

¹³¹ Hansen, William W. "Poverty and "Economic Deprivation Theory": Street Children, Qur'anic Schools/almajirai and the Dispossessed as a Source of Recruitment for Boko Haram and other Religious, Political and Criminal Groups in Northern Nigeria." *Perspectives on Terrorism*. October 2016.

¹³² Ibid.

Furthermore, food insecurity and malnutrition disrupt education. The significant relationship between food insecurity and poor education outcomes is particularly visible in rural areas. The FAO reports that famine increases rates of student absenteeism and decreases overall school attendance.¹³³ Youth in subsistence economies view hunger as increasing the opportunity costs of staying in school when they could be otherwise supporting their families.¹³⁴ In addition, hunger causes malnutrition, which is found to adversely impact the ability of students to learn, leading to poorer overall performance.¹³⁵ Low education levels and illiteracy limit job opportunities for youth and hinder economic mobility.¹³⁶ Terrorist organizations take advantage of both unemployment and limited economic opportunities to persuade young people to join.¹³⁷ This forms a component of the aforementioned join-for-bread phenomenon.

Furthermore, uneducated and illiterate youth are deprived of the critical thinking capabilities that could otherwise protect them from indoctrination. Poorly educated and uneducated students are more likely to accept extremist religious ideology, especially since they lack the capabilities to read holy texts.¹³⁸ The nature of the famine as an outgrowth of transport disruptions and price hikes is likely to increase disaffection with the Western global market system, making the anti-Western rhetoric characteristic of Boko Haram more appealing.

Despite experiencing an increase in poverty levels in 2017, the Nigerian government has maintained control of the territory reclaimed from Boko Haram in 2015. Notwithstanding, the Fragile States Index ranked Nigeria

¹³³ Burchi, Francesco and De Muro, Pasquale. "Education for Rural People and Food Security: A Cross-Cultural Analysis." 2007.

¹³⁴ WFP USA, 2017. *Winning the Peace: Hunger and Instability*. World Food Program USA. Washington, D.C.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*

¹³⁷ Onuoha, Freedom C. "Why Do Youth Join Boko Haram?" US Institute of Peace. 2014.

¹³⁸ Hansen, William W. "Poverty and "Economic Deprivation Theory": Street Children, Qur'anic Schools/almajirai and the Dispossessed as a Source of Recruitment for Boko Haram and other Religious, Political and Criminal Groups in Northern Nigeria." *Perspectives on Terrorism*. October 2016.

the sixteenth most fragile state in 2022.¹³⁹ Among the most glaring weaknesses pertinent to the terror discussion were the ineffective security apparatus, declining and uneven economic development, and underdeveloped public services systems.¹⁴⁰ Famine demonstrates the inability of the state to provide the food aid or monetary assistance necessary to keep the poor fed or provide them with the wherewithal to buy food for themselves. These impacts are cyclical. By limiting the economic opportunities of those impacted, famine cuts tax revenue, strains state treasuries, and thus undermines the efforts of governments to respond to humanitarian crises.

The President Buhari administration has spear-headed numerous social security programs. However, citizens are skeptical. Individuals are less likely to focus on improvements to social security apparatuses if they remain incapable of alleviating present suffering. Furthermore, Buhari is due to conclude his eight-year presidency after the 2023 elections, and the social policy agenda of his successor cannot be known. The inability of the government to meet the needs of the citizens will engender a loss in public faith as well as dissatisfaction and possible resentment towards the state. This may undermine the legitimacy of the Nigerian state. Citizens may come to see the militant regime as a preferable alternative. Furthermore, militants may be emboldened to expand operations domestically, given that Nigerian security forces have been historically unsuccessful in rooting out Boko Haram.

State inefficacy will most probably heighten human suffering and cause destabilization across the Lake Chad region that could allow Boko Haram to increase the frequency of its militant activities abroad, expand its territory, and more frequently cross national borders. Sourcing over 40 percent of its wheat imports from Russia and Ukraine, Cameroon is likely to experience crippling inflation that will prevent well over half of the population that is already food insecure from buying staple foods.¹⁴¹ While Boko Haram

¹³⁹ "Global Data." Fragile States Index 2022. <https://fragilestatesindex.org/global-data/>.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ "Ukraine/Russia: As War Continues, Africa Food Crisis Looms." Human Rights Watch. April 28, 2022. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/28/ukraine/russia-war-continues-africa-food-crisis-looms>.

membership has remained largely Nigerian, it is possible that hunger will provide militants with an ample body of recruits in surrounding countries willing to join for food or financial provisions. Without robust border security, militants would have easy access to blighted communities abroad wherein rhetoric can be spread and training initiated.

Policy Recommendations

The complex nature of this security threat necessitates a multidimensional response. Fundamentally, eradicating Boko Haram and affiliated groups would require a large-scale overhaul of existing political, educational, and religious institutions along with economic diversification initiatives and a robust anti-corruption campaign. However, these are not realistic targets within the given timeframe, so the present objective is to prevent as much human suffering as possible and curtail the rise in terrorism that will attend the consequent instability. There are two axes within which policy options can fall. The first is between national and international policy. The second axis is between policies that mitigate hunger and policies that suppress conflict – in other words, those that target the cause, and those that target the effect.

Domestic fiscal policy should focus on mitigating hunger in low-income areas, as the very poor tend to suffer most acutely. The UN recommends implementing targeted cash transfers rather than blanket subsidies to prevent individuals from falling below the poverty line. The poorest 40 percent would reap 12 percent of the benefits of subsidies, but 60 percent of the benefits of cash transfers.¹⁴² Implemented multinationally, cash transfers would prevent 75 percent of the vulnerable population from falling below the poverty line.¹⁴³ Subsidies or tax cuts, however,

¹⁴² Malina, George Gray, Montoya-Aguirre, María, Ortiz-Juarez, Eduardo. “Addressing the Cost-Of-Living Crisis in Developing Countries: Poverty and vulnerability projections and policy responses.” *United Nations Development Programme*. July 2022. <https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2022-07/Addressing-the-cost-of-living-crisis-in-vulnerable-countries.pdf>.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

would overheat a fiscal budget already drained from responding to shocks caused by the pandemic.¹⁴⁴

The UN points out that without the proper social registry systems and payment mechanisms in place, cash transfers are hard to realize. However, Nigeria has equipped itself to track and aid the most vulnerable with the National Social Register (NSR), an arm of the National Social Safety-Nets Coordinating Office (NASSCO).¹⁴⁵ In December 2021, Nigeria initiated the National Social Safety Net Program Scale-Up (NASSP-SU), funded by a World Bank-approved \$800 million credit from the International Development Association.¹⁴⁶ These cash transfers aimed at stabilizing the economy after an increase in prices and decline of incomes related to the pandemic. To complement the National Social Register, the Rapid Response Register (RRR) was created.¹⁴⁷ In the battle against imminent famine, the tracking processes developed for the Rapid Response Register could be used to identify vulnerable households, although data would have to be re-collected. Providing the large-scale assistance needed to the most vulnerable would likely require cooperation with the World Bank. The UN reports that the World Bank is considering a debt moratorium for countries most in need.¹⁴⁸

The World Food Programme proposes establishing school feeding programs in order to increase attendance. In 2016, the Buhari administration launched the National Home Grown School Feeding Programme (NHGSFP), which invested 70 naira (currency in Nigeria, 1 USD is approx. 420 naira

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ "Learn more about the NSR." National Social Safety-Nets Coordinating Office. <http://nassp.gov.ng/learn-more-about-the-nsr/>.

¹⁴⁶ "Nigeria to Scale-up Delivery of Social Assistance to 10.2 Million Households." The World Bank. December 16, 2021. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2021/12/16/nigeria-to-scale-up-delivery-of-social-assistance-to-10-2-million-households>.

¹⁴⁷ "Nigeria steps forward its Rapid Response Register." National Social Safety-Nets Coordinating Office. <http://nassp.gov.ng/nigeria-steps-forward-its-rapid-response-register/>.

¹⁴⁸ Malina, George Gray, Montoya-Aguirre, María, Ortiz-Juarez, Eduardo. "Addressing the Cost-Of-Living Crisis in Developing Countries: Poverty and vulnerability projections and policy responses." *United Nations Development Programme*. July 2022. <https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2022-07/Addressing-the-cost-of-living-crisis-in-vulnerable-countries.pdf>

as of August, 2022) per child per day into the provision of one stable, nutritious meal to students in need.¹⁴⁹ In an interview with the Nigeria Health Watch, a primary school teacher found that absenteeism plummeted when the school feeding program was initiated because the knowledge that they would receive a meal incentivized students to come to class.¹⁵⁰ Proper nutrition also improved academic performance. In addition, the NHGSFP provided jobs to cooks, drivers, and other members of the supply-chain while supporting local farmers and vendors.¹⁵¹ This cuts unemployment rates and provides support to the agricultural sector that is particularly necessary as imported foodstuffs become scarce. Therefore, the NHGSFP has the capacity to level a multifaceted assault upon key socioeconomic risk factors for terrorism recruitment.

However, the NHGSFP has been confronted with cost-related difficulties since its inception. Cooks are few and underpaid.¹⁵² Insufficient funding has complicated efforts to keep pace with rising prices, and cooks admit to using their own money to buy food needed to feed the students.¹⁵³ In 2022, the federal government increased the allowance to 100 naira per child per day.¹⁵⁴ However, critics fear that this raise may yet be insufficient to meet the needs of rising prices, particularly in a post-invasion economy. Many school feeding programs are funded by national governments, but projected increases in expenditures may overburden state budgets.

¹⁴⁹ Lawal, Iyabo, Salau, Gbenga, , Njoku, Lawrence, Godwin, Ann, Adewale, Murtala, Akingboye, Oluwaseun Agbor, Timothy, Agosi Todo, Tina, Agboluaje, Rotimi. "States lament as FG's school feeding programme flops." *The Guardian*. May 13, 2022. <https://guardian.ng/features/states-lament-as-fgs-school-feeding-programme-flops/>.

¹⁵⁰ "Feeding the Future – The Nigerian School Feeding Story." *Nigeria Health Watch*. May 9, 2022. https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=8wmtr_BljDQ.

¹⁵¹ "Feeding the Future – The Nigerian School Feeding Story." *Nigeria Health Watch*. May 9, 2022. https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=8wmtr_BljDQ.

¹⁵² Lawal, Iyabo, Salau, Gbenga, , Njoku, Lawrence, Godwin, Ann, Adewale, Murtala, Akingboye, Oluwaseun Agbor, Timothy, Agosi Todo, Tina, Agboluaje, Rotimi. "States lament as FG's school feeding programme flops." *The Guardian*. May 13, 2022. <https://guardian.ng/features/states-lament-as-fgs-school-feeding-programme-flops/>.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ "FG Increases School Feeding Consumption to N100 Per Child." *TVC News Nigeria*. February 23, 2022. <https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=RUMM-ka44gE>.

Nigerian officials report that donations from non-governmental organizations have been especially helpful sources of funding.¹⁵⁵ Of particular interest is the possibility of borrowing from the World Bank, which has previously helped fund social welfare initiatives in Nigeria.

Peacekeeping in the northeast requires a robust coalition of law enforcement and intelligence-gathering institutions. Nigerian security forces lost credibility after perpetrating a myriad of human rights abuses in an attempt to root out Boko Haram militants. Because local police forces lacked the wherewithal to store traditional evidence, such as fingerprints, officers relied on confessions, which are often forced. Suspected terrorists were often executed without a trial.¹⁵⁶ Furthermore, Nigerian intelligence-gathering systems are underdeveloped, disjointed, and are even prone to infighting. The entire Nigerian police force has less than 70 intelligence analysts, and the military has less than 100.¹⁵⁷ Compounding the inefficacy, rampant corruption, and a history of past repressions, infiltration by Boko Haram militants has further weakened operating capabilities and public faith in law enforcement and intelligence-gathering structures.

Critics suggest increasing funding for, as well as cooperation between, the Nigerian Police Force, the State Security Service, and the National Intelligence Agency.¹⁵⁸ Funds should be invested into recruiting and training officers, who at the moment are often “barely literate” and poorly trained.¹⁵⁹ Nigeria should invest in evidence-collection technology and the establishment of a criminal database.¹⁶⁰ Similarly, both civilians and law enforcement officers may be recruited and trained to fill the role of intelligence

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Elkaim, Zachary. “Boko Haram: The Rise, Success, and Continued Efficacy of the Insurgency in Nigeria.” International Institute for Counter-Terrorism. 2012.

¹⁵⁷ Omoniyi, Tosin. “Analysis: Intelligence failure compounding insecurity in Nigeria.” April 19, 2021. <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/456057-analysis-intelligence-failure-compounding-insecurity-in-nigeria.html>

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

analysts.¹⁶¹ Their training would require an understanding of computer and internet software.¹⁶²

Non-governmental organizations may provide both in-kind food aid and cash-based food assistance. The World Food Programme has shifted from providing food aid as a top-down support to providing a combination of food aid and food assistance in the form of electronic funds, bank notes, or vouchers.¹⁶³ These cash transfers comprise one-third of all WFP assistance.¹⁶⁴ Food aid continues to offer benefits to hungry communities, and cash transfers grants individuals the agency to purchase goods according to their tastes and seasonality.¹⁶⁵

Food distribution relies on reliable transport channels. In 2020, Boko Haram and the affiliated Islamic State of West Africa (ISWA) launched 67 attacks upon highways within Borno State alone, killing 259 Nigerians and accounting for 90% of kidnappings perpetrated by the group that year.¹⁶⁶ Both civilian and military vehicles were targeted. Boko Haram has been attacking northeastern highways more frequently, and operations have expanded on a smaller-scale into Cameroon.¹⁶⁷ Highway attacks complicate efforts to safely and punctually deliver food aid. Therefore, the federal government must secure interstate thoroughfares. Attacks persist despite military presence along targeted roads. The military may benefit from increasing intelligence operations, though the local contacts may be reticent to come forward with information about an impending attack, fearing reprisal. The WFP has previously flown food aid into regions in Nigeria deemed too

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ "Food assistance: cash and in-kind." World Food Programme. <https://www.wfp.org/food-assistance>.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ "Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa Target Nigeria's Highways." *African Center for Strategic Studies*. December 15, 2020. <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/boko-haram-iswa-target-nigeria-highways/>.

¹⁶⁷ "Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa Target Nigeria's Highways." *African Center for Strategic Studies*. December 15, 2020. <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/boko-haram-iswa-target-nigeria-highways/>.

dangerous to enter by car.¹⁶⁸ While this option should definitely be considered regarding the delivery of outside food aid, reconnecting the states of Yobe and Borno remains essential to effectively responding to public need.

International support of the Nigerian military has been successful against Boko Haram insurgency. In 2015, an agreement was made to deploy 7,500 African Union troops from Niger, Cameroon, Chad, and Benin to combat insurgency. Consequently, the Nigerian military began reclaiming key cities, and Boko Haram operations shifted from urban centers to the Sambisa Forest. Several strategies are available to neutralize violent extremism before international military support becomes necessary. First, media platforms should remain unified in their condemnation of terrorist attacks. Social media sites should strictly monitor the publication of extremist media. Rhetoric encouraging violence should be flagged and removed, and the associated accounts should be deleted. As stated above, Boko Haram used the media less as a recruitment tactic than as a tool to inspire fear and leach public faith from the government.¹⁶⁹

An agreement between states across the Lake Chad region to share intelligence would provide needed support to the Nigerian state. In addition to the domestic intelligence reforms suggested above, Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger should agree to share intelligence on Boko Haram operations in their spheres of influence. This would allow border security forces to coordinate timely interceptions and domestic law enforcement bodies to preempt attacks. This should coincide with multilateral border security agreements, which may be mediated by the African Union. States should commit to fortifying checkpoints along cross-national roadways and increasing intelligence operations along their borders, especially at their most porous points.

¹⁶⁸ "Fighting famine." World Food Programme. <https://www.wfp.org/fight-famine>.

¹⁶⁹ Mahmoud, Omar. "Local, Global, or in Between? Boko Haram's Messaging, Strategy, Membership, and Support Networks." Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point. 2018.

Conclusion

Boko Haram is able to self-perpetuate due to the socioeconomic problems related to uneven regional development, such as poverty, poor education, and unemployment. The famine caused by the Russo-Ukrainian War will increase the threat posed by Boko Haram by enabling members to recruit new militants, highlighting the weakness of the state, and facilitating transnationalization. Effective policy will combat food insecurity, the immediate cause of the increased security threat, and strengthen traditional and non-traditional security structures as a means of containing the threat. Domestic aid may include targeted cash transfers and school feeding programs, while domestic peacekeeping will require coordinating law enforcement institutions, countering insurgent infiltration, and securing roadways. On the international scale, in-kind aid should be offered to northeastern Nigerians, and a debt moratorium may help eliminate the stress on the government. International peacekeeping should entail insurgent activity online, creating a framework for intelligence-sharing, and securing the borders between Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon.

This paper focused primarily on the impacts of the famine, an isolated event, on the threat posed by an existing terrorist organization. However, further research is still needed to understand how famine may facilitate the formation of new militant groups in Nigeria, the broader Lake Chad region, or the Sahel as a whole. Similarly, resource scarcity has historically driven conflict between Fulani herdsman and sedentary Nigerian farmers, and it may be profitable to analyze how this dynamic will be impacted by constraints on food supply. Lastly, it would be useful to analyze how Russian disinformation campaigns in Africa may be used by militant groups to support anti-Western rhetoric in an emerging multi-polar world order.

Economic Sanctions and Factors Inhibiting Success: An Analysis of Recent Sanctions Against the Russian Federation

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Abstract: This paper seeks to analyze why economic sanctions implemented in 2022 by the West have so far failed to succeed in pressuring the Russian Federation to withdraw its military forces out of Ukrainian territory by examining the factors that influence their effectiveness. The paper first provides a brief history of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and the events leading up to the sanctions imposed on Russia in 2022. It then provides an overview of the sanctions imposed on Russia in 2014 as a means of comparison with those currently being implemented. The paper then identifies and analyzes the factors that contribute to the shortcomings of sanctions. Finally, the paper concludes by providing policy recommendations with the intention of making sanctions more effective.

Keywords: Economic Sanctions, Russian Invasion, Ukraine

Introduction

Since the Invasion of the Crimean Peninsula, the West's main tool against Russian aggression has been economic sanctions. Thus far, these sanctions have not deterred the Russian invasion. This paper seeks to explain this conflict, understand factors as to why western economic sanctions thus far have not been effective in achieving political goals, and discusses policy recommendations. In this paper, economic sanctions are defined and understood as the following:

*The withdrawal of customary trade and financial relations for foreign and security-policy purposes. Sanctions may be comprehensive, prohibiting commercial activity with regard to an entire country, like the long-standing U.S. embargo of Cuba, or they may be targeted, blocking transactions by and with particular businesses, groups, or individuals.*¹⁷⁰

Before examining the effects of 2022 sanctions, this paper first provides a brief historical background of the Russian-Ukrainian war. It then proceeds by examining the effects of 2014 sanctions and identifies why they remained limited. The paper then analyzes the current situation of sanctions imposed on Russia and why they continue to have a minimal impact on the Russian economy, failing to thwart the country's efforts in Ukraine. Finally, the paper concludes by providing several policy recommendations to improve the effectiveness of sanctions.

A brief history of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict

The Russian-Ukrainian conflict dates back to 1991 with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Upon gaining independence in 1991, the Russian government has struggled to come to terms with the idea of Ukraine as a sovereign nation.¹⁷¹ According to Scaliger,

¹⁷⁰ Masters, Jonathan. 2019. "What Are Economic Sanctions?" Council on Foreign Relations. August 12, 2019. <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-are-economic-sanctions>.

¹⁷¹ Golanski, Robert. "One Year after Minsk II: Consequences and Progress." *European View* 15, no. 1 (2016): 67–76. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12290-016-0398-2>.

*Both cultures [Russian and Ukrainian] regard the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv, as their ancestral heartland, a view vindicated by a shared history and language that only diverged in the Middle Ages. Even today, the Russian and Ukrainian languages are so similar as to be mutually comprehensible, and both peoples are predominantly Orthodox Christian. Moreover, large swaths of land in Ukraine, as recognized internationally, are almost entirely ethnic Russian.*¹⁷²

It is easy to understand why Russians believe they have a claim over parts of Ukraine; ethnically Russian people heavily populate the eastern part of the country. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, many Ukrainians have desired to move closer in relations to Western Europe rather than Russia, more specifically joining NATO and the European Union. When the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries i.e. Estonia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Latvia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Poland, and Romania joined NATO, Russia became worried that NATO was encroaching on its “sphere of influence”.¹⁷³ Western officials insisted soon after the dissolution of the Soviet Union that NATO was not a threat to Russian influence, but these efforts have not convinced Russia, with many of its former allies growing closer to the western world.¹⁷⁴

Russian fears were further triggered following the removal of pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovich. In 2013, former President Yanukovich rejected an “Association Agreement with the European Union.”¹⁷⁵ In response, pro-European protests broke out in major Ukrainian cities, including Kyiv. According to Kulyk, many Ukrainians perceived this action as “a closure of Ukraine’s ‘door to Europe’ and, accordingly, ‘robbing the Ukrainian people of a future’”.¹⁷⁶ When the Ukrainian Special Forces attacked and assaulted peaceful protestors, the protests evolved into a “mass action

¹⁷² Scaliger, Charles. “RUSSIA VS. UKRAINE IS IT OUR FIGHT?” *The New American* (Belmont, Mass.) 38, no. 3(2022): 10–16.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁵ Kulyk, Volodymyr. “Ukrainian Nationalism Since the Outbreak of Euromaidan.” *Ab imperio* 2014, no. 3 (2014): 94–122.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

of national scope”.¹⁷⁷ These protests, referred to as the Euromaidan, ultimately paved the way for the Revolution of Dignity, the uprising that led to the removal of President Viktor Yanukovich.

Following the removal of President Viktor Yanukovich, Russia started a “humanitarian” project in Crimea in order to “protect” the ethnically Russian people who lived in Crimea, a peninsula in the south of Ukraine.¹⁷⁸ The Russian Government claimed that “neo-Nazis and other far-right groups were now going to commit violence against ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in Ukraine.”¹⁷⁹ Citing these reasons, Russia annexed the peninsula of Crimea using the force of unmarked Russian troops.¹⁸⁰ This action constituted a violation of the Budapest Memorandum¹⁸¹ by failing to respect the independence, sovereignty, and borders of Ukraine.

As Russia proceeded to annex Crimea, pro-Russian separatists clashed with pro-Ukrainian forces. In eastern Ukraine, in the Donbas region, the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Luhansk People’s Republic declared independence from Ukraine and claimed swaths of the region as their territory.¹⁸² These states are understood to be “Russian proxy pseudo-states” recognized as a tool in supporting Russian claims over Ukraine.¹⁸³ In 2014, the Minsk Agreement was signed, establishing a ceasefire agreement between pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian forces. This agreement however, did little

¹⁷⁷ Shveda, Yuriy, and Joung Ho Park. “Ukraine’s Revolution of Dignity: The Dynamics of Euro-maidan.” *Journal of Eurasian studies* 7, no. 1 (2016): 85–91.

¹⁷⁸ Chappell, Bill, and Mark Memmott. “Putin Says Those Aren’t Russian Forces in Crimea.” NPR, March 4, 2014. <https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/03/04/285653335/putin-says-those-arent-russian-forces-in-crimea>.

¹⁷⁹ Biersack, John, and Shannon O’Lear. “The Geopolitics of Russia’s Annexation of Crimea: Narratives, Identity, Silences, and Energy.” *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 55, no. 3 (2014): 247–69. <https://doi.org/10.1080/15387216.2014.985241>.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁸¹ The 1994 Budapest Memorandum, also referred to as the “Memorandum on Security Assurances” is an agreement signed by Ukraine, who at that time agreed to reduce its nuclear weapon arsenal to zero in return for the security assurances of Russia, the USA, and the United Kingdom should Ukraine become the target of any future aggressions.

¹⁸² Golanski, “One Year after Minsk II: Consequences and Progress”

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*

to stop fighting in the area. After fighting resumed, a second Minsk Agreement was signed, however it has never been “implemented in full”.¹⁸⁴

In 2021, Russia began to build up its military forces on the border of Ukraine, close to Donetsk and Luhansk.¹⁸⁵ This buildup of forces was explained away by Russia as a military training exercise.¹⁸⁶ However, by late February 2022, it was apparent that Russia was lying when the Russian military, with over 200,000 troops, invaded the western region of Ukraine in what was described by them as a “peacekeeping mission”.¹⁸⁷ In actuality, these troops sought to take over Ukraine.¹⁸⁸

2014 Sanctions and their Effectiveness

In response to the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014, the European Union introduced economic sanctions. These sanctions included embargoes on exports of equipment for oil drilling, the military, and engineering.¹⁸⁹ 2014 sanctions also focused more on the Crimean region, rather than Russia as a whole.¹⁹⁰ These sanctions targeted “individuals and entities involved in annexation, as well as anyone doing business in or with Crimea.”¹⁹¹ In 2015, the United States introduced sanctions on Russian banks such as VEB, Bank of Moscow, VTB Bank, Rosselkhozbank,

¹⁸⁴ Menkiszak, Marek. “Russia’s Minsk Dilemma.” *The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs* 26, no. 4 (2017): 70–85.

¹⁸⁵ Masters, Jonathan. “Ukraine: Conflict at the Crossroads of Europe and Russia.” Council on Foreign Relations. Council on Foreign Relations, 2022. <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-crossroads-europe-and-russia#chapter-title-0-5>.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁹ Shirov, A. A., A. A. Yantovskii, and V. V. Potapenko. “Evaluation of the Potential Effect of Sanctions on the Economic Development of Russia and the European Union.” *Studies on Russian Economic Development* 26, no. 4 (2015): 317–26. <https://doi.org/10.1134/s1075700715040103>.

¹⁹⁰ DuBard, Adam. “War in Europe: 2014 and Now: Will Sanctions Change Putin’s Calculations?” Friedrich Naumann Foundation, 2022. <https://www.freiheit.org/2014-and-now-will-sanctions-change-putins-calculations>.

¹⁹¹ DuBard, “War in Europe: 2014 and Now: Will Sanctions Change Putin’s Calculations?”.

and Gazprombank.¹⁹² These sanctions severely restricted their access to the US financial system.¹⁹³ Additionally, this round of sanctions also targeted large Russian energy companies, Rostneft and Novatek.¹⁹⁴ It is worth noting the contrast between EU and US sanctions. The US directly sanctioned Russian Energy companies i.e. Rostneft and Novatek, while the EU chose to not go that route. This small detail highlights how, in 2014, the EU was not willing to cut off imports of Russian oil and gas due to their dependence on Russian pipelines. As seen and shown, European countries cannot easily change their dependence on Russian gas in the short run.¹⁹⁵

Initially, it was assumed that the economic sanctions were having their intended effect when the Russian economy went through a recession between 2014 and 2015. However, according to analysts, it cannot be assumed that there is a link between the two. Many other factors could have caused this recession, most notably the fall in gas prices from \$115 to \$35 per barrel.¹⁹⁶ Furthermore, the International Monetary Fund found that only 1.0-1.5 percent of Russia's economic output was reduced as a result of western sanctions.¹⁹⁷

As observed, 2014 western sanctions were not correlated with a large economic impact to Russia's economy. But what about politically? According to the Council on Foreign Relations, "[Sanctions] didn't appear to have much immediate effect, disappointing policymakers who hoped sanctions would deter Russian interventionism. Russia is still active in Ukraine."¹⁹⁸

¹⁹² Oxenstierna, Susanne, and Per Olsson. "The Economic Sanctions against Russia: Impact and Prospects of Success." *Swedish Defence Research Agency*, September 2015.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ Chatzky, Andrew. "Have Sanctions on Russia Changed Putin's Calculus?" Council on Foreign Relations. Council on Foreign Relations, May 2019. <https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/have-sanctions-russia-changed-putins-calculus>.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

Effectiveness of 2022 Sanctions

As highlighted in the previous section, sanctions in 2014 were not severe, as they did not ban Russia from SWIFT, and focused more on Crimea than the Russian economy. These sanctions did do damage, as stated before, but ultimately did not achieve its goal of convincing Russia to withdraw from Crimea.¹⁹⁹

Learning from the experience of 2014 sanctions, 2022 sanctions put in place in the wake of the February invasion of Ukraine are more intensive. The 2022 sanctions removed large Russian banks from SWIFT, which prevented Russian banks from being able to do international transactions.²⁰⁰ The European Union also is implementing a ban of Russian oil by sea. The United States is implementing a more intensive strategy, by planning to ban all Russian oil.²⁰¹ According to BBC, The EU relies on Russian gas for 40% of their needs, making them less enthusiastic to introduce more harsh sanctions.²⁰² Additionally, the West has targeted Russian oligarchs. By sanctioning these wealthy, powerful people, the West hoped to influence the oligarchs to convince Putin to change Russia's military actions.²⁰³

On April 6th, 2022, the White House stated "As long as Russia continues its brutal assault on Ukraine, we will stand unified with our allies and partners

¹⁹⁹ Chatzky, Andrew. "Have Sanctions on Russia Changed Putin's Calculus?" Council on Foreign Relations. Council on Foreign Relations, May 2019. <https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/have-sanctions-russia-changed-putins-calculus>.

²⁰⁰ BBC. "What Are the Sanctions on Russia and Are They Hurting Its Economy?" BBC News. BBC, June 27, 2022. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60125659>.

²⁰¹ The White House. "Fact Sheet: United States, G7 and EU Impose Severe and Immediate Costs on Russia." whitehouse.gov. The United States Government, April 6, 2022. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/06/fact-sheet-united-states-g7-and-eu-impose-severe-and-immediate-costs-on-russia/>.

²⁰² The White House. "Fact Sheet: United States, G7 and EU Impose Severe and Immediate Costs on Russia." whitehouse.gov. The United States Government, April 6, 2022. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/06/fact-sheet-united-states-g7-and-eu-impose-severe-and-immediate-costs-on-russia/>.

²⁰³ Tavernise, Sabrina, and Matt Apuzzo. "Will Sanctioning Oligarchs Change the War?" The New York Times. The New York Times, March 22, 2022. <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/22/podcasts/the-daily/russian-oligarchs-sanctions-ukraine-war.html?showTranscript=1>.

in imposing additional costs on Russia for its actions”²⁰⁴ From this statement, it can be concluded that the main goal of sanctions is to change Russia’s military behavior in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian War.

At their core, sanctions are meant to put pressure on countries to act in a certain way. With the fundamental understanding of sanctions in mind, it can be deduced that, in the short run, sanctions have not achieved their overarching goal – to change the Russian Federation’s military behavior. Namely, sanctions have not put enough pressure on Russia to withdraw the military out of Ukraine and to respect their sovereignty. That is not to say that Russian sanctions have been totally ineffective: The International Monetary Fund projects that the Russian Federation’s real GDP will fall by 8.5% in 2022 and that consumer prices will increase by 21.3%.²⁰⁵ Although these numbers are promising, the Russian economy has been bouncing back from sanctions quicker than first expected, with the Russian ruble bouncing back to pre-war exchange rates.

Analysis

This paper seeks to explain factors of sanction effectiveness and analyze them in context of the 2022 Russian sanctions to explain why sanctions have not resulted thus far in changing Russia’s military actions. Three factors will be analyzed in this paper: so called sanction buster states, length of sanctions, and international coordination.

Firstly, sanction buster states will be considered. According to the book, “Busted Sanctions: Explaining Why Economic Sanctions Fail”, third party states can mitigate the effects of economic sanctions, therefore causing them to fail to be as effective as sanction sender states would like them to be.²⁰⁶ Third party

²⁰⁴ The White House, “Fact Sheet: United States, G7 and EU Impose Severe and Immediate Costs on Russia.”

²⁰⁵ IMF. “Russian Federation and the IMF.” International Monetary Fund, 2022. <https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/RUS>.

²⁰⁶ Early, Bryan R. *Busted Sanctions: Explaining Why Economic Sanctions Fail*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015.

states can be used by target states to supply resources that sanction senders attempt to cut off.²⁰⁷ These will now be discussed in the proceeding section

In 2014, discussions in the West were held about removing Russian banks from SWIFT, a Western based system used by banks to make international payments. Although it was ultimately not acted upon in 2014, Russia never forgot the possibility of Russian banks being cut off from the world wide network. Anticipating this threat in the future, Russia pioneered its own alternative to SWIFT, a system called The System for the Transfer of Financial Messages.²⁰⁸ The head of development for the system claims that this system already has eight international banks in its membership book.²⁰⁹ By the framework laid out, these foreign bank entities are considered sanction-busters. Russia anticipated the future correctly, because in 2022, the West did what they had failed to agree to do before: restrict Russian bank access to SWIFT.

Another alternative to SWIFT that Russia could utilize is the Chinese based system of CIPS, or the Cross-border Interbank Payment System. This system was engineered in 2015 by the People's Bank of China. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, transactions are growing on CIPS.²¹⁰ Russia, along with other countries disillusioned with the Western world order, now have the possibility of seeking out CIPS as an alternative to using SWIFT. Both systems – The System for the Transfer of Financial Messages and CIPS not only mitigate the impact the removal from SWIFT was supposed to have, but they also draw anti-western countries closer together.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

²⁰⁸ Shagina, Maria. "How Disastrous Would Disconnection from Swift Be for Russia?" Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2021. <https://carnegiemoscow.org/commentary/84634>.

²⁰⁹ The Moscow Times. "Eight Foreign Banks Join Russian Transfer System." The Moscow Times, July 25, 2022. <https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/10/02/eight-foreign-banks-join-russian-transfer-system-a67555>.

²¹⁰ Center for Strategic and International Studies. "Sanctions, Swift, and China's Cross-Border Interbank Payments System." Sanctions, SWIFT, and China's Cross-Border Interbank Payments System | Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2022. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/sanctions-swift-and-chinas-cross-border-interbank-payments-system>.

An additional partnership that Russia has been looking to strengthen has been one with India. India has remained a “neutral” power in sanctions against Russia.²¹¹ India has “neither condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine nor imposed sanctions, although it abstained from the UN Security Council vote.”²¹² In the wake of western sanctions, India has been looking into ways to sanction bust with Russia. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, India has been bolstering their economic ties with Russia, with India “using rupee debt for joint investment to promote Russian-Indian strategic partnership.”²¹³ Russia and India have also been looking into other partnerships, such as “a rupee-ruble trade agreement.”²¹⁴

These two partnerships have the potential to change the world order that has been around since the end of World War II. These actions not only draw non-western countries together, but may lead to a polarization of two opposing forces, therefore disrupting the international order.

Secondly, the length of time sanctions are imposed is an important dimension in understanding whether these sanctions will be effective or not. According to the Swedish Defense Research Agency, “The longer sanctions stay in place, the higher the accumulated costs”.²¹⁵ However, sender countries may reduce the length of sanctions for many reasons. A factor of sanction length is public support for sanctions. If costs of economic sanctions to the sender country are high, leaders may face political pressure to reduce or end sanctions by their constituents. If sender countries face political pressure to reduce or end sanctions due to costs on their own countries, they may be forced or coerced to end sanctions.

²¹¹ Zongyuan, Zoe Liu. “Besides China, Putin Has Another Potential De-Dollarization Partner in Asia.” Council on Foreign Relations. Council on Foreign Relations, 2022. <https://www.cfr.org/blog/besides-china-putin-has-another-potential-de-dollarization-partner-asia>.

²¹² Ibid.

²¹³ Zongyuan, “Besides China, Putin Has Another Potential De-Dollarization Partner in Asia.”

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Oxenstierna and Olsson, “The Economic Sanctions against Russia: Impact and Prospects of Success.”

“Busted Sanctions: Explaining Why Economic Sanctions Fail” suggests sanctions put in place by the United States government in the past have “cost Americans billions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of jobs”.²¹⁶ High costs for sender countries such as these can often be enough for citizens to totally reject sanctions, therefore putting pressure on elected officials to end sanctions prematurely or to not raise sanctions even higher. If target countries anticipate sender countries de-escalating sanctions or not raising sanctions even higher, they may not change their behavior.

The U.S. Energy Information Administration reports that before the Russian-Ukrainian war, in January 2022, gas prices in United States averaged at \$3.413 per gallon. In June of 2022, gas prices were \$5.032 per gallon, an all-time high.²¹⁷ This rapid increase in gas prices has been linked to the complete US ban of Russian oil. This ban reduced the supply of oil, therefore driving up prices at the pump.²¹⁸ According to Gallup, as of June 2022, 67% of Americans polled described gas price increases as causing “financial hardship” for them and their households.²¹⁹ They also averaged an Economic Confidence Index of -58, the lowest recorded since the 2008-2009 financial crisis.²²⁰ Poll results such as these show that Americans are unhappy with the state of the economy as a whole.

By ending sanctions prematurely, it undermines the potential impact they might have in the long run. Although sanctions in the short-term have not yet succeeded in ending the war between Russia and Ukraine, they could in the long-run by crippling Russia’s economy. Josep Borrell, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security

²¹⁶ Early, “Busted Sanctions: Explaining Why Economic Sanctions Fail.”

²¹⁷ USEIA. “Petroleum Prices.” U.S. all grades all formulations retail gasoline prices (dollars per gallon), 2022. https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=emm_epm0_pte_nus_dp&f=m.

²¹⁸ Smith, Kelly Anne. “Will Gas Prices Continue to Decline? How to Save At The Pump This Summer.” *Forbes*. *Forbes Magazine*, July 18, 2022. <https://www.forbes.com/advisor/personal-finance/how-to-save-money-on-gas/>.

²¹⁹ Saad, Lydia. “Gas Prices Squeezing Americans as More Rate Economy ‘Poor.’” *Gallup.com*. *Gallup*, July 20, 2022. <https://news.gallup.com/poll/394190/gas-prices-squeezing-americans-rate-economy-poor.aspx>.

²²⁰ *Ibid*.

policy, posits that it may “take a long time for [sanctions] to have the desired effect”.²²¹ If sanctions were to end before the end of 2022, arguably it would undermine their introduction in the first place.

A third and final factor to consider, is international coordination for economic sanctions, deemed critical for their effectiveness. The Swedish Defense Research Agency for example, argues “the diverse agendas of different senders may create confusion and competition, which can be used by the target state. Multilateral sanctions issued by individual states may also divide the senders, thereby decreasing the pressure on the target for change in political behavior.”²²² This paper also supports this claim, and puts forth that uncoordinated sanctions can have a reduced effect on the target country and should instead be highly synchronized. This concept will be touched upon in the proceeding section of this paper.

Policy Recommendations

The question that continues to preoccupy the minds of government officials, policymakers, and scholars is “How can sanctions against Russia work more effectively?” Bearing in mind the framework, reasoning, and explanations offered in this paper, a few policy recommendations are presented with the goal of increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of sanctions.

“The involvement of international institutions” the Swedish Defense Research Agency argues, “is found to increase the chances of sanction success.”²²³ As touched upon previously, disorganized sanctions can decrease their impact. The European Union has done a fair job of rallying member countries to coordinate sanctions. However, dissent remains between

²²¹ Borrell, Josep. “The Sanctions against Russia Are Working.” The sanctions against Russia are working | EEAS Website, 2022. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/sanctions-against-russia-are-working_en.

²²² Oxenstierna and Olsson, “The Economic Sanctions against Russia: Impact and Prospects of Success.”

²²³ Oxenstierna and Olsson, “The Economic Sanctions against Russia: Impact and Prospects of Success.”

countries. Germany for example, originally opposed banning Russia from SWIFT. Out of all EU countries, Germany trades the most with Russia. Therefore, banning Russia from SWIFT would negatively impact the German economy.²²⁴ Additionally, Hungary opposed any EU sanctions that imposed Russian energy limits since it heavily relies on Russian gas.²²⁵ As time has gone on, however, both Germany and Hungary have changed their stance, agreeing with European Union measures.

As demonstrated, international institutions are vital to sanction collectivism. It also represents the first policy recommendation suggesting the European Union should keep their sanctions solid and unified. It is therefore vital that the European Commission passes the proposal introduced on May 25th 2022 that would make sanction violations a crime in the European Union.²²⁶ Countries who fail to comply could face fines imposed against them. Incentives should be provided to EU countries that undertake the most severe sanctions against Russia and to countries that follow sanctions by the book. For example, incentives could include EU funding for public programs for the country. The funding for these incentives should be drawn from fines imposed against EU member states that are found to be not following sanctions. This approach simultaneously encourages member states to abstain from violating sanctions as well as provides reason to follow them more closely.

A second policy recommendation would be for the EU for Western countries to fight sanction buster states. As previously discussed, sanction buster states have the potential to lessen the effect that sanctions have on target states. If states such as China and India continue to move closer

²²⁴ Reuters. "Germany Softens Stance on Curbing Russian Access to Swift." Reuters. Thomson Reuters, February 26, 2022. <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/germany-favour-targeted-functional-swift-curbs-russia-minister-2022-02-26/>.

²²⁵ Al Jazeera. "Why Is Hungary Not Backing EU Sanctions on Russian Oil?" Oil and Gas News | Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera, May 10, 2022. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/10/explainer-why-is-hungary-blocking-sanctions-on-russian-oil>.

²²⁶ European Commission Press Release. "Ukraine: The Commission Proposes Rules on Freezing and Confiscating Assets of Oligarchs Violating Restrictive Measures and of Criminals." European Commission – European Commission, May 25, 2022. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_3264.

to Russia and provide outlets from sanctions, they should face penalties. According to Bryan Early, “Policy makers can selectively target trade likely trade-based sanction busters with intensive diplomatic or coercive pressure to prevent them from sanction busting.”²²⁷ This is the approach that should be taken with states such as India and China if they continue down the diplomatic path they are currently on.

A final policy recommendation is to combat sanction fatigue. As the war goes on and the media loses focus on the Russian-Ukrainian invasion, many citizens of countries like the United States, who are experiencing large gas price increases, begin to wonder why sanctions are being utilized. This mindset is one that discourages collectivism for Ukraine. A public information campaign that shows the horrific crimes Russia is committing while occupying Ukraine could help citizens of countries being impacted by higher prices understand that sanctions against Russia are for the greater good of the world. The western media must not forget about Ukraine as the war goes on, or else public support for the sanctions could be lost.

Conclusion

Sanctions are a tool of international policy that have been utilized historically to attack a country in such a way that it does not cause full military escalation. Although the sanctions utilized by the West in the Russian-Ukrainian War have had some effects on the Russian economy, the impact has not been large enough to change Russia’s war path in Ukraine.

This paper has examined the current state of economic sanctions and their effect, discussed a brief history of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, reviewed a case study of the 2014 sanctions imposed on Russia for its invasion in Crimea, analyzed factors contributing to the effectiveness of sanctions directed at Russia, and offered policy recommendations for the future in order to increase their effectiveness. Furthermore, this paper has identified three critical factors to improve the impact of sanctions: identify and

²²⁷ Early, “Busted Sanctions: Explaining Why Economic Sanctions Fail.”

address sanction buster states, ensure the length of time sanctions are enacted, and international coordination. As the Russian-Ukrainian war ensues, the situation will continue to evolve and change. Therefore, it is important to emphasize that this paper has operated off of information that is accurate and current as of June 2022. What remains needed is follow up research, not only to understand why sanctions fail or succeed, but more importantly, to understand how sanctions against Russia are changing the post-World War II order that has been the international norm since the 1940s.

Ukraine's Security Service, SBU; Security Sector Reform, SSR in the post-Soviet bloc and role in Eastern European Security

Lénka VILLELA

Abstract: This paper is derived from a case study of Ukraine's Security Service (Служба безпеки України, СБУ). Through a comprehensive examination of Security Sector Reform, this paper will discuss its functionalities and aims in the intelligence and security services of Ukraine in the post-Soviet environment between 2014–2022. In addition, it examines the debates surrounding the Ukraine's Security Service's role and re-integration in modern Eastern European security.

Keywords: Security Sector Reform, Intelligence services, Ukraine's Security Service

Introduction

To facilitate the broader discussion of Ukraine's discourse on independence and security, it is necessary to acknowledge the inception and history of Ukraine's intelligence and security sector in order to interpret the country's sphere and scope in the face of conflict. This paper focuses on the emergence of Ukraine's intelligence and security sector following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and analyses the specific roles of the Security Sector Reform (SSR), and Security Sector Governance (SSG), provided by the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF): SSR Backgrounder Series. Furthermore, this paper outlines the predatory control of its Soviet counterpart and discusses how it caused delays in the SBU's path to reform. This paper argues that sustainable security cannot be achieved in absence of an ethical and effective framework, one that would promote good governance, parliamentary supervision and transparency to serve the best interest of Ukraine and its civilians. Without such a framework, this paper posits that pre-existing vulnerabilities will pose as a greater risk to Ukraine's sovereignty. Therefore, it is important to analyse SBU's long path to modernisation, as it provides an effective example for assessing the challenges and vulnerabilities in both the SBU's past and transitional period towards reconstructing stability and integration of international standards.

Political Unrest in Ukraine

Although NATO established relations with Ukraine in 1992²²⁸, the country's membership has remained uncertain. This is in part due to the levels of internal corruption; the later part of the nineties served as a prelude to future political unrest in Ukraine. Previously, the government remained pressured to function under the principles of Russian influence. However, an increasing number of Ukrainians sought a more sustainable approach

²²⁸ NPR.org. "Russia's at War with Ukraine. Here's How We Got Here." Accessed July 20, 2022. <https://www.npr.org/2022/02/12/1080205477/history-ukraine-russia>.

to government, politics and economics as proscribed in the West. Additionally, ethnic and cultural divides have persisted between those in the West, who generally subscribe to the ideals of European liberalism, and those in the East, who continued to follow Russian cultural ideals. To further illustrate this disparity, eastern Ukraine contains a predominantly Russian-speaking population in the Donbas region, where the residents identify themselves as ethnically Russian. The mounting divisions between western and eastern Ukraine, supplemented by the security sector and the government's past, have contributed to the internal conflicts currently witnessed in Ukraine.

The Orange Revolution

As the Ukrainian people sought democratic change, a political crisis struck. The Presidential election of 2004, serving as a prime example of corruption and election fraud, set the stage for Ukraine's ongoing revolution. Outlining the country's political divide, pro-Western candidate Viktor Yushchenko's loss against East-leaning candidate and former governor to Ukraine's Eastern Province Viktor Yanukovich gave room for speculation among the Ukrainian people. Following the results of the presidential election, thousands of Ukrainians flooded Kyiv's Independence Square to protest. In response, Ukraine's Parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, called for a recount of the votes. However, efforts were initially thwarted when Yushchenko mysteriously fell ill and became disfigured. Despite confirmation from doctors that he was poisoned with dioxin, the Kremlin-backed Yanukovich insisted he won the election. However, massive protests followed as evidence emerged that the election was rigged and calls for a recount ensued – referred to as the Orange Revolution. Following a third vote, Yushchenko this time triumphed as president and Yulia Tymoshenko as prime minister. Additionally in 2008, both Yushchenko and Tymoshenko would take steps towards NATO's membership action plan."²²⁹ However, these efforts were

²²⁹ NPR.org. "Russia's at War with Ukraine. Here's How We Got Here."

short-lived, when later Yanukovich would take steps to fortify ties with Russia, and obstruct further relations with the West.

Despite Tymoshenko's popularity as prime minister and leader of the Orange Revolution, she lost to her opponent Viktor Yanukovich in Ukraine's 2010 election. The election once again caused concern over the legitimacy of Ukraine's ballot system, as Yanukovich won under suspicious circumstances.²³⁰ In either case, the elections illustrated the ensuing divide between the west and east – with the West in favour of Tymoshenko and the East in favour of the Putin-supported incumbent. Moreover, efforts previously initiated by former President Yushchenko to orientate Ukraine with the West, by initiating the process to join the European Union (EU) were undermined by Yanukovich. NPR reports, "Just days before it is to be signed, Yanukovich refused to sign."²³¹

Ukraine's Revolution of Dignity

In response to Yanukovich's delay in signing the European Association Agreement, protests erupted in Kyiv November 31st, triggering what would become known as the Euromaidan movement²³² Law enforcement responded by brutally attacking peaceful demonstrators, many of which were young students. This further ignited the protests which quickly grew to become a massive movement against the government's tyrannical actions.²³³ Despite harsh sub-zero temperatures, violence continued into 2014. On January 16th the Ukrainian government passed anti-protests laws, and later dispatched military units to attack demonstrators. In addition, the SBU was assisted by Russian intel during the conflict.²³⁴ Yanukovich's efforts to fortify ties with Russia enabled Russian intelligence to infiltrate Ukraine's security sector. After enduring two revolutions in

²³⁰ Ibid.

²³¹ Ibid.

²³² "Ukraine's Revolution of Dignity: The Dynamics of Euromaidan." *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 7, no. 1 (January 1, 2016): 85–91.

²³³ Ibid.

²³⁴ Ibid.

a matter of 10 years, the Verkhovna Rada committee put into motion the removal of Yanukovich from the presidential post of Ukraine on February 22nd 2014. However, Yanukovich refused to resign from his position, and later abandoned the capital. Following Yanukovich dismissal, a new round of elections followed. In May of 2014 Petro Poroshenko²³⁵ was inaugurated as the new president. Shortly after, Poroshenko resumed talks with the EU and signed the EU's Association Agreement June 27, 2014, signalling progress in reorientating Ukraine towards the West.

Nevertheless, the damage under Yanukovich's leadership has been long-standing. After, Yanukovich was driven from power by violent protests, Russian-backed separatist seized the opportunity to take control of Crimea, which has a Russian speaking majority. A referendum was quickly held, with supposedly 97% of voters favouring to join Russia, regarded both by Ukraine and the West as illegal.²³⁶ With the eventual annexation of Crimea, Ukraine's territorial sovereignty became further subjected to distortion by Russian influence. Not only did Russia now have a military base in Ukraine, but direct access to the SBU, who was directly connected with the military base. As the crisis continued on the world stage, the SBU's actions were less than productive. The government of Ukraine was exploited and corrupted at all levels, contributing to the security sector's failure to mitigate and intervene in the crisis.²³⁷ Additionally, the prolonged conflict had greatly changed the way civilians perceived their government and national identity. As time passed, the rise in conflict and corruption had imposed a leverage of dependency on Russia; however, this link impacted Ukrainian society horribly.

The people of Ukraine did not see any willingness from the president or government to provide substantive solutions, resulting in waves of resistance,²³⁸ with no indications to modernise and incurring major economic losses. The civil resistance was fuelled, not only by the policies that provided no future and trust in the judicial system, but also to the violence imposed by

²³⁵ NPR.org. "Russia's at War with Ukraine. Here's How We Got Here."

²³⁶ Ibid.

²³⁷ "Ukraine's Revolution of Dignity: The Dynamics of Euromaidan." *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 7, no. 1 (January 1, 2016): 85–91.

²³⁸ Ibid.

the government's authoritative power. Additionally what we can observe from Ukraine's Orange Revolution (2004 to 2014) is the dissident and unwilling release projected by Soviet rule. Russia's exertion of control over Ukraine has been outlined throughout history. As security forces were instructed to release fire on civilians, the recurring aggression resulted in thousands of Ukrainians being killed, injured and displaced.

However, reforming the security sector and special services of Ukraine would be subject to delay. Recurrently Russia's deliberative actions intercepted democratic influence in the former Soviet Republics. Russia's profuse force, supplemented by the SBU's course of action and unconventional practice would produce a familiar set of repercussions to Ukrainian society. The SBU's structure at the time allowed for various points of vulnerability of Russian infiltration, Thus, to understand the failure of the Ukrainian government to secure and preserve Ukraine's sovereignty, it is necessary to focus on Russia's malintent disguised behind the security sector. The lack of transparency, accountability, and violations to human rights, supplemented by the failure to mitigate coincide the profuse level of Russian control, exploiting Ukraine's security sector as a medium for countering Western influence.

Intelligence Services: Diametric Approach in the post-Soviet Bloc

An often overlooked facet of state intelligence and security services is the consequences of the transition from the Soviet stronghold in Eastern Europe. Leonid Polyakov in his work, *On Integrity of Intelligence of Eastern Europe* argues, argues "In this environment a common feature of the transition process is the general lack of integrity. Not surprisingly, instead of serving as a guardian against corrupt practices in government, they turn into a major conduit of political and economic corruption".²³⁹

²³⁹ Polyakov, Leonid. "On Integrity of Intelligence in Countries of Eastern Europe." *Information & Security: An International Journal* 30, no. 1 (2013): 55–63. <https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.11610/ij.3005>.

During Ukraine's Orange Revolution, the sitting leadership's lack of integrity allowed influential Russian corruption to penetrate Ukraine's government. During the turbulent period of the Orange Revolution, the government was incapable of serving as the guardian of Ukrainian society. The police who followed the government's orders to brutally attack demonstrators, the parliament who allowed the president to increase in his autocratic power, and the military members who repeatedly assaulted the populace, all failed the people of Ukraine.

Preliminary efforts for reform were made but of course not substantial; the security sector contained critical flaws that made it impossible to sustainably build upon. An entirely new foundation had to be laid if Ukraine wanted to defuse the pitfalls dug in their Soviet past which "increasingly amplified ... their own legacy of ineffective governance and high level of corruption".²⁴⁰ By consequence of these constraints, Ukraine's transitional period towards democracy would be set back by the security sectors' lack of legitimacy and efficacy. Additionally, Polyakov's study outlines that countries experienced internal conflict as a consequence of its foundation. He asserts:

*Regional conflicts had a rather corrosive impact on defence and security sectors integrity delaying their democratization: loosening control over financial and other resources, increasing secrecy and limiting oversight. These developments contributed to the weakening of the early prospects for stable and secure societies and the rapid growth of criminality and corruption.*²⁴¹

Emanating from the paradigm of abusive security, Ukraine would re-emerge in the crosshairs of national and international conflict.

²⁴⁰ Polyakov, "On Integrity of Intelligence in Countries of Eastern Europe." 55-63.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

Ukraine's Security Service, SBU

Though Ukraine would enter into a new chapter of independence, intelligence agencies emerging in post-Soviet Ukraine would face a myriad of complications stemming from their failure to properly establish and develop modernised systems of security. However, on March 25, 1992, the Law on the Security Service of Ukraine²⁴² was adopted by the Rada and marked the establishment of the SBU. Following the inception of the SBU, its main range of activities included the creation of, “units responsible for intelligence and counterintelligence, protection of statehood and counterterrorism activities. Military counterintelligence, fighting corruption and organised crime, government communications and special unit A”.²⁴³ However, its formation from the onset faced shortcomings. The SBU adopted a framework that imitated the role it has served in the intelligence systems of the USSR, and infrastructure that lacked centralised control. Due to the SBU's overlapping scope of power and limited oversight, it found itself unlawfully involved in the Orange Revolution, the Revolution of Dignity and annexation of Crimea.

An interim report recently conducted by Philipp Fluri and Leonid Polyakov on *Intelligence and Security Services Reform and Oversight in Ukraine*, also attests the SBU's long path to reform. In the report, they argue that SBU's delays in reform was a result of:

*being held hostage to the pace of political developments in Ukraine. Weak parliamentary control (inability to create an intelligence committee in the parliament) complicated system of executive control-all contributed to problems with intelligence budgets, delays upon delays in SSU reforms, agencies' leadership reshuffles, and limited cooperation with foreign partners from democratic countries.*²⁴⁴

²⁴² SSU. “SSU.” Accessed July 12, 2022. <https://ssu.gov.ua/istoriia-ssu>.

²⁴³ Ibid.

²⁴⁴ Fluri, Philipp, Leonid Polyakov, Leonid Polyakov, and Leonid Polyakov. “Intelligence and Security Services Reform and Oversight in Ukraine – An Interim Report.” *Connections: The Quarterly Journal* 20, no. 1 (2021): 51–59. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.11610/Connections.20.1.03>.

The major distortions of the SBU was due to the lack of transparency in the service's operations and activities and avoidance of further international cooperation. However, Fluri and Polyakov argue that the concept of reforming the SBU already began to take place between 2005-2009 and more specifically "during the years of the Ukraine-NATO joint Working Group on Defence Reform".²⁴⁵ Seven years later in 2016 a permanent international group was implemented, and NATO standards for SBU reform were drafted. The following year President Poroshenko would announce a reform of the SBU, which included separating law enforcement from their responsibilities; however, this restructuring would be delayed until 2020.

Later in 2021, the Atlantic Council's Eurasia Center in Washington D.C gathered to discuss the process of reform: *Securing the Home Front, SBU reform in Ukraine* that included MP's of Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada, and Oleksandr Danylyuk, Chair of the Centre for Defence Reform. During the discussion, they noted how, "[the SBU] participate in multiple processes in the country in all spheres of life, political life, economic life, and many people who observe the SBU from the outside do not understand the real role of this institution".²⁴⁶ This often led to the wide misinterpretation of the SBU's compass of control, which persisted for thirty years. The SBU continued to foster an environment susceptible to risks in the context of national and international security. Various officials and scholars therefore emphasized that the only way to truly have freedom in Ukraine was by changing the SBU from the inside out. Additionally Danylyuk stressed that change could not be forced from the outside, but rather reform needed to be implemented to induce any change.

Defining the role of Security Sector Reform, SSR

The precedent for sustainable intelligence and security cannot be met without the role of good governance and reform. The medium for interpreting

²⁴⁵ Ibid.

²⁴⁶ *Securing the Home Front: SBU Reform in Ukraine*. Accessed July 12, 2022. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RwsYzheoTfI>.

the role of Security Sector Governance (SSG) and Security Sector Reform (SSR) is made available by DCAF; SSR Backgrounder *on Security Sector Reform – Applying the principles of good governance to the Security Sector*. According to DCAF, SSG “describes how the principles of good governance apply to security provision, management and oversight by state and non-state actors”.²⁴⁷ In a similar manner, the SSR is defined as “the political and technical process of improving state and human security by applying the principles of good governance to the security sector”.²⁴⁸ Taken together, they represent the intersection of ethical practices in intelligence and human security. Thus, resulting in the connection between security and society. SSR’s area of concern ranges from the responsibilities to the outcomes of interagency practice. As such, the internal practice of the security sector is mirrored in the country’s political, economic, and cultural sphere. With this in mind, the security sector’s ability to produce considerable impact on the integrity of Ukraine, is made clear. DCAF additionally notes that “a security sector which is not effective cannot deliver security, while a security sector that is not accountable endangers both the population and the state”²⁴⁹. There are various reasons for reforming the SBU, a list has been adapted to the DCAF’s SSR Backgrounder criteria below:

- Inability to provide state and human security;
- Limited oversight, increasing risks for corruption;
- Lack of accountability and transparency;
- Abuse and overlap of power;
- Inability to prioritise the interests of civilians;
- Fostering violence in society;
- Impeding economic, political and social development ²⁵⁰
- Additionally situational trends that call for SSR have been listed below:
- Reforms to the political system;

²⁴⁷ “Security Sector Reform: Applying the Principles of Good Governance to the Security Sector | DCAF – Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance.” Accessed July 12, 2022. <https://www.dcaf.ch/security-sector-reform-applying-principles-good-governance-security-sector-0>.

²⁴⁸ “Security Sector Reform: Applying the Principles of Good Governance to the Security Sector | DCAF – Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance.” 1-10

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

- Transitional justice processes;
- Peace processes;
- Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programmes;
- National development plans and poverty reduction strategies;
- Public financial management reforms;
- Rule of law reforms;
- National security-policy-making.²⁵¹

When considered from the perspective of DCAF, this application employs the medium of transparency, legitimacy, and accountability. Thus, the degree for assessing proposed suggestions for reform are made possible through the applicable framework.

SSR, and Intelligence Services

To foster the discussion of Intelligence in the security sector of Ukraine, this section of research will employ the previously discussed framework and will introduce a comprehensive description to intelligence services in security and society. Thus, receding from the context of intelligence in post-Soviet Ukraine, the functions and operations of Intelligence contribute to the protection of national security and the best interest of civilians. Providing the means for discussing the framework of intelligence services is DCAF – Geneva’s Centre for Security Sector Governance, SSR Backgrounder Series on *Intelligence Oversight*. Intelligence services participate in a wide range of tasks, which include providing critical information necessary to the formulation of informed counter measures for deterring threats. Additionally intelligence analysis aide the political infrastructure provided below:


- Defining national interests;
- Developing coherent national security and military strategies and adequate security policy;

²⁵¹ “Security Sector Reform: Applying the Principles of Good Governance to the Security Sector | DCAF – Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance.” 1-10

- Determining the mission, doctrine and strategies of the armed forces and other security institutions;
- Preparing for and responding to national crises;
- Preparing for and prevent threats to the state and its population (CT).²⁵²

However, it is imperative to call attention to the SBU’s abuse of power in law enforcement, as DCAF notes, “undemocratic governments often provide intelligence services with extensive law enforcement authority to strengthen capacities for political repression”.²⁵³ These leverages of power would contribute to the SBU being linked to crimes committed in the previously documented revolutions, and abuse of human rights. Thus it is necessary to distinguish the role of intelligence as a proactive response to threat and law enforcement as a reactive response.

Figure 1. Intelligence for security versus intelligence for law enforcement



Source: DCAF – Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance. “Security Sector Reform: Applying the Principles of Good Governance to the Security Sector.”

²⁵² “Intelligence Oversight: Ensuring Accountable Intelligence within a Framework of Democratic Governance | DCAF – Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance.” Accessed July 11, 2022. <https://www.dcaf.ch/intelligence-oversight-ensuring-accountable-intelligence-within-framework-democratic-governance>.

²⁵³ Ibid.

Moreover, an essential element of SSG in intelligence services are outlined in the principles below:

- Being accountable to democratically chosen authorities that oversee all elements of the intelligence process;
- Being transparent within a system of democratic oversight that protects sensitive information while serving the public interest in disclosure;
- Being respectful of human rights and the rule of law within an explicit legal framework;
- Being Inclusive and implementing non-discriminatory, gender-responsive policies and procedures in both their operations and administration;
- Fulfilling their mandate for state and human security;
- Being efficient in meeting public policy objectives while making the best possible use of public resources.²⁵⁴

In absence of the above listed principles, intelligence services are antithetical in practice and have the potential to produce unfavourable tendencies in their lack of good governance, in particular:

- Insufficient oversight of which undermines intelligence services' credibility and legitimacy;
- Excessive secrecy that creates opportunities for abuse that endanger state and human security;
- Illegal activity that jeopardises state and human security, which intelligence services are bound to protect;
- Exclusive intelligence services that may be inclined to suppress parts of the population, or may lack access diverging perspectives;
- Politicized intelligence that is ineffective because it neglects existing and future security threats in favour of the immediate political concerns of the government;
- Inefficient intelligence services that waste resources or fail to account for their use.²⁵⁵

²⁵⁴ "Intelligence Oversight: Ensuring Accountable Intelligence within a Framework of Democratic Governance | DCAF – Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance." 1-9

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

As discussed earlier in the paper, SBU's operations greatly lacked transparency. Though secrecy is a key to intelligence practice, in excess secrecy can have adverse outcomes.²⁵⁶ DCAF stresses that "rules for classification, freedom of information, and access to information for oversight bodies protect against excessive secrecy. Openness encourages more robust oversight to reveal illegality and misconduct, which prevents intelligence from creating a culture of impunity".²⁵⁷ Excessive secrecy, supplemented by a lack of democratic oversight greatly correlates to lack of legitimacy. Human rights is greatly impacted by the level of transparency in Intelligence oversight. DCAF also notes the significance of international cooperation in intelligence services, as international cooperation serves a key role in preventing terrorism. However, the SBU's lack of international cooperation would greatly be reflected in the intelligence services interests. In evading international cooperation, obtaining diverse perspectives for establishing methods of action and aiding peace keeping operations are made increasingly difficult. However, SSR has a great and wide range of benefits to intelligence services as it also produces effective analysis and assessment, through its inclusive and holistic methods. The next section of this research will demonstrate viable solutions proposed to the advantage of this process.

Assessments and Recommendations

When initiating the process of reforming SBU, the Ukrainian Institute for the Future carried out a comprehensive study *SSU Reform Challenges and Prospects* seeking to identify those aspects in other countries that could be replicable in Ukraine. In particular, the study focuses the replicability of international recommendations and standards against the framework of services in other countries i.e. European models such as the Netherlands, France, Germany, Romania, Bulgaria, and Poland²⁵⁸. Much like DCAF, the study concludes by noting the universal need for parliamentary oversight,

²⁵⁶ Ibid.


²⁵⁷ Ibid.

²⁵⁸ "Реформа Служби безпеки України | Український інститут майбутнього." Accessed July 20, 2022. <https://uifuture.org/publications/reforma-sluzhby-bezpeky-ukrayiny/>.

separation of functions, and international cooperation. Additionally, the study addresses the concept of building integrity in the SBU by staying within the functions outlined in SSR. Moreover, the study emphasizes the need to act in compliance to the law supplemented by parliamentary oversight, in order to foster an environment of both transparency and accountability.

Additionally, the study makes recommendations to the Verkhovna Rada and Government of Ukraine, underling the need to limit power in the SBU, by severely limiting its sphere of law enforcement including inquiry and investigation. Likewise, the study suggests the need to cultivate trust in the public by enacting stricter background checks on personnel, such as identifying individuals deemed “at-risk” of disclosing the agency’s activities. And lastly, the study discusses the importance of building trust with other nations for international cooperation and oversight to promote the SBU’s legitimacy and compliance to enacted reforms and functions. In servicing the principles suggested above, both the Rada and government can facilitate the protection and ethical development of Ukraine. Below in Figure 2 is the new suggested structure of the SBU made available by the Ukrainian Institute for the Future.

Figure 2. Suggested Architecture



Source: SSU. “SSU Reform, Ukrainian Institute for The Future.”

SSR, Integration

In 2019, further steps for initiating reform in Ukraine was facilitated by President Zelensky. However, it was not registered in Parliament until March 10, 2020²⁵⁹. The draft law (3196-D)²⁶⁰ took into consideration essential international recommendations before being presented. However, shortly following the first stage of revision in January of 2021, the draft law received criticism, mainly due to its lack of safeguards for human security²⁶¹. After revisions were made, the draft law received the support of international partners consisting of the EU, NATO, and the United States.²⁶² Though the reform is still a work in progress, the new head of the SBU Ivan Bakanov, stated, "The Service is already dynamically adapting to the new reality. We are professionalising personnel services, strengthening key areas and making the organisational structure more agile. The reform should complete these processes and organise the work of the renewed Service so that it becomes most effective in protecting the security of citizens and the state"²⁶³. As far as a body of intelligence and security, the new SBU's approach has transitioned from a reactive form of security to a proactive one; In deterring Russian aggression, both inside and out, the SBU has proven that even during conflict, change can be supplemented on the inside. As such, the SBU has focused on counterintelligence counteraction to threats to state security, Counterterrorism, Cyber security, Protection of national statehood and territorial integrity, and the Protection of state secrets²⁶⁴. The SBU's focus for accountability and transparency in national security includes:

- Separation of functions;
- The guarantee to political independence;

²⁵⁹ SSU. "SSU." Accessed July 12, 2022. <https://ssu.gov.ua/istoriia-ssu>.

²⁶⁰ "Офіційний Портал Верховної Ради України." Accessed July 20, 2022. http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=68347.

²⁶¹ Human Rights Watch. "Ukraine: Reform of Abusive Security Agency at Risk," June 3, 2021. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/06/03/ukraine-reform-abusive-security-agency-risk>.

²⁶² "Opinion: International Advisory Group on Reform of the Security Service of Ukraine — EUAM Ukraine," November 8, 2021. <https://www.euam-ukraine.eu/news/opinion/international-advisory-group-op-ed-on-reform-of-the-security-service-of-ukraine/>.

²⁶³ SSU. "Головна сторінка :: Служба безпеки України."

²⁶⁴ SSU. "Main Page :: Security Service of Ukraine." Accessed July 12, 2022. <https://ssu.gov.ua/en>

- Staff demilitarisation and optimisation;
- Refraining from the investigation of corruption and economic crimes;

Democratic civil control ²⁶⁵

In the separation of functions the SBU is now incapable of impeding in criminal proceedings that do not fall within the jurisdiction of the service previously outlined by the draft law.²⁶⁶ Nevertheless, since Russian aggression began in February 2022, SBU cited “800, cyber incidents and cyber-attacks on state institutions neutralized. 5000, traitors and collaborators exposed. 360, enemy agents detained²⁶⁷”. Moreover, inclusive democratic civil control allows “every citizen to take part in exercising civilian control over the Service through public organisations, deputies of representative bodies and personally through an appeal to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Commissioner for Human Right.”²⁶⁸ In terms of oversight in democratic civil control, the new SBU includes parliamentary control, added supervision by the newly established committee of the Rada, external fiscal audits, departmental, judicial, and public control as well as prosecutors supervision.²⁶⁹

The SBU has made great changes towards protecting the services’ internal integrity including changes to its staff and grounds for dismissal. Moreover, in light of reducing its head count, the SBU has adopted the practice of staff demilitarisation and optimisation. Although the current number of service staff exceeds 27,000²⁷⁰, the new SBU estimates in the near future that the headcount will be 15,000 once peace is restored.²⁷¹ Currently, the SBU’s head count reflects its focus on deterring the current Russian aggression, and will only begin working towards the reduction of its staff in 2027²⁷². However, the SBU asserts that it will “not reduce the defence potential

²⁶⁵ Ibid. SSU. “Main Page: Security Service of Ukraine.” Accessed July 12, 2022. <https://ssu.gov.ua/en>

²⁶⁶ SSU. “SSU.” Accessed July 20, 2022. <https://ssu.gov.ua/reforma-ssu>

²⁶⁷ SSU. “Main Page :: Security Service of Ukraine.” Accessed July 12, 2022. <https://ssu.gov.ua/en>

²⁶⁸ Ibid.

²⁶⁹ “Головна сторінка :: Служба безпеки України.”

²⁷⁰ SSU. “Головна сторінка :: Служба безпеки України.”

²⁷¹ Ibid.

²⁷² SSU. “Main Page: Security Service of Ukraine.” Accessed July 12, 2022. <https://ssu.gov.ua/en>

of the SBU against Russian aggression, but will create a more agile, efficient Service"²⁷³. The SBU needs to prioritize the maintenance of nominal operational conditions, and therefore the number of staff should fluctuate to accommodate demand.

Lastly, Ukraine has yet to meet the requisites to join NATO. It is necessary for Ukraine to consider increased satellite oversight conducted by the International Advisory Group (IAG). However due to the ongoing war, NATO should consider gradual sole oversight of the SBU, to ensure that in time of conflict and in time of peace that the service acts in compliance to effective and sustainable security. Additionally, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces should be implemented into the IAG to support the groups capacity of oversight and assessment of the SBU. Collectively, reform and internal supervision aided by international cooperation can induce sustainable modifications to the security sector's internal framework. In due course, the SBU's internal reorientation can be mirrored into Ukraine's path to prolonged sovereignty.

Conclusion

The research above has analysed the resulting outcomes of the transitional period of Ukraine, including the projection of Soviet rule and shift to democratisation, written with the goal of fostering a situational awareness of Ukraine's ongoing struggle for independence and stability in the intelligence and security sector. Through a technical examination of Ukraine's SBU against the framework of intelligence services – SSR and SSG, this paper has evaluated the disparity of intelligence and security in Eastern Europe, but especially within Ukraine. We have also explored the functions that allow necessary and prolonged change to their capacities through SSR. On the whole, findings in this study conclude that effective intelligence is derived at the nexus of comprehensive and sustainable interagency practice, and safeguards against internal and external corruption. Through proposed suggestions, and the SBU's adoption of reform, the present findings

²⁷³ Ibid.

show a somewhat promising future in Ukraine's ability to further deter Russian aggression. Despite limitations in Ukraine's thirty-year turbulence towards reform, the SBU is moving inexorably towards positive change. Looking forward, these findings should be replicated with consideration to the potential effects and outcome of the ongoing aggression, re-orientation of geopolitics and changes to security sector reforms in the twenty-first century.

Cybersecurity Lessons from Estonia

Heaven SULLIVAN

Abstract: Estonia is an excellent country to reference for cybersecurity lessons because of the country's long history and global reputation for expertise in the field. There are three aspects of Estonia's cybersecurity ecosystem that those hoping to learn from the country should examine. First is Estonia's heightened perception of cybersecurity's importance stemming from its post-Soviet restructuring, start-ups, and Russian threat. In general, this aspect is not replicable. The second aspect is cyber deterrence through international cooperation, which has limited replicability in European countries and other regions of the world. The third aspect is national cybersecurity agendas with specific and achievable goals. This aspect, with all it encompasses, can be replicated in a wide range of countries with varying economies and existing cybersecurity capabilities.

Key Words: Estonia, Cybersecurity, Replicability, e-Governance, Cyber deterrence

Introduction

Estonia is a small state on the Baltic Sea bordering Russia. In 1941 it was occupied by the Soviet Union and lost its sovereignty for nearly 40 years. Today the country is known for its elite e-governance and cybersecurity, becoming a leader in those fields since gaining its independence. This paper seeks to understand what Estonia's cybersecurity strategy is and identify those aspects that are replicable in other countries. In particular, this paper identifies and will focus on three distinct aspects of Estonia's cybersecurity strategy – a heightened perception of cybersecurity's importance, international cooperation in the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and national cybersecurity agendas with specific and achievable goals.

Heightened Perception of Cybersecurity's Importance

Although most governments around the world recognize the importance of cybersecurity, Estonia is unparalleled in the importance placed on cybersecurity in its national identity, lifestyle, and economy. First, Estonia has an e-governance system that digitizes almost all of its citizen's data. For this system to work, that data must be adequately protected. Second, cybersecurity makes up a large part of Estonia's economy – the country leads Europe in start-ups, unicorns, and investments per capita.²⁷⁴ Third, Estonia's expertise in cybersecurity increases its presence and influence on the global stage. Fourth, Estonia faces a unique and persistent cyber threat from neighboring Russia. This section concludes with an explanation of why this aspect of Estonia's cybersecurity strategy is not replicable in other countries.

²⁷⁴ See <https://investinestonia.com/estonia-leads-europe-in-startups-unicorns-and-investments-per-capita/> for more information on Estonian start-ups and economy.

E-Governance

Estonia's path to e-governance began when the country gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. (E-governance refers to the application of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) for delivering government services.) The Soviet command economy and isolation from modern technologies behind the Iron Curtain left Estonia's economy and infrastructure in shambles. However, Estonian policy makers quickly realized that building an e-governance system from scratch was a unique opportunity. They sought to build new technological infrastructures from nothing while catching up with the West as quickly as possible. This led to a series of e-governance policies, online services, and internet initiatives that are presented in Figure 1.

Particularly important is the ambitious Tiger Leap Initiative launched in 1996 that aimed to build technology infrastructure by providing internet access to all schools in Estonia. The program was built on three pillars – “Computers and Internet, basic teacher training, and native-language electronic courseware for general education institutions.”²⁷⁵ The goal of the Tiger Leap Initiative was met in 2001 and laid the foundation for other important initiatives such as the Tiger Leap Plus, SchoolLife, ProgeTiger, and the IT Academy. Together, these programs have built a digitally competent and technology focused society. Soon the goal would shift from building technology infrastructure to protecting the one that exists (i.e., cybersecurity).

Estonia has continued to develop its e-governance system, and cybersecurity not only became a digital necessity but also deeply infused into Estonian identity. In 2008, it developed a national e-Health system integrating data from Estonia's healthcare providers to improve the quality and efficiency. Similarly in 2010 e-Prescription was introduced, followed by e-Residency and the Road Administrations e-portal in 2014. Today 99% of public services are accessible online and the entire country has access to free public Internet.²⁷⁶ Needless to say, life for Estonians is digital, and therefore needs

²⁷⁵ Education Estonia, “How it all began? From Tiger Leap to digital society,” 2022.

²⁷⁶ See <https://e-estonia.com/story/> for more information on e-governance in Estonia.

to be protected from cyberattacks and data breaches. This digital lifestyle has thus become an integral part of Estonian identity as former advisor to the Estonian Prime Minister of ICT, Linnar Viik, points out: "For other countries, the Internet is just another service, like tap water, or clean streets. But for young Estonians, the Internet is a manifestation of something more than a service – it's a symbol of democracy and freedom."²⁷⁷ This sentiment is reflected by Estonia's development of the world's first data embassy in 2017. The embassy, which lies outside of Estonia's border in Luxembourg, assures the digital continuity of Estonian statehood in worst-case scenarios like critical system failures or external threats.

Economy

Estonia's boom in Internet infrastructure led to an innovative environment that fostered start-ups and helped rebuild Estonia's economy. In the 1990s, rules for private enterprises were simplified, a more transparent tax system was introduced, and communication with authorities was improved, resulting in a robust start-up network.²⁷⁸ The culmination of this network happened in 2005, when the well-known Estonian start-up Skype was sold for \$2.6 billion USD. One of the founders of Skype, Jane Tallinn, points out that start-ups in the early 2000s allowed the creation of a new class of Estonian investors. To date, Estonia has the most start-ups per capita in the world and has produced 10 start-ups with a value of over \$1 billion USD (also known as unicorns.) Additionally, Estonia leads Europe in investments per capita.

Cybersecurity is essential to producing Estonia's start-ups and managing its investments. There are two major reasons for this. First, the security of its e-governance system allows Estonian start-ups and technology companies to utilize digital signatures, paperless communication, and online tax returns with ease. Second, strong and reliable cybersecurity practices provide trust to those buying start-ups and funding investments. Therefore,

²⁷⁷ Patrick Kingsley, "How tiny Estonia stepped out of the USSR's shadow to become an internet titan," *The Guardian*, 2012.

²⁷⁸ Katarzyna Kaminska-Korolczuk, and Barbara Kijewska, "The History of the Internet in Estonia and Poland," In *The Routledge Companion to Global Internet Histories*, edited by Gardard Goggin and Mark McLelland, 135–150. New York: Routledge, 2017.

an event such as a cyberattack or data breach could decrease trust in Estonian technology and comprise its economy more so than a similar event in other countries. This type of event would also diminish Estonia's shining role as a global cybersecurity leader and pioneer.

Global Presence

Estonia has emerged as a regional and global leader of cybersecurity, increasing its presence and power on the global stage. For example, Tallinn, the capital of Estonia, is home to NATO's Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence (CCDCOE) and was ranked the #1 country for cybersecurity in the EU in 2020.²⁷⁹ Additionally, non-EU and non-NATO states also seek cybersecurity expertise from Estonia – as evidenced in 2019 when three Azerbaijani officials visited Estonia to learn and discuss Estonia's development and implementation of legislation of Internet technologies and study Estonia's cybersecurity strategies overall.²⁸⁰

Estonia's global leadership in cybersecurity is a result of several events, including Estonia's successful e-governance system, its reliable and innovative start-ups, the country's response to the 2007 cyberattacks on its infrastructure, its national goal to become a global leader in cybersecurity, and its success in deterring and minimizing cyberattacks. It is important to note that, compared to other global leaders in the field such as the United States, India, and China, being a global cybersecurity leader is far more important to Estonia because it is a small state with a population of only 1.4 million. With such a small population, it is exceptionally difficult to be a global leader in several fields.

²⁷⁹ Invest in Estonia, "Estonia leads Europe in startups, unicorns, and investments per capita," Last modified March 2022, <https://investinestonia.com/estonia-leads-europe-in-startups-unicorns-and-investments-per-capita/>.

²⁸⁰ EU for Digital, "Azerbaijani officials to visit Estonia for study on cyber security," Last modified May 11, 2019, <https://eufordigital.eu/azerbaijani-officials-to-visit-estonia-for-study-visit-on-cyber-security/>.

Russian Threat

Estonia faces a unique and persistent threat from Russia that forces cybersecurity to be a national priority. Because of its Soviet past, ethnic Russians make up 25% of Estonia's total population. Additionally, Estonia shares a border with Russia and is only 338 kilometers from Russia's second largest city, St Petersburg. In 2007 Estonia suffered a cyberattack on its critical infrastructure, usually referred to as the "Bronze Night." The attack was prompted by the removal of a Soviet World War II statue in Tallinn. For ethnic Russians living in Estonia the statue was a memorialization of those who died in the war, while for ethnic Estonians the statue was a symbol of bitter occupation. Violent protests broke out in Tallinn between the local police and those who did not want the statue to be removed. The following day, a series of deliberate and targeted denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks against the country began. Government websites, major banks, media organizations, and political parties were affected by the attacks that lasted twenty-two days occurring in several waves. The Russian government was originally blamed for the attacks, strengthened by the fact that political tensions between the two countries had dramatically worsened in the weeks before. However, the Russian government's involvement cannot be properly verified as it is impossible to prove who was behind the attacks – most experts believe that politically motivated hackers were responsible.²⁸¹ This was a pivotal moment for the entire country and especially for legislators who released the first national cybersecurity law later that year. Although the Bronze Night was pivotal, it was only the first of Russian threats that Estonians paid attention to.

Several events involving the Russian government impacted Estonia's cybersecurity strategy following the 2007 attack. The 2008 Georgian-Russian war highlighted Russia's willingness to use cyberattacks against post-Soviet states in the name of protecting Russian citizens abroad. In response to Georgia's attack against separatist forces in South Ossetia, Russia sent

²⁸¹ Nick Robinson, and Alex Hardy, "Estonia: from the Bronze Night to cybersecurity pioneers," In *The Routledge Companion to Global Cyber-Security Strategy*, edited by Scott Romaniuk and Mary Manjikian, 211–255. London: Routledge, 2021.

military troops and attacked Georgian institutions with DDoS attacks and defacements. There were two phases of attacks with the first focused on news and government websites and the second focused on financial, business, and education institutions. Six years later, the annexation of Crimea reminded the Estonia government of the Soviet occupation and forced it to think about ensuring the continuity of government and public services in the face of a Russian attack. Consequently, a few years later Estonia made its data embassy agreement with Luxembourg. More recently, Estonia has paid close attention to and strongly detested Russia's invasion of Ukraine. In midst of the conflict, Russian has questioned the sovereignty of Lithuania, another Baltic state. This ongoing conflict will certainly impact the Estonia's next cybersecurity agenda.

Replicability

The heightened sense of cybersecurity that exists in Estonia is the cornerstone of the country's cybersecurity strategy, but it cannot be replicated in other countries, mainly because of the context in which it was developed. As the Internet became more prominent globally, Estonia needed to rebuild its economy and infrastructure. This, combined with the Russian threat, created a situation that put Internet technology and cybersecurity at the forefront of the Estonian government's strategy. Overtime, with policies such as the Tiger Leap Initiative and the relaxation of laws to foster start-up innovation, Internet technology, and cybersecurity, became increasingly important to the Estonian general population as well. In a practical sense, the circumstances that forced Estonia to prioritize e-Governance and cybersecurity are not replicable; this is because the Internet is no longer an emerging technology, it has permeated most of globe and many aspects of daily life. A case could made that a country whose economy and infrastructure needs to be rebuilt could prioritize e-governance and cybersecurity in a similar manner as Estonia in the 1990s. However, the materials required to accomplish that are much more expensive and less accessible to a country in that position. Additionally, without the threat of a cyberattack that could jeopardize sovereignty and wreck an economy, there is no guarantee that cybersecurity would remain a priority. The importance

Estonia places on cybersecurity is therefore essential to understand, and those hoping to learn lessons from Estonia's cybersecurity strategy must know which aspects of that strategy cannot be replicated.

International Cooperation in the EU and NATO

Cyber Deterrence

Estonia's international cooperation in the EU and NATO is essential to its cybersecurity strategy, especially for cyber deterrence. "Deterrence" Nye argues, "can be understood as dissuading someone from doing something by making them believe the costs will exceed the expected benefit."²⁸² This definition can also apply to the field of cybersecurity. Although some cybersecurity scholars argue that cyber deterrence is not possible, a case study on Estonian cyber deterrence by Pernik, proves that Estonia has been successful in the field.²⁸³ According to Pernik,, Estonia's cyber deterrence policies and practices are built on tools including cyber norms, international cooperation, information sharing with allies, defense, risk management, law enforcement and public attribution.²⁸⁴ Tools like cyber norms, law enforcement, and risk management are most beneficial in deterring domestic cyber threats, while international cooperation, information sharing with allies, defense, and public attribution are most beneficial in deterring foreign cyber threats. The study also argues that Estonia's success with cyber deterrence is rooted in its layered and whole-of-society approach, where international cooperation and presence is the first layer.

Importantly, Estonia has collective defense through its membership in the EU and NATO. The EU has the power to impose damaging sanctions on individuals, organizations, and states that use cyber-attacks or break

²⁸² Joseph S. Nye, "Deterrence in Cybersecurity." *China US Focus*, June 12, 2019.

²⁸³ Piret Pernik, "Hybrid CoE Paper 8: Cyber deterrence: A case study on Estonia's politics and practice." The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats. Last modified October 12, 2021. <https://www.hybridcoe.fi/publications/hybrid-coe-paper-8-cyber-deterrence-a-case-study-on-estonias-policies-and-practice/>.

²⁸⁴ Ibid.

International cyber laws. Similarly, in 2016, NATO added cyberspace as an operational domain that, when attacked, could trigger collective military defense.²⁸⁵ The power of these two organizations in the face of a cyber attack has been instrumental in preventing Russian cyber attacks following the Bronze Night.²⁸⁶ This has not been the case in other post-Soviet countries that do not have such membership.

Replicability

Estonia's cyber deterrence through international cooperation in the EU and NATO has limited replicability, particularly in Europe. Countries such as Ukraine and Georgia, who have expressed interest and have the potential to join those organizations, are good examples.²⁸⁷ However, cyber deterrence through collective defense could also be possible outside of Europe and North America if there was an organization with advanced cyber defense capabilities. However, those hoping to learn cyber deterrence from Estonia would benefit more from attempting to implement the other tools that Estonia uses for cyber deterrence (namely cyber norms, law enforcement, risk management, and public attribution), which are replicable.

National Cybersecurity Agendas

National cybersecurity agendas with specific and achievable goals are an essential aspect of Estonia's cybersecurity strategy that can be replicated in other countries. Following the 2007 Bronze Night attacks, the Etonian government developed national-level cybersecurity strategies to move the country forward and protect it from increasing threats. So far, three national strategies have been produced, and a fourth is expected in the

²⁸⁵ See https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm?selectedLocale=en for more information on cyberspace as the fifth domain of NATO's collective defense.

²⁸⁶ Kevin Kohler, "Estonia's National Cybersecurity and Cyberdefense Posture" (Zurich: Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich, 2020), https://css.ethz.ch/en/publications/risk-and-resilience-reports/details.html?id=/e/s/t/o/estonias_national_cybersecurity_and_cybe.

²⁸⁷ It is worth noting here that Ukraine and Georgia do share some similarity with Estonia because they are both post-Soviet states who have large Russian minorities and have been attacked by Russia.

coming years. Importantly, the strategies lay out goals based on the past (world events, its historical perspectives), the present (needs of the country), and the future (potential advancements in technology or threats). Additionally, the goals are realistic and achievable.

First National Strategy

The first national cybersecurity strategy was released in 2008 and marked a new era for the country's national security.²⁸⁸ Estonian cyber defense underwent significant organizational changes to improve coordination and collaboration within the government and between the government and private sector.²⁸⁹ The primary aim of the first strategy was to reduce the vulnerabilities of cyberspace in the nation as a whole. Among the main goals were establishing a multilevel system of securities measures, expanding Estonia's expertise and awareness of information security, adopting an appropriate regulatory framework to support the security and extensive use of information systems, and consolidating Estonia's position as one of the leading countries in international cybersecurity efforts. Additionally, there were two subgoals that included providing a comprehensive assessment of infrastructure interdependence, cross-dependencies, and development of measures to protect it in the future and committing to cybersecurity education, research, and development. The main legislative outcome included a law that recognized cyberattacks can constitute a national emergency, the re-defining of critical services and coordination agencies, an implementation of mandatory IT security standards, the creation of the Estonian Cyber Defense League, and changes to the penal code covering cybercrime. This strategy lasted until 2013.

²⁸⁸ Estonian Ministry of Defense, Cyber Security Strategy Committee, *Cyber Security Strategy*, 2008, https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwiyr-in4Mz7AhW0lmoFHeMpA8wQFnoECBIQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.enisa.europa.eu%2Ftopics%2Fnational-cyber-security-strategies%2Fncss-map%2Fstrategies%2Fcyber-security-strategy%2F%40%40download_version%2F993354831bfc4d689c20492459f8a086%2Ffile_en&usg=AOvVaw2__tiWtd_XI9UIAwOg-zGW.

²⁸⁹ Robinson, 213.

Second National Strategy

The second national cybersecurity strategy was released in 2014²⁹⁰ with a focus on critical infrastructure, consolidation, and digital continuity. It places a greater emphasis on protecting critical infrastructure and the preservation of vital services in both public and private sector with two major structural changes.²⁹¹ The first structural change brought cybersecurity policy under the control of Ministry of EAC, while the second structural change created a cybersecurity council. This strategy had five strategic objectives: ensuring the protection of information systems underlying important services, enhancing the fight against cybercrime, development of national cyber defense capabilities, managing evolving cybersecurity threats, and implementation of cross-sectoral activities. An important change in language and tone occurred, proposing the use of alternate ICT infrastructure solutions and secure storage of data overseas (data embassy), in the event of a large-scale disruption. Once again, the strategy seeks to develop Estonia's public awareness as a means to combat cybercrime and role as a digital power/cybersecurity leader. This strategy spanned for three years.

Third National Strategy

The third national strategy was released in 2019²⁹² amidst the Ukrainian border conflict and increasing global cyberattacks. It details Estonia's ability to withstand cyber threats and highlights cybersecurity as a shared responsibility across society. There are no major structural changes introduced, but there are main objectives including the development of a sustainable digital society, cybersecurity research and development,

²⁹⁰ Republic of Estonia, Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communication, *Cyber Security Strategy*, 2014, https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/national-cyber-security-strategies/ncss-map/Estonia_Cyber_security_Strategy.pdf.

²⁹¹ Robinson, 216.

²⁹² Republic of Estonia, Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications, *Cybersecurity Strategy*, 2019, <https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwilgv-j78z7AHUeRDABHT2fA1cQFnoECA8QAw&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.mkm.ee%2Fmedia%2F703%2Fdownload&usg=AOvVaw0QU1XSmTUWuP8cLmE80cTo>.

international cybersecurity contributions, and producing a cyber-literate society.²⁹³ The strategic objective here is to prepare country for the future by making it more resilient. Also worth noting is that the Estonian government acknowledges that its digital ecosystem is susceptible to advancing cryptography and calls for a big picture view that ensures compliance with security standards.

Replicability

Countries hoping to learn from Estonia's cybersecurity strategy should focus on these national agendas. There are several reasons for this. First, the Estonian government publishes these agendas (and so much more) on government websites for everyone to view. There is an abundance of information about these agendas, both from the Estonian government and academics from various countries. Second, the strategies were produced chronologically with evidence of Estonia's existing cybersecurity capabilities available for each strategy. This means countries can look at Estonia's capabilities for each of the strategies and find which strategy most closely matches its own capabilities. Additionally, Estonia's strategies can be compared to other countries' strategies to determine why Estonia has been successful in reaching its goals and theirs have not. Third, the goals in the agendas are specific and achievable, usually resulting in legislation. Countries hoping to develop their own goals in relation to cybersecurity would benefit from looking at these strategies and mimicking their characteristics or methods, even if the goals are different than those in the strategy.

The Estonian Cyber Defense League²⁹⁴ referenced in the first national cybersecurity strategy is worth exploring in more detail because of its unique and innovative model. The league, existing under the Cyber Defense Unit, uses volunteer involvement in national cyber defense. Its main focus is on "strengthening the professional cyber defense skills of its volunteer

²⁹³ Robinson, 218.

²⁹⁴ See <https://ccdcoe.org/library/publications/the-cyber-defence-unit-of-the-estonian-defence-league-legal-policy-and-organisational-analysis/> for more information on the Estonian Cyber Defense League.

members in order to prepare and enhance support capabilities in a crisis.”²⁹⁵ In fact, the Estonian Ministry of Defense requested that NATO do a case study of the league so that other countries may follow a similar model. The case study is meant to explore the legal context of using volunteers and identifies the major issues and concerns with the Estonia’s Cyber Defense League. For countries who are not able to afford competitive wages for cybersecurity professionals, this model is a viable option. The Estonian government suggests, “the emergence of a bottom-up initiative to support national defense and security objectives with regard to the emerging security threats from the ICT environment can be regarded as a rather organic development.” This is because the Cyber Defense Unit is built on longstanding private-public cybersecurity cooperation and well-established volunteer national defense tradition. Countries hoping to implement a similar model should be cognizant of the context in which Estonia’s Cyber Defense Unit was built, as to not develop false expectations.

Conclusion

This paper has discussed three aspects of Estonia’s cybersecurity strategy, identifying those aspects that are replicable and those that are not. Heightened perception of cybersecurity’s importance, international cooperation, and national agendas were the aspects chosen because they are the core of Estonian cybersecurity. This paper covered Estonia’s heightened perception of cybersecurity’s importance more thoroughly than the other two aspects because it is the most neglected in literature on Estonia’s cybersecurity strategy. Understanding why cybersecurity is so important to Estonians is essential to understanding Estonia’s cybersecurity ecosystem as a whole, and therefore enables us to identify which aspects of that system are replicable. International cooperation in the EU and NATO has been essential for Estonia’s cyber deterrence, especially from Russian cyber-attacks which have been widespread across the post-Soviet region. Estonia’s national cybersecurity agendas are the most replicable aspect of the country’s

²⁹⁵ From “The Cyber Defense Unit of the Estonian Defense League: Legal, Policy, and Organizational Analysis,” NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence, 2013.

cybersecurity, with methods that can be used in a wide range of countries. For example, countries with smaller economies and less cybersecurity professionals could benefit from an Estonian-style Cyber Defense League. Although this paper has provided an in-depth analysis about three critical aspects of Estonia’s cybersecurity ecosystem, there is still much more to explore. The country is eager to provide cybersecurity assistance to other countries and maintain its position as a global leader in the field.

Figure 3: Timeline of e-Governance in Estonia 1991-2005

Year	Event	Challenge	Effect
1991	Resuming independence	To build new technology infrastructure from scratch while catching up with West as quickly as possible.	Policy makers seize a unique opportunity to create low-cost, cutting-edge systems based around accessibility and efficiency.
1994	First draft of the “Principles of Estonian Information Policy”	To solve social challenges stemming from political uncertainty with IT solution.	1% of GDP earmarked as state funding for IT.
1996	Launch of the Tiger Leap Initiative	To catch up to the West by updating local IT infrastructure and establishing computer skills as a priority in schools.	99% of the population uses the internet regularly; Estonia ranked as #1 in the Digital Development Index.
1996	First e-banking services	To make banking solutions available to client in rural communities.	The development of high-quality e-banking services, which encouraged people to get online and embrace e-government, and later, e-ID.
1996	e-Cabinet meeting	To reduce government bureaucracy by making e-solutions part of governance.	The average length of Estonian cabinet meetings shrinks to 30 minutes from five hours.
2000	e-Tax board	To maximize state tax revenue to support the growing needs of a developing society.	To declare taxes now takes about 3 minutes online; 98% of people declare their income online.

Year	Event	Challenge	Effect
2000	m-parking	To manage growing traffic in urban areas, and to create a low-cost parking infrastructure.	95% of parking fees are paid via mobile phones; this solution has been adopted in several countries.
2001	X-Road	To create national integration platform to reduce data exchange costs, and end data leads from existing unsecured databases.	X-road became the backbone of e-Estonia, allows the public and private sector information systems to link; 99% of public services are available online 24/7.
2002	e-ID and digital signature	To securely identify residents using public and private e-services.	98% of Estonians have an ID card; digital signatures save 2% of GDP annually.
2005	i-Voting	To make voting more accessible to a country with a low population density.	1/3 of votes in elections are cast online, with votes cast from over 110 countries.

Source: <https://e-estonia.com/story/>

The Tribal Circle Process and the Potential for Positive Peace: A Focus on the Native American Experience in the United States

Wendelin HUME, PhD

Abstract: This paper seeks to understand why the US Government has failed to move beyond negative to positive peace with Native Americans. It then proposes policies needed to enable the shift towards positive peace to occur. Violence and discrimination against Native Americans are legacies of the US history of racial injustice. The US has done very little to acknowledge the genocide of Native Americans or the myth of racial difference created to justify the “removal” of Native people from their lands and the forced assimilation of their children. Strengthening partnerships and sustaining engagement serve as linchpins to bring together the necessary resources, following a culturally appropriate model, to achieve Positive Peace and improve life outcomes for future generations.

Key Words: Positive Peace, Native American, colonization, sovereignty, self-determination

Introduction

Boozhoo, or hello in Anishinaabe, a language often spoken where I grew up as a member of a First Nation reserve in northwestern Ontario Canada. Though I grew up in Canada, I was born in and have lived in the United States (US) for the majority of my life and so, this paper will focus on the Native American experience in the US. The primary research question this paper seeks to address is why the US Government has failed to move beyond negative to positive peace with Native Americans. It then proposes policies needed to enable this shift towards positive or “sustained peace”.

To answer the research question, I will provide an overview of the violence by the American government against the Native Americans over hundreds of years. This violence was so widespread that it resulted in the genocide of many unique tribes and cultures. It was not until 1924, that Native Americans were even considered citizens of the US. An examination of contemporary policies, remaining injustices that have inhibited the US Government in transitioning from negative to positive peace with Native American tribes, and recent efforts to improve relations with Tribes will be provided. Finally, policy suggestions and a new Tribally inspired model will be offered in the hope that by following a combination of complimentary international recommendations that have worked with other countries and the culturally relevant Tribal Circle Process, it may be possible to transform US government and Native American nation-to-nation relations to that of positive peace.

Key Concepts Pertaining to Native Americans and Positive Peace

There are a number of words or phrases that are used to indicate the original inhabitants of “Turtle Island”, or the North American continent. Native American is a term often used to refer to a member of one of the groups of people who were living in North America before Europeans arrived.²⁹⁶

²⁹⁶ Cambridge University Press, “Native American”, Cambridge Dictionary last modified 2022, <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/native-american>

For the purpose of this paper, the term will be used to refer to the Indigenous people of the US in particular.

Racism is one of the dominant historical contributors to conflict between the US and Native Americans. Racism is a prejudice, discrimination, or antagonism directed against a person or people on the basis of their membership in a particular racial or ethnic group. Typically, the group is a minority or marginalized and it is the belief of those that express racism, that different races possess distinct characteristics, abilities, or qualities, especially so as to distinguish races as inferior to their own.²⁹⁷

The experience of colonization is also important to recognize in understanding existing conflicts with Native Americans. Colonization is the action or process of settling among and establishing control over the indigenous people of an area. It occurs when one nation subjugates another, conquering its population and exploiting it, if not eradicating it, often while forcing its own language and cultural values upon the existing people.^{298, 299}

In the consideration of the notion of positive peace, it is useful to distinguish how it is distinguished from negative peace. Negative peace is more than just the absence of war, it is the absence of violence or even the fear of violence³⁰⁰. Positive peace on the other hand, is a transformational concept meant to put the focus on positives instead of negatives in society³⁰¹. The positives include the attitudes, institutions and structures that

²⁹⁷ Oxford University Press, "Oxford Languages and Google," Accessed July 20, 2022, <https://languages.oup.com/google-dictionary-en/>

²⁹⁸ Blakemore, Erin "What is colonialism? The history of colonialism is one of brutal subjugation of indigenous peoples." *National Geographic*. February 19, 2019, <https://www.nationalgeographic.com/culture/article/colonialism>


²⁹⁹ Perry, Barbara. *Silent Victims: Hate Crimes Against Native Americans*. Arizona: University of Arizona Press, 2008, <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1jf2d59>

³⁰⁰ Vision of Humanity, "Defining the Concept of Peace>> Positive & Negative Peace," Accessed July 15, 2022, <https://www.visionofhumanity.org/defining-the-concept-of-peace/>

³⁰¹ Galtung, Johan, Violence, "Peace, and Peace Research," *Journal of Peace Research*, 6.3 (1969): pp. 167-191 http://www2.kobe-u.ac.jp/~alexroni/IPD%202015%20readings/IPD%202015_7/Galtung_Violence,%20Peace,%20and%20Peace%20Research.pdf

create and sustain peaceful societies³⁰². Positive peace improves measures of inclusiveness, wellbeing and happiness by creating socio-economic resilience and maximizing human potential. As illustrated in Figure 1 below, positive peace is built and sustained with the interconnectedness of eight key factors, or pillars specifically: Free Flow of Information, Sound Business Environment, Equitable Distribution of Resources, High Levels of Human Capital, Free Flow of Information, Good Relations with Neighbors, Low Levels of Corruption, and Well-Functioning Government. According to the Positive Peace Report 2020, North America was the only world region which had not improved in their overall measures of Positive Peace since 2009³⁰³.

Figure 4: The eight pillars of positive peace (adapted by author).



Source: "Positive Peace Report 2020: Analyzing the Factors That Sustain Peace". Institute for Economics & Peace. December 2020, <http://visionofhumanity.org/resources>; graphic representation created by the Autho.

Historical Policies

The history of US government relations with Native Americans is rife with violent conflict and loss of life. The history can be divided into six main periods each titled based on the dominant US governmental approach toward

³⁰² "Positive Peace Report 2020: Analyzing the Factors That Sustain Peace". Institute for Economics & Peace. December 2020, <http://visionofhumanity.org/resources>

³⁰³ Ibid.

Native Americans at that time. A brief overview of these periods and a few of the key policies within each, can demonstrate the lack of peace and the violation of trust that has historically been prevalent in US policies towards Native Americans^{304,305}.

Colonial Period

The first period is the colonial period outlining the beginning of the establishment of the American colonies. As illustrated in Map 1, before European contact, there were about 12 million people in 600 tribes inhabiting North America. By 1880 the Indigenous population had diminished by 95% to only about 250,000³⁰⁶.

Map 7: Tribal Distribution, 1500



Source: O'Brien, Sharon. "Traditional Tribal Governments." *American Indian Tribal Governments*. Pp. 15. Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1989.

In 1607, Jamestown was founded in Virginia by settlers. By 1763, the English Royal Crown stated the lands in North America belonged to the Indian Tribes. However, about 10 years later in 1775, there was the American War

³⁰⁴ Stannard, David E. *American holocaust: Columbus and the Conquest of the New World*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.

³⁰⁵ Prucha, Fancis P., ed. *Documents of United States Indian Policy*. 3rd ed. Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2000.

³⁰⁶ History, "Native American History Timeline," Accessed July 20, 2022, <https://www.history.com/topics/native-american-history/native-american-timeline>

of Independence, and to finance the war, Indian lands were sold by the Americans without permission. The first treaty between the new American Government and an Indian Tribe took place in 1778. In 1781, the Articles of Confederation declared the federal government has authority over Indian affairs, and their rights shall not be infringed. That initial concept of Indian rights was reinforced in the 1787 Northwest Ordinance which stated that land shall not be taken from Indians.

Additionally, in 1788, the U.S. Constitution stated that Congress should regulate commerce with Tribes and that treaties are the supreme law of the land³⁰⁷. As more settlers continued to arrive on American shores in 1803, the Louisiana Territory was purchased not from the Native Americans but from the French. Then in 1804, Lewis and Clark were sent by President Jefferson to charter the western part of the largely unexplored continent.

Removal Period

The next historical period, the Removal period, saw numerous attempts to remove Native Americans from their ancestral lands despite previous treaties and statements that the lands belonged to the Native Americans. In 1823, three Supreme Court decisions known as the Marshall Trilogy, stated that tribes cannot sell their own lands without permission of the federal government³⁰⁸. Another ominous piece of legislation was in 1824, when the Bureau of Indian Affairs was created and placed under the War Department. In 1830, the Indian Removal Act was passed, which ordered the forced removal of Eastern Tribes to the west of Mississippi River by the US Army, see Map 2.

The Removal Act forced the Cherokee, Choctaw, Creek, Chickasaw, and Seminole Nations to cede their lands to the United States and to be relocated west of the Mississippi River. Known as the Trail of Tears, this 1,200-mile government – mandated forced march relocation took 9 months, during

³⁰⁷ Prucha, Francis P. ed. *Documents of United States Indian Policy*. 3rd ed. Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2000.

³⁰⁸ Wilkins, David E. *American Indian Sovereignty and the U.S. Supreme Court: The Masking of Justice*. Texas: University of Texas Press: 1997.

which tens of thousands of indigenous people died as a result of food shortages, exertion, disease, dehydration, and exposure³⁰⁹. While some theorize that Indian removal was inevitable given US expansion ambitions, others point out that it was a contested political act—resisted by both indigenous peoples and many US citizens, which Congress passed by a thin margin³¹⁰.

Map 8: Unorganized Tribal Territory 1834



Source: O'Brien, Sharon. "A Century of Destruction." *American Indian Tribal Governments*. Pp. 62 Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1989.

Reservation Period

As fighting continued between the US government and many Native American tribes over the broken treaties and loss of land, the mid 1800's saw the beginning of the Reservation period. In 1849, the Bureau of Indian Affairs was established and placed in the new Department of the Interior. Increasingly, Native Americans were placed on tracts of land known as reservations and they were often ordered not to leave those lands. For instance, in 1849, the fighting between Navajo and the US Army resulted in the incarceration of Navajo on reservation lands, see examples in Map 3.

³⁰⁹ Norton-Smith, Kathryn, Lynn, Kathy, Chief, Cozzetto, Karen, Donatuto, Jamie Hiza Redsteer, Margaret, Kruger, E. Linda, Maldonado, Julie, Viles, Carson and Whyte, P. Kyle, "Climate Change and Indigenous Peoples: A Synthesis of Current Impacts and Experiences," United States Department.

³¹⁰ Claudio, Saunt, *Unworthy republic : the dispossession of Native Americans and the road to Indian territory*, 1st ed., W.W. Norton & Company, Inc. : New York, 2021.

to a two-pronged assault on their tribal identities from the moment they entered one of these institutions. First, school officials stripped away all outward signs of children's association with tribal life. School officials mandated uniforms, dictated hair length, and in many cases ordered children to change their Indian names to common Euro-American names. Second, the boarding schools' pedagogy was intended to eliminate the traditional culture from Native youth. By removing children from the "corrupting" influences of their families and everyday reservation life for years at a time, these institutions usurped Indian parenting responsibilities, tore apart tribal kinship networks, and destroyed the fabric of Indian communities³¹³. Finally, the 1871 Dawes Act, stated that the US will no longer make treaties but protect those that already exist.

Allotment and Assimilation Period

During the next period Native Americans continued to see loss of life and lands as the US government tried to assimilate the people and allot the lands to individuals, often non-Native individuals, instead of the tribes it had already been given to. In 1876, the infamous Battle of Little Big Horn took place and General Custer and 250 soldiers died. As a result, the US confiscated the Black Hills and other lands that had been protected by treaty³¹⁴. In 1887, the General Allotment Act removed land from communal Tribal ownership to individual allotments and excess land was open to homesteading by non-Indians. The resulting land loss can be seen in Map 4.


In 1906, the Burke Act – allowed the Secretary of Interior to administer Indian trust land, and 27 million acres of allotted land was lost to sale by 1934. Despite the mistreatment by the US government, more than 10,000 American Indians served in WWI. In 1923, Commissioner of Indian Affairs John Collier declared that "the administration of Indian affairs [is]

³¹³ The White House Washington, "2014 Native Youth Report," Executive Office of the President, December 2014, <https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED565658.pdf>

³¹⁴ History, "Native American History Timeline," Accessed July 20, 2022, <https://www.history.com/topics/native-american-history/native-american-timeline>

a disgrace—a policy designed to rob Indians of their property, destroy their culture [,] and eventually exterminate them”³¹⁵.

Map 10: Tribal Land Cession



Source: O'Brien, Sharon. "A Century of Confusion." *American Indian Tribal Governments*. Pg. 79 Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1989.

As a precursor to changes in policy, in 1924, Native Americans were granted US Citizenship and in 1928, the first federal study on Native Americans, titled the Merriam Report, detailed the destructiveness of federal Indian policy.

³¹⁵ The White House Washington, "2014 Native Youth Report," Executive Office of the President, December 2014, <https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED565658.pdf>

Reorganization Period

In an effort to reorganize American Indian policy, in 1930, Congressional Hearings were held on the status of American Indians. Then in 1934, the Indian Reorganization Act, which repealed the Dawes Act, allowed Tribes to adopt their own constitutions and by-laws, if they were Federally approved.³¹⁶ For the next 20 years, many tribes moved away from their traditional forms of governance and tried to mimic American governance, by adopting constitutions and holding elections. As wars gripped the global community more than 44,000 American Indians served in WWII and more than 10,000 American Indians served in the Korean War.

Tribal Termination Period

Despite some progress with reorganization, the next period focused on trying to terminate tribes. In 1953, House Resolution 108 passed, providing a process where a Tribe's status could be dissolved and lands taken and sold. As a result of this resolution, 11,466 Indians lost official Tribal identity and 1,362,155 acres were lost. Another change was in allowing State jurisdiction over Indian lands in six states in 1953 as a result of Public Law 280³¹⁷. Furthermore, in 1955, the Supreme Court held that land occupancy by Indians is not a right and it can be terminated without compensation. Then in 1956, the Relocation Act was passed, which encouraged Native Americans to leave their Tribal lands and move to urban areas.

³¹⁶ Native Voices, "1934 President Franklin Roosevelt signs the Indian Reorganization Act," Native Peoples' Concepts of Health and Illness, Accessed July 15, 2022, <https://www.nlm.nih.gov/nativevoices/timeline/452.html>

³¹⁷ Prucha, Fancis P., ed. *Documents of United States Indian Policy*. 3rd ed. Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2000.

Contemporary Policies

Self – Determination Period

Contemporary policies tended to focus on the self-determination and sovereignty of Native Americans. As the US experienced many citizens pushing for enhanced civil rights during the 1960's Native Americans advocated for self-determination. As a result, several Acts were passed including the Indian Civil Rights Act in 1968, which ensured Constitutional protections for Native Americans. In 1971, the Alaska Native Claims Act passed, which allowed regional and Inuit village corporations to own and manage 44 million acres of land³¹⁸. Then in 1978, Native American spiritual beliefs were no longer illegal, when the American Indian Religious Freedom Act passed, which allows the use and possession of sacred objects, and the freedom to worship through traditional rites.

Sovereignty Period

Currently, policies primarily focus on sovereignty – the power and authority to govern oneself and be free of external control³¹⁹. In 1980 the Supreme Court ruled that the Sioux must be compensated for confiscation of the Black Hills, the Sioux refused the money in an attempt to regain the land³²⁰. In 1990, the Native American Graves Protection Act was passed, recognizing the importance of sacred burial sites³²¹. As Native Americans grew in their legal ability and desire to govern themselves, once again they also continued to grow in number, reaching 2.47 million according to the 2000 Census.

³¹⁸ History, "Native American History Timeline," Accessed July 20, 2022, <https://www.history.com/topics/native-american-history/native-american-timeline>

³¹⁹ Oxford University Press, "Oxford Languages and Google," Accessed July 20, 2022, <https://languages.oup.com/google-dictionary-en/>

³²⁰ Jr. Deloria, Vine. *God Is Red: A Native View of Religion*. 2nd ed. Colorado: Fulcrum Publishing, 1994.

³²¹ Trope, Jack F. and Echohawk, Walter R. 'The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act: Background and Legislative History'. *Readings in American Indian Law: Recalling The Rhythm of Survival*, Carrillo, Jo, ed., pp 178-197. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998.

Remaining Injustices

Despite a number of improvements in policy and law, there are a number of remaining injustices as a result of the historical trauma and inequities experienced by Native Americans and a lack of additional government or society efforts to address these inequities. These injustices include inequality, hate crimes, police violence, mass incarceration, and high suicide rates to name a few. Many in the US are not aware of the issues faced by Native Americans, as they are nearly invisible in the media, and their rich and resilient history is neglected in most US educational curriculums.

Historically, Native Americans and their families have been underrepresented in the social sciences literature. Scholars have attributed this near invisibility to shifting census categories, underrepresentation in samples, and residence in more rural geographic areas³²². That disparity and the invisibility it suggests are likely not accidental³²³. This underrepresentation also creates a lack of reliable data and research to assist in forming policies or establishing needed programs.

More than one in three American Indian and Alaska Native children live in poverty, and the high school graduation rate is 67 percent, the lowest of any racial/ethnic demographic group across all schools³²⁴. When discussing the political and economic inequality of people of color, it often seemingly becomes their own fault. Marginalized groups still experience inequality, but it is increasingly covert, institutionalized, and “void of direct racial terminology” except for Native Americans in the US³²⁵.

³²² Gavazzi, Stephen. “Emerging Ideas: The Near Invisibility of Native Americans And Their Families Within The Flagship Journals Of Family Science.” *Family Relations*, 1–9. (2022), <https://doi.org/10.1111/fare.12650>

³²³ Treuer, David. “Invisibility, Disappearance, and the Native American Future.” *Claremont McKenna College*. March 30, 2022, <https://www.cmc.edu/athenaeum/invisibility-disappearance-and-native-american-future>

³²⁴ The White House Washington, “2014 Native Youth Report,” Executive Office of the President, December 2014, <https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED565658.pdf>

³²⁵ Dwanna L. Robertson. “Invisibility in the Color-Blind Era: Examining Legitimized Racism against Indigenous Peoples.” *American Indian Quarterly* 39, no. 2 (2015): pp. 113–53, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5250/amerindiquar.39.2.0113#metadata_info_tab_contents

Big data and the algorithms used, can further biased treatment of some groups. Big data – is a broad term usually referring to extremely large data sets that can be hard to manage, but may be statistically analyzed, to reveal patterns, trends, and associations, often relating to human behavior and interactions³²⁶. Algorithms are step by step instructions for either hardware or software based routines³²⁷. If these instructions contain an error or bias that is repeated, such as in a computer system, it can create unfair outcomes. These outcomes, such as privileging one category over another, by pushing certain users’ content out of a social feed, further marginalizes already marginalized groups. This makes those who are underserved and ostracized in society, even more invisible and underserved, at least on social media.

While hateful attitudes may be experienced in social media, hate crimes can also be a concern for Native Americans³²⁸. The FBI relies on local police agencies to voluntarily report hate crimes, so they tend to be underreported. The Bureau catalogued 4,200 hate crimes in 2015, 3.4 percent of them against Native Americans and Alaska Natives. The figure is statistically significant among a people who represent only one percent of the total U.S. population³²⁹. During 2010-19, persons who are American Indian, Alaska Native, or two or more races had the highest rate of violent hate crime victimizations³³⁰.

Hatred does not just happen at the hands of other citizens but also at the hands of police. Allegations of excessive police use of force against African-Americans has captured international attention recently. But there is

³²⁶ GeeksforGeeks, “Difference Between Big Data and Data Science,” May 19, 2022, <https://www.geeksforgeeks.org/difference-between-big-data-and-data-science/>

³²⁷ Kordzadeh Nima & Maryam Ghasemaghaei “Algorithmic bias: review, synthesis, and future research directions.” *European Journal of Information Systems*. 31:3, (2022): pp. 388-409, DOI: 10.1080/0960085X.2021.1927212

³²⁸ Chavers, Dean. *Racism In Indian Country*. New York: Peter lang Publishing, Inc., 2009.

³²⁹ Hilleary, Cecily. “Rise in Hate Crimes Alarms Native American Communities.” VOA. June 5, 2017, <https://www.voanews.com/a/rise-in-hate-crimes-alarms-native-american-communities/3887303.html>

³³⁰ Kena, Grace and Thompson, Alexandra, “Hate Crime Victimization, 2005-2019,” U.S. Department of Justice, September 2021, NCJ 300954, https://bjs.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh236/files/media/document/hcv0519_1.pdf

another group whose stories you are less likely to hear about. Native Americans are killed in police encounters at a higher rate than any other racial or ethnic group, according to data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Yet rarely do these deaths gain the national spotlight³³¹. Data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention collected between 1999 and 2011 shows that Native Americans, who are 0.8 percent of the United States population, comprise 1.9 percent of police killings. They are 3.1 times more likely to be killed by police than whites. Law enforcement kills African Americans at 2.8 times the rate of whites³³².

The reservation to prison pipeline refers to the displacement of Native Americans from their communities to prisons and jails due to patterns of mass incarceration³³³. Once Native youth are arrested, it is harder for them to escape the system – being referred to courts at a much higher rate than White youth^{334,335}.

Compared to White juvenile offenders, Native youth are 1.5 times more likely to be incarcerated and referred to the adult criminal system^{336,337}. Approximately 60 percent of juveniles held in federal custody are Native

³³¹ Hansen, Elise, “The forgotten minority in police shootings,” CNN, November 13, 2017, <https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/10/us/native-lives-matter/index.html>

³³² Equal Justice Initiative, “Police Killings Against Native Americans Are Off the Charts and Off the Rader,” October 31, 2016, <https://eji.org/news/native-americans-killed-by-police-at-highest-rate-in-country/>

³³³ Wang, Leah, “The U.S. criminal justice system disproportionately hurts Native people: the data visualized,” October 8, 2021, <https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2021/10/08/indigenoupeoplesday/>

³³⁴ “Are Native Youth Being Pushed into Prison?.” *National Congress of American Indians*. Accessed July 5, 2022, https://www.ncai.org/policy-research-center/research-data/prc-publications/School-to-Prison_Pipeline_Infographic.pdf

³³⁵ Hockenberry, Sarah and Charles Puzanchera. “Juvenile Court Statistics, 2015.” *Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention*. 2018, <https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/juvenile-court-statistics-2015>

³³⁶ “Are Native Youth Being Pushed into Prison?.” *National Congress of American Indians*. Accessed July 5, 2022, https://www.ncai.org/policy-research-center/research-data/prc-publications/School-to-Prison_Pipeline_Infographic.pdf

³³⁷ Arya, Neelum and Addie C. Rolnick. “A Tangled Web of Justice American Indian and Alaska native Youth in Federal, State and Tribal Justice Systems.” *Race and Ethnicity Series*. 1 (2008). Pp. 1-35, <http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/research/cfyj-reports/item/a-tangled-web-of-justice-american-indian-and-alaska-native-youth-in-federal-state-and-tribal-justice-systems>

Americans³³⁸. According to Stormy Ogden, “Europeans locked up Native people in military forts, missions, reservations, boarding schools, and today, increasingly, in state and federal prisons. For American Indians, incarceration is an extension of the history and violent mechanisms of colonization”³³⁹.

A final but drastic remaining injustice to be mentioned here is the high suicide rate of Native Americans. Native Americans have the highest rates of suicide of any racial/ethnic group in the US. The rates of suicide in this population have been increasing since 2003³⁴⁰. Suicide is the second leading cause of death—2.5 times the national rate—for Native youth in the 15 to 24 year old age group³⁴¹. Violent deaths, unintentional injuries, homicide, and suicide, account for 75 percent of all mortality in the second decade of life for American Indian/Alaska Natives³⁴².

Recent Efforts – A Troubling Mix

Today, federal and state partners along with Tribal communities themselves are making improvements in a number of areas, including education. However, the absence of any significant increase in financial and political investment makes the path forward uncertain. Although there have been some advances in tribal self-determination, the opportunity gaps remain startling³⁴³. Despite the demonstrated importance of education in

³³⁸ “The Indigenous ‘Womb To Prison’ Pipeline.” *Indian Country Today*. March 25, 2021, <https://indiancountrytoday.com/newscasts/stephanie-autumn-03-25-2021>

³³⁹ “Carceral Colonialism: Imprisonment in Indian Country How Has Settler Colonialism Shaped The Carceral State?.” *University of Minnesota*. Accessed July 5, 2022, <https://statesofincarceration.org/states/minnesota-carceral-colonialism-imprisonment-indian-country>

³⁴⁰ Allison Ertl, Kameron Sheats, Emiko Petrosky, Asha Ivey-Stephenson, and Katherine A. Fowler. “Suicides Among American Indian/Alaska Natives — National Violent Death Reporting System, 18 States, 2003–2014.” 67 (2018). Pp. 237–242, <https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/67/wr/mm6708a1.htm>

³⁴¹ The White House Washington, “2014 Native Youth Report,” Executive Office of the President, December 2014, <https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED565658.pdf>

³⁴² “Mental and Behavioral Health – American Indians/Alaska Natives.” *U.S. Department of Health and Human Services*. May, 19 2021, <https://minorityhealth.hhs.gov/omh/browse.aspx?lvl=4&lvlid=39>

³⁴³ The White House Washington, “2014 Native Youth Report,” Executive Office of the President, December 2014, <https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED565658.pdf>

improving the future outlook for minority communities, the inconsistent and often detrimental (i.e. boarding schools) history of Native American education policy up to this point has left lasting scars that continue to affect Native youth and the underlying nation-to-nation relationship. Today, tribes operate more than two-thirds of Bureau of Indian Education schools and 37 tribal colleges and universities. More than 200 tribal nations have created their own education departments or agencies and vested them with the authority and responsibility to implement tribal education goals and priorities. Despite these significant strides, today's Native youth continue to confront formidable barriers to success³⁴⁴.

A few recent key policies have the potential to improve the conditions for peace for Native Americans, but so far those improvements have not been realized. The 2010 Cobell Settlement required the Federal government to create a \$1.5 billion fund to pay Indian trust beneficiaries, a \$1.9 billion trust land fund and \$60 million scholarship fund to improve access to higher education³⁴⁵. So far, these funds, which are meant to compensate for some of the funding inequities and loss of land, represent just the beginning of reconciliation efforts, but further efforts have yet to be realized.

In 2016, Native American communities organized grassroots protests to the development of the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) which possibly threatened key waterways but which was intended to move oil from the Bakken oilfields. While the protests caught media attention and brought many tribes together for the first time in collective protest, the opportunity for Native Americans to have a voice and effect policy was destroyed. The pipeline was completed despite the protests and now many of the protestors still have criminal charges cases active in the American Courts.

Both the 2019 Savanna's Act and the Not Invisible Act of 2020, increase the coordination of efforts to reduce violent crime within Indian lands and against Indians. While the intent of the acts are clear, the questions

³⁴⁴ Ibid.

³⁴⁵ U.S. Department of the Interior, "Consultations on Cobell Trust Land Consolidation," U.S. Department of the Interior, Accessed July 20, 2022, <https://www.doi.gov/cobell>

that remain are whether the coordination will really increase, whether research and data collection will improve, and whether the coordination will result in fewer violent crimes against Native Americans without funding or enhanced prosecutorial actions.

Most recently as decided in the 2022 Supreme Court case of *Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta* (21-429), the Federal Government and the State have concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country. This decision goes against the Tribal efforts of self-governance and sovereignty, especially on their own lands^{346,347}.

Inhibitors of Positive Peace

To improve US Tribal relationships from one of negative peace to positive peace, it is important to identify the inhibitors of positive peace. If one wants to know why American Indians have the highest rates of poverty of any racial group, why suicide is the leading cause of death among Indian men, why Native women are two and a half times more likely to be raped than the national average and why gang violence affects American Indian youth more than any other group, one must not look only to history. While there is no doubt about the violence against Native American communities in the 19th and 20th centuries, it is the policies today of denying Native Americans ownership of their land, refusing them access to the free market, and failing to provide the police and legal protections due to them as American citizens that have turned many reservations into basically small third-world countries in the middle of the richest and freest nation on earth^{348, 349}.

³⁴⁶ Wilkins, David E., and Lomawaima, Tsianina, K. *Uneven Ground: American Indian Sovereignty and Federal Law*. Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001.

³⁴⁷ Wilkins, David E. *American Indian Sovereignty and the U.S. Supreme Court: The Masking of Justice*. Texas: University of Texas Press: 1997.

³⁴⁸ Riley, Namoni Schaefer, *The new Trail of Tears : how Washington is destroying American Indians*, 1st ed., Encounter Books: New York, 2016.

³⁴⁹ Chavers, Dean. *Racism In Indian Country*. New York: Peter lang Publishing, Inc., 2009.

Discrimination and harassment are widely reported by Native Americans across multiple domains of their lives, regardless of geographic or neighborhood context. Native Americans report major disparities compared to whites in fair treatment by institutions, particularly with health care and police/courts. Results suggest modern forms of discrimination and harassment against Native Americans are systemic and untreated problems^{350, 351}.

Thirty nine percent of the American Indian and Alaska Native population is under 24 years old compared to 33 percent of the total population. Across the US, tribes and their communities are making meaningful and often transformative differences in the lives of their children. By bolstering the interest and involvement of Native youth in tribal cultures and traditions, Native communities have learned how to reach struggling youth. But the challenges faced by Native youth require broader support. Federal, state, local, and tribal governments, as well as private and non-profit sector institutions, all have roles in assuring that all young people have the tools and opportunities they need to succeed³⁵².

In 2012, median household income for the American Indian and Alaska Native population stood at \$39,715 compared to \$56,746 for the U.S. overall. The poverty rate among American Indians and Alaska Natives was 27 percent compared to 15 percent for the nation, and at 34 percent, child poverty was 13 percentage points higher than the national average of 21 percent³⁵³.

There is a lack of research pertaining to the impacts of climate change on sovereignty, culture, health, and economies that are currently being experienced by Alaska Native and American Indian tribes and other indigenous

³⁵⁰ Findling , G. Mary, Logan S. Casey, Stephanie A. Fryberg, Steven Hafner, Robert J. Blendon, John M. Benson, Justin M. Sayde, and Carolyn Miller. Discrimination in the United States: Experiences of native Americans. *Health Services Research*. 54. (2019): pp. 1431– 1441, <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1475-6773.13224>

³⁵¹ Chavers, Dean. *Racism In Indian Country*. New York: Peter lang Publishing, Inc., 2009.

³⁵² The White House Washington, "2014 Native Youth Report," Executive Office of the President, December 2014, <https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED565658.pdf>

³⁵³ Ibid.

communities in the US³⁵⁴. Development of key frameworks that inform, and are informed by, indigenous understandings of climate change impacts and pathways for adaptation and mitigation are needed. Research regarding tribal sovereignty and self-determination, culture and cultural identity, and indigenous community health indicators is needed. To understand the existing health disparities experienced by indigenous communities, as well as the ways that these disparities will be exacerbated by climate change, one must consider not only historical trauma, but also structural violence rooted in poverty, inequality, and discrimination³⁵⁵.

Currently, there is no governance framework in place in the United States or abroad that evaluates the impact of climate-change and determines when a community can no longer be protected. There are also no institutional mechanisms that determine when a preventive relocation should occur, who makes the decision to preventively relocate, or how the decision should be made³⁵⁶. There is currently no national framework to deal with the relocation of tribal communities, and forced relocation is compounded by the current lack of governance mechanisms and funds to support the communities. This intensifies community impoverishment, negative economic and health impacts, and loss of place, social networks, and culture caused by relocation. Currently, federal laws obstruct Tribes from expanding or transferring tribal jurisdiction and few tribes have the economic means to buy new land and move all of their Tribal members³⁵⁷.

Finally, the ability for the Native Americans to have voice and protest and shape policy is important in the movement toward positive peace. As policing continues to be militarized and state legislatures around the country

³⁵⁴ Norton-Smith, Kathryn, Lynn, Kathy, Chief, Cozzetto, Karen, Donatuto, Jamie Hiza Redsteer, Margaret, Kruger, E. Linda, Maldonado, Julie, Viles, Carson and Whyte, P. Kyle, "Climate Change and Indigenous Peoples: A Synthesis of Current Impacts and Experiences," United States Department of Agriculture, October 2016, https://www.fs.fed.us/pnw/pubs/pnw_gtr944.pdf

³⁵⁵ Norton-Smith, Kathryn, Lynn, Kathy, Chief, Cozzetto, Karen, Donatuto, Jamie Hiza Redsteer, Margaret, Kruger, E. Linda, Maldonado, Julie, Viles, Carson and Whyte, P. Kyle, "Climate Change and Indigenous Peoples: A Synthesis of Current Impacts and Experiences," United States Department of Agriculture, October 2016, https://www.fs.fed.us/pnw/pubs/pnw_gtr944.pdf

³⁵⁶ Ibid.

³⁵⁷ Ibid.

pass laws criminalizing protest in the US, the fact that a private security firm retained by a private Fortune 500 oil and gas company coordinated its efforts with local, state, and federal law enforcement to undermine the Native American protest movement has profoundly anti-democratic implications³⁵⁸.

TigerSwan was the security agency hired by the pipeline company, Energy Transfer Partners, to suppress the protests. TigerSwan operates worldwide and specializes in armed conflict zones. The company utilized militaristic counterterrorism tactics including attack dogs, against Indigenous led anti-DAPL protests in several states.

North Dakota law enforcement and the national guard responded to Standing Rock demonstrations with an aggressive show of force, as police in riot gear deployed pepper spray, tear gas and other “less than lethal” weapons against unarmed people, in some cases leading to serious injuries³⁵⁹. These actions violated the already precarious negative peace with the conscious use of “fear” tactics. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) called for the Department of Justice to investigate the use of force by law enforcement officers on the protesters. The ACLU was joined by Amnesty International and the National Lawyers Guild in condemning the use of force by law enforcement agencies³⁶⁰.

Circle Process/Policy Suggestions

In support of the possibility of restoring negative peace and moving toward a positive sustained peace, a few International nation-to-nation policy suggestions for peace that are in alignment with the concept of positive

³⁵⁸ Brown, Alleen, Parrish, Will, and Speri Alice, “Leaked Documents Reveal Counterterrorism Tactics Used at Standing Rock to “Defeat Pipeline Insurgencies,” The Intercept, May 27, 2017, <https://theintercept.com/2017/05/27/leaked-documents-reveal-security-firms-counterterrorism-tactics-at-standing-rock-to-defeat-pipeline-insurgencies/>

³⁵⁹ The Guardian, “Dakota Access pipeline activists say police have used ‘excessive’ force,” Accessed July 20, 2022, <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jan/18/dakota-access-pipeline-protesters-police-used-excessive-force>

³⁶⁰ Ibid.

peace, as well as Native American cultural based teachings from the Tribal Circle Process will be shared^{361, 362, 363}.

The suggestions are visually represented in the Figure 2 Medicine Wheel Model for Positive Peace. The model is my own creation and while it is general enough to represent the beliefs of most Tribal cultures, and thus should be useful for policy makers, I do not presume to speak for all Native people. The model itself encourages elements of self-design by the varied Tribal cultures. The circle is a sacred symbol which represents the interconnectedness of all of us. The four directions and their colors are sacred as they offer us lesson and guidance to improve our selves as human beings. The Medicine Wheel puts the emphasis on getting well rather than getting even. The Circle Process is often used in Native American culture both historically and contemporarily to solve conflicts and gather community members to collectively assist those in need of healing or support and accountability³⁶⁴. The international recommendations are shared in the innermost circle while the Tribal Circle Process ideals are listed in the outer ring of the model. All model elements are interconnected.

In the model we start in the East quadrant of the wheel, as is culturally traditional. East is represented by the color yellow, and it symbolizes our early childhood or beginning steps of our journey, during which the value of respect is learned. In this quadrant are the international recommendations to achieve positive peace – Access to Services/Protection, the Absence of Violence, and Accountable Revenue Distribution. As this paper has demonstrated, currently none of these recommendations and (few of the others which follow) have yet to be realized by Native Americans.

³⁶¹ Ross, Rupert. *Indigenous Healing: Exploring Traditional Paths*. Canada, Ontario: Penguin Group, 2014.

³⁶² McCaslin, Wanda D. ed. *Justice As Healing: Indigenous Ways*. Minnesota: Living Justice Press, 2005.

³⁶³ Robinson, Mary. "Conflict Prevention, Post-Conflict Peace building and Promotion of Durable Peace, Rule of Law and Governance". United Nations: Department of Economic and Social Affairs: Sustainable Development. February 6, 2014. <https://sdgs.un.org/statements/conflict-prevention-post-conflict-peace-building-and-promotion-durable-peace-rule-law>

³⁶⁴ Pranis, Kay, Stuart, Barry, and Wedge, Mark. *Peacemaking Circles: From Conflict to Community*. Minnesota: Living Justice Press, 2003.


Yet, the changes would be appreciated in Tribal communities as they are in alignment with tribal values. The tribal values in support of these recommendations include acting with respect, participating in the process voluntarily, and conducting the process to be inclusive of all members.

The South quadrant is colored black, representing our life as youth when we learn to practice caring for all of our 'relatives' be they people, plants, or animals. In line with caring, the international recommendations include: Participatory Decision Making, an Increase in Transparency, and Promoting Dialogue. The Tribal strategies that align with the international recommendations are encouraging direct participation by everyone involved, allowing each Tribal community to add elements of their own self-design to the process so it reflects their values and beliefs, and creating an interest-based approach by ensuring participants understand how the issue at hand affects people, places, or things they care about.

The West quadrant is colored red and it represents our adulthood where we need to work at honesty in all of our interactions. The international recommendations include: the Right to Public Information and Inclusive Economic Governance. The Tribal strategies include the open mindedness to be flexible during the Circle Process and to make sure there is equal opportunity for all to have their say and influence the process.

The North quadrant is colored white, it represents being an elder and sharing your wisdom with members of the Tribe. The set of international recommendations are the Management of Natural Resources, Address Grievances, and Inclusive Governance. The Tribal strategies include: allowing our spirituality to guide us, heal in a holistic way (mind, body and spirit), and discuss and negotiate between all parties (not vote or decide purely by rank) to reach a consensus.

Figure 5: A Medicine Wheel Model for Positive Peace



Source: author creation.

Given the complexity and magnitude of the historical and current challenges facing Native Americans, there is a need for a broad array of partners to support tribes in identifying solutions to help Native youth and all Tribal members peacefully reach their potential. Federal commitments will be critical to this collaboration. Substantial opportunities exist for tribal nations to engage the private sector and public sector to create and maintain transformative programs. Organizations committed to working on issues of poverty, health, juvenile justice, educational inequality, and student opportunities can play an important role in improving the lives of Native youth³⁶⁵. To raise the visibility of Native American issues we could strengthen tribal control of education and basically everything in Tribal communities so comprehensive, community-based tribal supports can be implemented. Education about Tribal history and cultures should be part of the curriculum for all US classrooms. Also, efforts need to be

³⁶⁵ The White House Washington, "2014 Native Youth Report," Executive Office of the President, December 2014, <https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED565658.pdf>

made to strengthen and expand culturally relevant efforts that target suicide prevention^{76, 366}.

To address the impacts of climate change on Native Americans, approaches to relocation must be grounded in a human-rights-based framework³⁶⁷. Given the historical and contemporary forced relocations of indigenous peoples, indigenous communities must be empowered to make their own decisions regarding relocation. Relocation should be considered only after all possibilities for staying in place [e.g., resistance] are exhausted and should not be used as a way to force communities off of their land. According to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP 2007: Art: 1), “Indigenous peoples possess collective rights indispensable for their existence and well-being, including the right to collective self-determination and the collective rights to the lands, territories, and natural resources they have traditionally occupied and used.” In the context of climate change, the right to self-determination means that people have the right to make decisions regarding adaptation strategies and the right to make fundamental decisions about when, how, where, and if relocation occurs³⁶⁸. Traditional knowledge affects how indigenous communities understand climate-change impacts and develop adaptation strategies. Traditional knowledge has enabled indigenous populations to adapt to environmental changes for thousands of years and can inform climate action by recognizing changes, contributing to adaptation strategies, and implementing sustainable land management practices.

³⁶⁶ U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “To Live To See the Great Day That Dawns: Preventing Suicide by American Indian and Alaska Native Youth and Young Adults,” DHHS Publication SMA (10)-4480, CMHS-NSPL-0196, 2010 <https://store.samhsa.gov/sites/default/files/d7/priv/sma10-4480.pdf>

³⁶⁷ Norton-Smith, Kathryn, Lynn, Kathy, Chief, Cozzetto, Karen, Donatuto, Jamie Hiza Redsteer, Margaret, Kruger, E. Linda, Maldonado, Julie, Viles, Carson and Whyte, P. Kyle, “Climate Change and Indigenous Peoples: A Synthesis of Current Impacts and Experiences,” United States Department of Agriculture, October 2016, https://www.fs.fed.us/pnw/pubs/pnw_gtr944.pdf

³⁶⁸ Norton-Smith, Kathryn, Lynn, Kathy, Chief, Cozzetto, Karen, Donatuto, Jamie Hiza Redsteer, Margaret, Kruger, E. Linda, Maldonado, Julie, Viles, Carson and Whyte, P. Kyle, “Climate Change and Indigenous Peoples: A Synthesis of Current Impacts and Experiences,” United States Department of Agriculture, October 2016, https://www.fs.fed.us/pnw/pubs/pnw_gtr944.pdf

As suggested at the International level, achieving peace and eradicating violence entails progress on many different dimensions and goes beyond the absence of violence. As envisioned in the Medicine Wheel Model for Positive Peace, it must be comprehensive and multidimensional. Specific strategies that can be implemented include: creating responsive, transparent and inclusive governance that addresses the structural causes of conflict, violence and lack of safety. For example, decentralized, rights-based and participatory decision-making structures and social dialogue, with direct involvement of marginalized communities, can help reduce the risk of violence by providing political space to address grievances and aspirations. Promoting dialogue between the organs of state, civil society and the private sector is essential for enhancing governance, transparency and accountability. Increasing transparency in the flow of public funds, and accountability for how revenues are distributed by the government would increase people's trust in government institutions. Guaranteeing citizens' right to access public information would also increase people's trust in government institutions. Inclusive economic governance, growth and development, such as equitable, transparent and accountable management of natural resources; combating youth unemployment; equitable distribution and access to social services and extension of social protection floors; wealth-sharing and the fair distribution of resources, are also important components of peace consolidation.

The culturally appropriate practice of the Tribal Circle Process can be followed by practicing *Respect* by showing respect to all while encouraging voluntary participation by all in an inclusive manner, by demonstrating *Caring* by allowing each community to have direct participation of their members in a process that is self-designed by their community, by conveying *Honesty* through flexibility and equal opportunity and by sharing *Wisdom* through a holistic spiritually based consensus building approach.

Conclusion

Violence and discrimination against Native Americans are legacies of the US history of racial injustice. The US has done very little to acknowledge the genocide of Native Americans or the myth of racial difference created to justify the “removal” of Native people from their lands and the forced assimilation of their children. Generations of Native American activists have challenged this country to more truthfully confront this history and its legacy, which includes not only the highest police-violence rates, but also the highest poverty and suicide rates in the country.

The United States has a unique nation-to-nation relationship with and owes a trust responsibility to Indian tribes. The federal government’s trust relationship with Indian tribes (which is based on treaties, agreements, statutes, court decisions, and executive orders) charges the United States with moral obligations of the highest responsibility. Yet, despite the United States’ historic and sacred trust responsibility to Indian tribes, there is a history of deeply troubling and destructive federal policies and actions that have hurt Native communities, exacerbated severe inequality, and accelerated the loss of tribal cultural traditions.

All of us, including the federal government, have an important role in helping to improve the lives of Native Americans. Strengthening partnerships and sustaining engagement serve as linchpins to bring together the necessary resources, following a culturally appropriate model, to achieve finally Positive Peace and improve life outcomes for the next seven generations.

U.S. Gun Policy Framework with a Focus on Mass Shootings

Erick CORTES

Abstract: From the creation of the Constitution in 1787 to now, this paper seeks to explain gun culture in the United States and why such an importance is placed in the U.S. on the protections granted by the Second Amendment. The United States possesses the most civilian owned firearms, and that number has continuously increased over the last few years. In a country plagued by mass murders, especially in school settings, there is a lack of policy changes implemented to assist in keeping guns out of the hands of those who wish to do harm. This paper seeks to explain why firearms ownership has increased, why mass shootings have increased, and what can be done to ensure the number of mass shootings per year decreases, without infringing on the constitutional right to bear arms.

Keywords: Guns, mass shootings, NRA, Constitution

Introduction

The last 10 years have shown an alarming increase in mass shootings in the United States. This paper will examine the multifaceted cause of the increase of this phenomenon. Beginning with U.S. gun culture is essential to seeing the footprint guns have in this country. The media's involvement has been a critical talking point post-mass shootings. There have been many changes in policy but they have either become ineffective or written in such a way that they require being reintroduced in legislation. The NRA and Conservatives are set on going forward without any additional gun control, but it is known now that we need stricter policies in order to effectively protect American citizens. This paper seeks to understand the causes of the rising number of gun ownership and mass shootings in the past few years and to provide suggestions on legislative policy changes that would curve the rise.

American Gun Culture

There are two key points that must be mentioned in order to understand the current culture involving guns in the United States. First and foremost, the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution explicitly states that the people have the right to keep and bear arms, and that right shall not be infringed. It explicitly states, "A well-regulated Militia, [is] necessary to the security of a free state" and "the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."³⁶⁹ However, there remains no consensus on the matter and rather American citizens remain divided roughly into two groups – those that believe that the second amendment protects citizens to own guns in order to defend the country against a tyrannical government and the other that believe it was intended for the use of a militia or military. At the time of writing this paper, the highest court in the United States is led by a conservative majority, who recently ruled in favor

³⁶⁹ U.S. Const. Amend. II.

of gun owners by striking down the state of New York in *New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen*.³⁷⁰

During the pandemic and following recent protests, the United States saw an increase in gun purchases. To illustrate this, an average of 13 million guns were legally sold each year between 2010 to 2019, and then jumped to nearly 20 million in 2020 and again in 2021.³⁷¹ Those who never previously owned a gun have purchased them in an effort to protect their homes and businesses. Since November 1998, over 427 million background checks have been performed for the purchase of firearms, with over 94 million of those checks taking place between January 2020 to June 2022.³⁷²

Many Americans blame the rise of mass shootings to the expiration of a federal assault weapons ban that occurred over 15 years ago. The ban, within the Crime Control Act of 1994, prevented the possession of specific weapons and large capacity magazines.³⁷³ Research indicates that if the ban had continued, then at least 30 of the mass shootings that have occurred after its expiration, would not have taken place.³⁷⁴ It is worth pointing out that there remains no consensus in the U.S. as to what is constituted as a mass shooting. While some organizations define mass shootings according to the number of victims, committed acts, or type of weapon used, this paper uses the Congressional Research Services definition which classifies a mass shooting as having four or more victims, not including the offender.³⁷⁵ The chart presented below shows that under the definition of Congress, there has been a noticeable increase in mass shootings in recent years.

³⁷⁰ *New York State Rifle & Pistol Association INC., ET AL v. Bruen*, Superintendent of New York State Police, ET AL. 597 U.S. 1 (2022)


³⁷¹ Eric Young. (2022, March 24). *One in Five American Households Purchased a Gun During the Pandemic*. NORC at the University of Chicago. <https://www.norc.org/NewsEventsPublications/Press-Releases/Pages/one-in-five-american-households-purchased-a-gun-during-the-pandemic.aspx>

³⁷² Federal Bureau of Investigations (2022, June 30). *NICS Firearm Checks: Month/Year*. FBI. Retrieved July 20, 2022 from https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/nics_firearm_checks_-_month_year.pdf/view

³⁷³ Jeffrey Roth and Christopher Koper. (1999). *Impacts of the 1994 Assault Weapons Ban: 1994-96* (Report No. NCJ173405). U.S. Department of Justice. <https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/173405.pdf>

³⁷⁴ Merla Paul. (2021, March 25). *Assault weapon ban significantly reduces mass shooting*. Northwestern Now. Retrieved July 28, 2022, from <https://news.northwestern.edu/stories/2021/03/assault-weapon-ban-significantly-reduces-mass-shooting/>

³⁷⁵ William Krouse and Daniel Richardson. (2015, July 2015). *Mass Murder with Firearms: Incidents and Victims, 1999-2013*. Congressional Research Service. <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R44126.pdf>

Table 1: Death and Injury Data 2001 to 2019

Source: Shahid, S. & Duzor, M. (2021, June 1). *History of Mass Shooters*. The Violence Project. <https://projects.vonews.com/mass-shootings/>

The Media's Involvement

On average, there is a mass shooting in the United States every 12.5 days.³⁷⁶ When an event as tragic as a mass shooting occurs, the media is quick to fill the headlines with details about the shooter and the shooting. A study done in 2015 indicated that once a mass shooting occurs, after being covered by the media, at least 0.3 new incidents will occur in the following 13 days.³⁷⁶ This “contagion” as some call it, is used to explain how the behavior spreads across various people, through means of the media. The media continuously covering the manifestos, life stories and images of the shooters pushes the imitation, giving a sort of role model to those who have already considered inflicting harm on others. Recently, the “Don’t Name Them” campaign, created by the Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training team from Texas State University, in working with the FBI, has a goal of not sensationalizing the name of a shooter.³⁷⁷ The purpose

³⁷⁶ Sherry Towers, Andres Gomez-Lievano, Maryam Khan, Anuj Mubayi, & Carlos Castillo-Chavez. (2015). Contagion in mass killings and school shootings. *PLOS ONE*, 10(7). <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0117259>

³⁷⁷ Adam Lankford & Eric Madfis. (2017). Don’t Name Them, Don’t Show Them, But Report Everything Else: A Pragmatic Proposal for Denying Mass Killers the Attention They Seek and Deterring Future Offenders. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 62(2), 260–279. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764217730854>

is to stop putting a spotlight on the attacker, and instead focus on the victims and the heroes in each incident.

The news reports on these attacks, and social media spread the information faster than ever before. Following the Parkland school shooting in 2018, there was a two-week period where over 630 threats were made to schools across the country.³⁷⁸ Not all these threats were credible, some were merely a hoax, but it still sent fear rippling through communities. By publicizing the names and information of offenders, the media is giving them the fame and attention they so desperately want, and as a society we are helping them to achieve the goal of becoming a household name. It is heavily indicated that individuals who commit these acts to seek fame, will take the lives of twice as many victims. In 2015, the Umpqua Community College shooter said “the more people you kill, the more you’re in the limelight.”³⁷⁷

Notable Changes in Policy, A Brief History

One of the first acts passed by congress was the National Firearms act of 1934 to regulate the “importing, manufacturing, and dealing in firearms” by tax and registration.³⁷⁹ In 1938, the Federal Firearms Act of 1938 was passed which mandated persons involved in the selling of firearms to obtain a Federal Firearms License but most important, prohibited firearms from being sold to felons.³⁸⁰ The 1938 act was the first to highlight a need to keep guns out of the hands of violent individuals.³⁸⁰ Most legislative traction on gun reform occurred after the catalyst that was President John F. Kennedy’s assassination in Dallas, Texas in 1963. Arguably, one

³⁷⁸ Christal Hayes, (2018). After Florida shooting, more than 600 copycat threats have targeted schools. USA Today.

³⁷⁹ Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. (2009). *ATF national Firearms Act Handbook*. <https://www.atf.gov/firearms/docs/guide/atf-national-firearms-act-handbook-atf-p-53208/download>

³⁸⁰ Alfred Ascione, (1938). The Federal Firearms Act. *St. John’s Law Review*, 13(2), 439-441. http://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5667&=&context=lawreview&=&sei-re-dir=1&referer=https%253A%252F%252Fscholar.google.com%252Fscholar%253Fhl%253Den%2526as_sdt%253D0%25252C44%2526q%253Dfederal%252Bfirearms%252Bact%252Bof%252B1938%2526btnG%253D#search=%22federal%20firearms%20act%201938%22

of the most important legislative moves was the passing of the Gun Control Act of 1968 which directly set restrictions on the purchase or possession of a firearm based on age, criminal background and incompetence.³⁸¹ Tasked with the national tracing of guns, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) was created in 1972.³⁸² Since then, the role of ATF has expanded to become an investigative agency under the direction of the United States Department of Treasury.³⁸³ The Armed Career Criminal Act of 1986 paved the way of holding criminals accountable by enhancing penalties to crimes committed with a firearm while simultaneously imposing mandatory minimums for the illicit use of a firearm under specified conditions and banning the transfer or possession of a machine-gun; a fully automatic firearm that continuously fires bullets by pulling and holding down the trigger and stops firing when released.³⁸⁴

The Crime Control Act of 1990 banned the manufacturing and the importation of parts to build a semiautomatic rifle, which are self-loading, or shotguns.³⁸⁵ In addition to firearms bans, gun-free zones were also established; these are areas where firearms are not permitted, such as on school grounds, whether public or private, and within 1,000 feet of a school.³⁸⁶ Gun-free school zones carried over, and you will now find many establishments with gun-free signs in their windows, to include malls and restaurants. In 1994, the Brady Act forced background checks to be conducted on individuals attempting to obtain a handgun by means of the Chief local law enforcement officer and established a 5-day waiting period for purchasing handguns.³⁸⁷ Shortly after, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the Brady Act interim provisions were unconstitutional but the permanent provision of establishing a National Instant Criminal Background Check

³⁸¹ Gun Control Act of 1968, 48 U.S.C. § 922 (1968).

³⁸² Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. (n.d.). *ATF History Timeline*. Retrieved July 15, 2022 from <https://www.atf.gov/our-history/atf-history-timeline>

³⁸³ U.S. Department of Treasury. (n.d.). *Bureaus*. <https://home.treasury.gov/about/bureaus>

³⁸⁴ The Armed Career Criminal Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)

³⁸⁵ Crime Control Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 2204

³⁸⁶ Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 1702

³⁸⁷ Brady Handgun Control Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 102

System, also referred to as NICS, went into effect in 1998.³⁸⁸ This required dealers to conduct background checks to pre-purchase. In 2008, President George W. Bush signed the NICS Improvement Act of 2007 expanding the background check to include persons that are mentally ill.³⁸⁹

Following the Uvalde massacre on May 24, 2022, there was a strong push throughout the country for better gun control policy. After 28 years, this was considered the most significant firearms legislation to pass the House and Senate.³⁹⁰ The Bipartisan Safer Communities Act was sponsored by Florida Republican Senator Marco Rubio and introduced in October of 2021. The original goal of the act was to enhance background checks for those wishing to purchase a firearm, and close what is referred to as the “boy-friend loophole”, by no longer permitting convicted domestic abusers from buying a firearm for a period of five years.³⁹⁰ Additionally, the act gave some \$15 billion in funding to mental health services across the country.³⁹¹ One key change from this act was that juvenile records, both criminal and mental health related, would now be heavily examined through NICS.³⁹¹ BSCA included much more than just gun reform; however, as with common practice in the United States, many topics are looped into one bill such as Medicaid.

The National Rifle Association

In 1871, the National Rifle Association (NRA) was founded by Union veterans, displeased with the lack of marksmanship and proper firearms training in their troops.³⁹² In 1903, there was a push to promote shooting sports for the youth of the country. This led to the creation of NRA clubs throughout universities and military academies.³⁹² The NRA was a focal point in World War II, giving assistance to government organizations and even aided in

³⁸⁸ Printz, Sheriff/Coroner, Ravalli County, Montana v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)

³⁸⁹ National Instant Criminal Background Check System Act of 2008, 18 U.S.C. § 2

³⁹⁰ George Wright, & Matt Murphy. (2022, June 24). Congress passes first gun control bill in decades. BBC News. Retrieved July 26, 2022, from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-61919752>

³⁹¹ Bipartisan Safer Communities Act 2022, § 12001

³⁹² *A Brief History of the NRA.* (n.d.). The NRA Foundation. Retrieved July 22, 2022, from <https://www.nrafoundation.org/about-the-nra/>

arming Britain in preparation for German invasion. With a goal of protecting the Second Amendment, the NRA continues the mission of ensuring Americans have the proper firearms training necessary to be proficient firearm owners.³⁹³

Specified on their website, the NRA targets all constituents of the United States, to include women and the disabled. While some money donated to the NRA goes to funding programs, a good majority of the money is spent lobbying for votes towards individuals who best represent the ideas of the NRA. Mitt Romney, the junior United States Senator for the State of Utah, has received over \$13 million from the NRA over the last few years.³⁹⁴ Between 2019 and 2020, over \$5 million went to the political campaigns of Republicans across the country.³⁹⁴

Policy Change Recommendations

Policy changes cannot be made without the participation and cooperation of all aspects of the United States government. Unfortunately, it is not as easy as it sounds. For these policies to be implemented into law, they must be written into a bill, which will be decided on by the House and Senate before being sent to the President for signature. The President can veto a law, but this can be overruled by Congress with a two-thirds majority vote.³⁹⁵ Over the years numerous ideas have been presented, but few have made it far enough to become law. This section suggests three policy recommendations to improve gun enforcement.

Establishing red flag laws: Currently, 19 states and the District of Columbia have red flag laws. These laws are intended to prevent those who

³⁹³ *About the NRA Foundation.* (n.d.). The NRA Foundation. Retrieved July 22, 2022, from <https://www.nrafoundation.org/about-us/>

³⁹⁴ Brady United. (n.d.). *Which Senators Have Benefitted the Most from NRA Money?* Retrieved July 19, 2022, from <https://elections.bradyunited.org/take-action/nra-donations-116th-congress-senators>

³⁹⁵ United States Senator Tom Carper. (n.d.). *HOW A BILL BECOMES A LAW.* Tom Carper U.S. Senator for Delaware. Retrieved July 28, 2022, from <https://www.carper.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/how-a-bill-becomes-a-law#011260A1-287E-4716-829F-8C1F3459A144>

exhibit signs of being a threat to themselves or others from being able to purchase and possess a firearm. In the State of New York, an Extreme Risk Protection Order (ERPO) must be completed and filed with the supreme court local to the respondent. This information is then reviewed by a judge who decides if an ERPO should be issued, and if one is, then the police are responsible for removing the guns from the respondent's access.³⁹⁶ This gives law enforcement a tool to protect people who may suffer a spontaneous mental health episode. Often, these episodes derive from domestic disputes, drug use, being under the influence of drugs or alcohol. According to The Violence Project, "80% of mass shooters were in a noticeable crisis prior to their shooting."³⁹⁷


Raising the age minimum to purchase a gun: In May of 2022, just one week after the Uvalde school shooting that claimed the lives of 19 children and two educators, Democratic Congressman Jerry Nadler of New York presented the Protecting Our Kids Act.³⁹⁸ In the bill, it moves to prohibit sales of firearms to individuals under the age of 21. Currently, only six states prevent those under 21 from buying a firearm; California, Florida, Illinois, Hawaii, Vermont, and Washington, although each state has exemptions of their own to this rule.³⁹⁹ In Texas, where the Uvalde shooting occurred, an individual as young as 18 can buy firearms. The Protecting Our Kids Act also moved to establish new federal criminal offenses for the trafficking of firearms, and to prohibit the import and sale of large capacity ammunition feeding devices.³⁹⁸ The average age of a mass shooter was 34 years old, with the youngest being 11 years old and the oldest being 70 years old.³⁹⁷

³⁹⁶ The State of New York. (2019, August). Red Flag Gun Protection Law. Retrieved July 22, 2022, from <https://www.ny.gov/programs/red-flag-gun-protection-law>

³⁹⁷ Sharon Shahid & Megan Duzor, (2021, June 1). *History of Mass Shooters*. The Violence Project. <https://projects.voanews.com/mass-shootings/>

³⁹⁸ Protecting Our Kids Act of 2022, 18 U.S.C. § 101

³⁹⁹ Darragh Roche, (2022, June 3). *The 6 U.S. States Where Under 21s Can't Buy Guns*. Newsweek. Retrieved July 25, 2022, from <https://www.newsweek.com/6-u-s-states-where-under-21s-cant-buy-guns-ualde-shooting-1712586>

Table 2: Age of mass shooters

Source: Shahid, S. & Duzor, M. (2021, June 1). *History of Mass Shooters*. The Violence Project. <https://projects.voanews.com/mass-shootings/>

Continuous and mandatory background checks: At the moment, federal law only mandates firearm dealers to conduct a pre purchase background check. Once that background comes back clear, a purchaser will never have to conduct another background check unless he or she makes another purchase. Conducting continuous background checks ensures that if a person becomes a prohibited possessor at any time after having purchased a firearm, it will show up and notify authorities. Additionally, as our laws are currently written, private sales of firearms do not require a background check. The only time a private sale background check is run is when one of the two parties, buyer or seller, requests it.⁴⁰⁰

Conclusion

Future research into mass shootings can assist in the introduction of new policies. At this time, more research is needed to make connections

⁴⁰⁰ Giffords Law Center. (n.d.). Universal Background Checks. <https://giffords.org/lawcenter/gun-laws/policy-areas/background-checks/universal-background-checks/>

between mental illness and mass shootings, and this research could push more specific policy in regard to mental health and gun ownership. Without taking the proper steps to ensure firearms are not easily accessible to the masses, we will not be able to lessen the amounts of mass shootings that occur each year. The United States has taken minor steps in the past, but by allowing them to expire or not wording them specifically, there have been ways to get around these laws and continue allowing for firearms to fall into the wrong hands.

With the implementation of the recent Bipartisan Safer Communities Act, we may see a decrease in mass shootings committed by those under the age of 21, but it is simply not enough given how often they occur in the United States. Studies have shown that some of the mass shootings that occurred could have been prevented through the Crime Control Act of 1990, had it been extended, and it is time the United States implements something similar to crack down on the violence that is plaguing the nation. Taking guns away from those who are licensed and follow the law will not prevent them from falling into the hands of those who wish to do harm, but instead it will make it harder for law abiding citizens to protect themselves.

Environmental Security: the Case of the Pacific Island Countries and Dependent Territories

Kateryna HASHUTA

Abstract: We live in a rapidly changing world that brings new challenges and discoveries every day. International security evolves with these changes in the modern world. Despite the many resources and efforts focusing on ongoing security issues, environmental security is an area of security that remains conceptually unclear and theoretically underdeveloped. Due to the significant impact it has in our lives, it is vital that this area of security receives critical attention. The case of the Pacific Island Countries (PICs) and Dependant Territories (DTs) illustrate how the most fragile areas on earth suffer from the consequences of climate change and the challenges this man-made phenomenon poses to international security. This paper aims to contribute to the conceptual understanding of environmental security by examining the case of the Pacific Island Countries and Territories, who are struggling through a severe environmental crisis. It will also analyse the various threats to the security of the Pacific area looking comparatively at PICs and DTs, and conclude with policy recommendations.

Key words: environmental security, Pacific Island Countries, Dependant Territories, climate change, climate related migration

Introduction

This paper explores the case of the Pacific Island Countries (PICs) and Dependent Territories (DTs) and the main challenges for the security these territories face. In the past decade, climate change and environmental degradation have become the greatest security challenge facing humanity, with the higher probability of destruction and severe consequences. Although there remains no agreement on the conceptualisation of environment security, this paper defines it as, “The process of peacefully reducing human vulnerability to human-induced environmental degradation by addressing the root causes of environmental degradation and human insecurity.”⁴⁰¹ Regardless of the lack of consensus concerning the definition of environmental security, there is increasing recognition between the links between security and climate change. Professor Græger from the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and the University of Copenhagen, and former advisor to the Minister of Industry and Energy of Norway, provides four reasons for this. First, she argues that nature is something humanity depends on, and the consequences of the environmental degradation pose a great threat to human security. Second, she suggests environment degradation may cause conflicts over resources. Third, she posits, “predictability and control are essential elements of military security considerations, and these are also important elements in the safeguarding of the environment.” For the fourth reason, she puts forth the establishment of the cognitive linkage between environment and security.⁴⁰² As Wen and Hou point out in their research, environmental security explores the ways to preserve the natural system integrity, when the human ecological environment stays stable and sustainable.⁴⁰³

⁴⁰¹ Floyd Rita, Matthew Richard, *Environmental Security: Approaches and Issues* (N.P: Taylor & Francis Group, 2013), 22.

⁴⁰² Nina Græger, “Environmental Security?”, *Journal of Peace Research* 33, no. 1 (February 1996): 101-116, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/425137>

⁴⁰³ Jiafeng Wen, Kang Hou, “Research on the progress of regional ecological security evaluation and optimization of its common limitations”, *Ecological Indicators* 127, (August 2021): 1-10, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolind.2021.107797>

The line between the threats to humans and the threats to environmental security are thin, since humanity depends on the environment. Natural and man-made disasters can cause enormous damage, and, unfortunately, part of the population does not consider the environment as a priority. About one in eight (13%) of people interviewed for the global risk survey in 2019 said that climate change was “not a threat at all.”⁴⁰⁴ Rothe, a senior researcher at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg, discusses this phenomenon in his article *Security as a Weapon: How Cataclysm Discourses Frame International Climate Negotiations*, stating, “[...]while empirical knowledge about the security implications of climate change is still insecure, this does not affect the growing public perception of climate change as a security issue.”⁴⁰⁵ He highlights the need of further research on the concept of environmental security to establish the exact framework and create a plan how to cope with the consequences of climate change and environmental degradation. As he notes, “We can see that the securitization of climate change is a highly contested, interactive process where different argumentations and very different security concepts are applied. The framing of climate change as a security threat in a narrow sense makes up only a part of this broader discursive struggle.”⁴⁰⁶ The importance of the implementation of climate change on the security is undeniable. In the next section, the example of the PICs and DTs will be discussed to show what the current issues are and possible consequences for the security.

⁴⁰⁴ “World Risk Poll Reveals Global Threat From Climate Change,” GALLUP, accessed 15 August 2022, <https://news.gallup.com/opinion/gallup/321635/world-risk-poll-reveals-global-threat-climate-change.aspx>.

⁴⁰⁵ Delf Rothe, “Security as a Weapon: How Cataclysm Discourses Frame International Climate Negotiations,” in *Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict*, ed., (Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012), 243–258, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28626-1_12

⁴⁰⁶ Rothe, “Security as a Weapon: How Cataclysm Discourses Frame International Climate Negotiations,” 253

Pacific Island and Dependent Territories: Current Situation

The case of the Pacific Island Countries and Dependent Territories is unique. The Pacific area and its islands are among one of the most affected territories by climate change. For example, the territories of Kiribati include “33 low-lying atolls spread across 3.5 million square kilometres of ocean [...]” and “[a]t their highest elevation, the islands average 1.8 metres (6 feet) above sea level.”⁴⁰⁷ The highest point of Tuvalu is 4.5 metres above sea level and “the rise in sea level will increase by up to 18 centimetres (0.6 feet) by 2030.”⁴⁰⁸ The most Pacific Island Countries and Territories (PICTs) are considered as fragile and are in danger of disappearing under water.

Table 3: Population of the Pacific Island Countries

Country	Year	Population, total (thousands)
Bahamas, The	2020	393.25
Fiji	2020	896.44
Kiribati	2020	119.45
Marshall Islands	2020	59.19
Micronesia, Fed. Sts.	2020	115.02
Nauru	2020	10.83
Palau	2020	18.09
Papua New Guinea	2020	8,947.03
Samoa	2020	198.41
Solomon Islands	2020	686.88
Tonga	2020	105.70
Tuvalu	2020	11.79
Vanuatu	2020	307.15

Source: “Population, total,” World Bank Data, accessed May 22, 2022, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>

⁴⁰⁷ “Kiribati,” COP23 Fiji, accessed May 22, 2022, <https://cop23.com.fj/kiribati/>

⁴⁰⁸ “Tuvalu,” COP23 Fiji, accessed May 22, 2022, <https://cop23.com.fj/tuvalu/>

Table 4: Population of the Dependent Territories of the Pacific Area

Dependent Territory	Year	Population, total (thousands)
American Samoa	2020	55.20
French Polynesia	2020	280.90
New Caledonia	2020	271.96
Northern Mariana Islands	2020	57.56

Source: "Population, total," World Bank Data, accessed May 22, 2022, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>

In 2020, the overall population of the Pacific island small states was 2,528.96 thousand inhabitants.⁴⁰⁹ From the tables provided above, we can see that the approximate amount of the population of PICs and DTs is 12,534.85 thousand inhabitants. This geographical area represents a small part of the global population that is directly affected by the climate change. The rise of sea levels and temperatures, soil erosion, extinction of coral reefs and other marine life, has led to the destruction of the infrastructure, created economic issues, and caused health problems. The World Health Organization (WHO) states, "Climate change is already impacting health in a myriad of ways, including by leading to death and illness from increasingly frequent extreme weather events, such as heatwaves, storms and floods, the disruption of food systems, increases in zoonoses⁴¹⁰ and food-, water – and vector-borne diseases, and mental health issues."⁴¹¹ The article "Valuing the Global Mortality Consequences of Climate Change Accounting for Adaptation Costs and Benefits" provides data stating the "[...] average across the globe, the estimated full mortality risk of climate change [...] is projected to equal ~85 deaths per 100,000 [...] by 2100."⁴¹² The sea level

⁴⁰⁹ "Population, total," World Bank Data, accessed May 22, 2022, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>

⁴¹⁰ Zoonoses are infections or diseases, which naturally transmit from animals to human.

⁴¹¹ "Climate change and health," World Health Organization, accessed May 24, 2022, <https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/climate-change-and-health#:~:text=Climate%20change%20is%20already%20impacting,diseases%2C%20and%20mental%20health%20issues.>

⁴¹² Tamma Carleton et al., "Valuing the Global Mortality Consequences of Climate Change Accounting for Adaptation Costs and Benefits," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, (April 2022): 1-54, <https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjac020>

rise is causing the land to sink, and people are having to move to other islands or countries. Alongside of this, has been an ongoing migration crisis due to socio-economic and environmental issue that is indirectly caused by climate change. Some PICs and DTs are included in the top-20 migration corridors as the countries of origin.⁴¹³

Table 5: The migration corridor from New Caledonia (2020)

Country of origin	Year	Destination country	Amount of migrants
New Caledonia	2020	French Polynesia	2,236
		Australia	1,754
		Wallis and Futuna Islands	1,021
		Vanuatu	262
		Canada	234

Source: "World Migration Report 2022," International Organization for Migration, accessed May 20, 2022, <https://worldmigrationreport.iom.int/wmr-2022-interactive/>

Table 6: The migration corridor from Tonga (2020)

Country of origin	Year	Destination country	Amount of migrants
Tonga	2020	The United States	28,559
		New Zealand	28,331
		Australia	13,236
		Fiji	1,362
		American Samoa	1,292

Source: "World Migration Report 2022," International Organization for Migration, accessed May 20, 2022, <https://worldmigrationreport.iom.int/wmr-2022-interactive/>

⁴¹³ "World Migration Report 2022," the International Organization for Migration, accessed May 26, 2022, <https://worldmigrationreport.iom.int/wmr-2022-interactive/>

Table 7: The migration corridor from Samoa (2020)

Country of origin	Year	Destination country	Amount of migrants
Samoa	2020	New Zealand	57,947
		Australia	32,754
		The United States	27,186
		American Samoa	15,880
		Greece	455

Source: "World Migration Report 2022," International Organization for Migration, accessed May 20, 2022, <https://worldmigrationreport.iom.int/wmr-2022-interactive/>

Table 8: The migration corridor from Fiji (2020)

Country of origin	Year	Destination country	Amount of migrants
Fiji	2020	Australia	80,860
		New Zealand	64,271
		The United States	51,535
		Canada	26,559
		The United Kingdom	6,397

Source: "World Migration Report 2022," International Organization for Migration, accessed May 20, 2022, <https://worldmigrationreport.iom.int/wmr-2022-interactive/>

As Tables 3,4,5 and 6 illustrate, the number of migrants leaving PICs and DTs has been astonishing when comparing their numbers with the total population of these territories. After illustrating the magnitude of the problem, it is pertinent that the crisis be addressed now. Although many countries continue to maintain a human centric approach to protect their populations from the consequences of climate change, other states have changed their approach in recent years, adopting instead an environment security-based approach, with legislation including the rights of nature with the aim of protecting the environment. Ecuador for example, in 2008 adopted a new constitution that became the first country to codify the rights of nature. Article 10 in the Constitution states, "Persons, communities, peoples,

nations and communities are bearers of rights and shall enjoy the rights guaranteed to them in the Constitution and in international instruments. Nature shall be the subject of those rights that the Constitution recognizes for it.”⁴¹⁴ Chapter 7 of the Constitution goes on to describe the specific rights of nature or “Pacha Mama”, one of which is the right to be restored, “In those cases of severe or permanent environmental impact, including those caused by the exploitation of nonrenewable natural resources, the State shall establish the most effective mechanisms to achieve the restoration and shall adopt adequate measures to eliminate or mitigate harmful environmental consequences.”⁴¹⁵ The United States, New Zealand, Canada, Mexico, and other states have embraced laws to protect the environment, but Ecuador was the one who did it at a constitutional level. It is an important step, since human centric approaches concentrate on human security and the protection of human interests. Nevertheless, by protecting the environment, people are also protecting themselves. Hence we cannot be selfish, nature must be a priority, because only then will people live in healthy conditions and prosperity.

The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates, “Between 2030 and 2050, climate change is expected to cause approximately 250 000 additional deaths per year, from malnutrition, malaria, diarrhoea and heat stress.”⁴¹⁶ Environmental catastrophes related to the climate change bring huge economic losses. Climate change affects every aspect of the human security, and assuring a healthy environment is the most important step towards achieving economic, food, political, personal and community security.

Referring back to the situation of PICs and DTs, these territories are the smallest polluters; however, they suffer from the consequences of the CO₂ emission of the bigger and richer countries. Figure 1 shows the top-5 states producing the highest amount of carbon emission in 2018 – China, the United States, India, Russia and Germany. In the case of the PICs and


⁴¹⁴ “Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador,” Political Database of the Americas, accessed May 29, 2022, <https://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Ecuador/english08.html>.

⁴¹⁵ Political Database of the Americas, “Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador.”

⁴¹⁶ “Climate change and health,” WHO, accessed 15 August 2022, <https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/climate-change-and-health>.

DTs, there is almost no carbon emission produced. For example, the CO2 emission of Kiribati was 80 kt, of Tonga was 190 kt, and of Fiji was 1,900 kt in 2018. Comparing PICs carbon emission with the top five polluters illustrates the stark contrast.

Figure 6: The biggest CO2 emissions producers by states in 2018



Source: “CO2 emission (kt),” World Bank, accessed 31 May 2022, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.KT?end=2018&locations=US-CN-RU-IN-DE&start=2018&view=bar>

Perspectives of the Pacific Independent States and Dependent Territories

The PICs and DTs face the same challenges, but from the administrative perspective, their inhabitants have different options. While sovereign states such as Kiribati, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu have to cope with the environmental challenges and protect their citizens on their own, the inhabitants of DTs have the citizenship of developed states like France and the United States. They can therefore help their population to overcome the consequences of the extreme weather events and sea level rise. Meanwhile, the population of the PICs struggle to cope with environmental disasters, since they have limited financial capabilities.

The citizens of the PICs understand the importance of the environment security. Their population has from a time immemorable relied on nature and even now, it remains the most important part of their survival on these lands. In 2013, Kiribati issued the Kiribati Integrated Environment Policy (KIEP). It states, “The environment has emerged as a Key Policy Area (KPA) of the KDP [Kiribati Development Program] since 2008. This is a huge ‘break through success’ for the environment sector considering for the first time, the appearance of the environment on the development agenda for Kiribati at national level.”⁴¹⁷ This paper describes the main challenges like climate change, island biodiversity conservation and management, waste management and pollution control, resource management and environmental governance, strategic objectives and policy towards each. The Kiribati Climate Risk and Climate Risk Communication Strategy also describes the key issues the country faces and main goals for their mitigation.⁴¹⁸ For example, “By 2017, climate change and climate risk considerations will be integrated in at least 50% of Ministerial operational and sector plans.”⁴¹⁹ Nevertheless, PICs have a limited capability to improve the situation of the environment on their own, moreover contribute to the shape of international policies.

Although DTs sought at the international arena to influence environmental policies to cope with climate change, it was insufficient. One of the major turning points in the environment discourse came in 1962, with the release Rachel Carson’s book *Silent Spring* focused on environmental protection, environmental problems, and argued that they were caused by synthetic pesticides in the United States. Later in 1972, the United Nations organized the Conference on the Environment in Stockholm, which “was the

⁴¹⁷ Government of the Republic of Kiribati, *Kiribati Integrated Environment Policy*, accessed 10 July, 2022, <https://policy.asiapacificenergy.org/sites/default/files/Kiribati%20Integrated%20Environment%20Policy%20%28KIEP%29.pdf>

⁴¹⁸ The Office of Beretitenti Government of Kiribati, *Kiribati Climate Risk and Climate Risk Communication Strategy*, by Tamara Logan, 2013 https://kiribati-data.sprep.org/system/files/KI37-Kiribati_Cimate_Change_Comms_Final%20%281%29.pdf, accessed June 6, 2022

⁴¹⁹ “*Climate Change and Climate Risk Communications Strategy 2014-2018*”, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, accessed June 6, 2022, <https://www.climate-laws.org/geographies/kiribati/policies/climate-change-and-climate-risk-communications-strategy-2014-2018>

first world conference to make the environment a major issue.”⁴²⁰ It was attended by the representatives of the 113 states, NGO’s, international organisations, and so forth. The result of the conference was the creation of the Stockholm Declaration and Action Plan for the Human Environment, which contained 26 principles on the solving environmental issues.⁴²¹ Then the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) was organised in Rio de Janeiro (1992), also known as the “Earth Summit”. The conference included a large number of participants, covered a wide range of issues, and sought to create a more comprehensive plan of action. As the UN notes,

*One of the major results of the UNCED Conference was Agenda 21, a daring program of action calling for new strategies to invest in the future to achieve overall sustainable development in the 21st century. Its recommendations ranged from new methods of education, to new ways of preserving natural resources and new ways of participating in a sustainable economy.*⁴²²

Fifty years later, the UN organised the Stockholm+50 Conference. Developed countries such as France, who control overseas territories in the Pacific Ocean, sought to prevent catastrophic consequences of climate change by pushing for stricter policies on environmental protection i.e. cancelling domestic flights. Despite international and local efforts, humanity have not done enough to save the environment.

The temperature rise is accelerating faster than expected. According to the IPCC, global warming cannot be allowed to exceed 1.5°C. IPCC goes on to add, “Even temporarily exceeding this warming level will result in additional severe impacts, some of which will be irreversible. Risks for society will

⁴²⁰ “United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 5-16 June 1972, Stockholm,” United Nations, accessed June 14, 2022, <https://www.un.org/en/conferences/environment/stockholm1972>.

⁴²¹ United Nations, “United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 5-16 June 1972, Stockholm.”

⁴²² “United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 3-14 June 1992,” United Nations, accessed June 14, 2022, <https://www.un.org/en/conferences/environment/rio1992>.

increase, including to infrastructure and low-lying coastal settlements.”⁴²³ It requires cutting carbon emission by 45 percent by 2030, and achieving net zero emissions by 2050.⁴²⁴ Nevertheless, the UN Secretary-General António Guterres stated, “[...] according to current commitments, global emissions are set to increase almost 14 per cent over the current decade.”⁴²⁵ Humanity can already feel and see changes, and rather than take radical emergency measures, we keep worrying about development more than nature. The PICs and DTs are not the only places that can disappear under water. Nearby, in the Indian Ocean, is the Indonesian capital, Jakarta, that will eventually need to be replaced due to the sea level rise. The city is home to 10 million people, referred to as the fastest sinking city in the world, that could be entirely submerged by 2050.⁴²⁶ There is a solution to move the capital 1,300 km away. However, the PICs simply do not have enough space to run away from the rising water. The idea to run away from the existing problems might work in the short run, but in the future, there will be no place to hide from the disasters caused by climate change.

From the human security perspective, the inhabitants of the DTs are safer than people from the PICs. Citizens of territories belonging to states such as France, Australia or the United States, are under their protection; whereas “disappearing states” are no longer able to protect their citizens once the states cease to exist. Although some states will be able to avoid the same fate, it is likely that they can partly or completely lose their lands. Therefore, global cooperation is urgently needed, to protect our planet from climate change, and by doing so, we are protecting ourselves. People depend on the environment, and therefore, it is imperative we fight the environmental degradation. Like the Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF)

⁴²³ IPCC, “*Climate change: a threat to human wellbeing and health of the planet. Taking action now can secure our future*,” accessed June 28, 2022, https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2022/02/PR_WGII_AR6_english.pdf.

⁴²⁴ UN News, “IPCC adaptation report ‘a damning indictment of failed global leadership on climate,’” accessed June 18, 2022, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/02/1112852>.

⁴²⁵ UN News, “IPCC adaptation report ‘a damning indictment of failed global leadership on climate.’”

⁴²⁶ BBC, “Jakarta, the fastest-sinking city in the world,” accessed June 18, 2022, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-44636934>.

states, “We all depend on the natural environment for our livelihoods and well-being, and environmental security is a fundamental human right.”⁴²⁷

The Australia Climate Change Action Strategy describes the long term planning and investment to respond to the climate change issues. It also considers the PICs and the assistance, which is provided to these countries in order to meet Sustainable Development Goals. “In Australia’s neighbourhood,” the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade posit, “Pacific island countries are highly vulnerable to the adverse consequences of climate change. The Pacific islands Forum Boe Declaration acknowledges climate change as the greatest threat to the livelihoods, security, and wellbeing of peoples of the Pacific.”⁴²⁸ It provides information on how development assistance commitments work, the amount of funding provided for PICS in the past years, and highlights critical action needed such as building roads and bridges in response to the extreme weather conditions, building climate change resilient schools, and establishing programs to collect and analyse data on the climate in the region.

Each state takes measures based on their capabilities: some more effective, some less. The problem is there is no special concept and international legislation on the environmental protection, which would enforce the binding agreement and control its execution. The fact is that previous international and local agreements, programs, protocols, etc. aren’t as fruitful as they are supposed to be. Most were created with the consideration of human’s population and development, rather than nature’s needs, despite that it must be the priority since people depend on the environment. Different programs, which are created in order to protect environment are making life more comfortable for the people rather than fixing the problem that is that those comforts will be under water in 50-100 years.

From the perspective of the PICs, they have to establish their own policy on the environmental security. Considering the size of these states, they usually establish regional cooperation to be able to face the environmental challenges.

⁴²⁷ EJF, “Who we are,” accessed June 19, 2022, <https://ejfoundation.org/who-we-are>.

⁴²⁸ Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Climate Change Action Strategy,” accessed July 3, 2022, <https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/climate-change-action-strategy.pdf>.

Conclusion

The current state of affairs with climate change must end. As this paper has demonstrated, inequalities persist between developed states – those representing the world’s greatest polluters, and developing countries – those who cause the least amount of environmental degradation, but face the most severe consequences of climate change. Although PICs and DTs share the same location, they face different fates – the former their homes, the later their country. Drastic measures are needed to prevent the disappearance of these territories. At minimum the international community must urgently take steps to assist PICs and DTs, to be able to reach a point of development when they will be able to fight environmental degradation on their own.

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