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The Effects of the Mongol Empire on Russia

By: Dustin Hosseini

Introduction

The history of Russia has always been a relatively sad and tumultuous one wrought with wars, power struggles, and abrupt changes. These changes have often been forcibly thrust wholesale upon Russia, rather than evolving through gradual, measured methods as in most peoples' histories. From an earlier time, in which we know Russia as 'Kievan Rus,' the princes of the various cities (such as Vladimir, Pskov, Suzdal, and Kiev) constantly battled and bickered for power and control of the small semi-united state. Under the reigns of St. Vladimir (980-1015) and Yaroslav the Wise (1015-1054), the Kievan state was at its highest point and attained relative peace in contrast with years past. However, as history went, once the reigning rulers died, a power struggle ensued and wars once again flared.

It was perhaps the decision of Yaroslav the Wise before his death in 1054 to assign princedoms to his sons that set the future of Kievan Russia for the next two hundred years. Following this decision, civil wars between the various sons ravaged much of the Kievan confederation, draining it of essential resources it would later need. As the princes incessantly fought with each other, the confederation of cities known as the Kievan state slowly decayed, declined, and lost its former glory. Further weakened by the incursions of steppe tribes such as the Polovtsy (aka Cumans/Kumans or Kipchaks) and previously by the Pechenegs, eventually the Kievan state was ripe for a takeover by more powerful invaders from distant lands.

Yet before this, the Rus had a chance to change their fate. It was around 1219 when the Mongols first entered the areas nearest Kievan Russia in a move against the Polovtsy, who, in turn, asked for the assistance of the Rus princes. A council of princes convened in Kiev to

consider the request, an act which worried the Mongols. According to historical sources, the Mongols declared that they had not attacked the cities or people of the Rus nor attacked their lands. The Mongol envoys requested peace of the Russian princes. Yet the princes did not trust the Mongols, suspecting that the Mongol advance would continue into Rus. Subsequently, the Mongol emissaries were promptly killed and any chance for peace was destroyed at the hands of the princes of the fractured Kievan state. Within twenty years, Batu Khan marched from Mongolia with an army of 200,000 men. One by one, Russian principalities such as Ryazan, Moscow, Vladimir, Suzdal, and Rostov fell to the Batu and his armies. The armies looted and razed the cities, slaughtered the people, and took many as prisoners and slaves. The Mongols eventually captured, sacked, and destroyed Kiev, the symbolic center of Kievan Russia. Only outlying northwesterly principalities such as Novgorod, Pskov, and Smolensk survived the onslaught, though these cities would endure indirect subjugation and become tributaries of the Golden Horde. Perhaps a decision by the Russian princes to make peace could have averted this. However, that was not the case and for their miscalculations, Russia would be forever changed in terms of its religion, art, language, government, and political geography.

The Orthodox Church

With the initial Mongol onslaught, many churches and monasteries were looted and destroyed while countless adherents to the church and scores of clergy were killed; those who survived often were taken prisoner and enslaved (Dmytryshyn, 121). The mere shock of the force and size of the Mongol army was devastating. The distress was just as political and economic in nature as it was social and spiritual. The Mongol forces claimed that they were sent by God, and the Russians believed that the Mongols were indeed sent by God as a punishment for their sins. The Orthodox Church would become a powerful beacon during the “darker” years of the Mongol

subjugation. The Russian people would eventually turn inward, seeking solace in their faith and looking to the Orthodox Church for guidance and support. The shock of being conquered by this steppe people would plant the seeds of Russian monasticism, which would in turn play a major role in the conversion of such people as the Finno-Ugrian tribes and the Zyrianians (now known as the Komi), as well as the colonization of the northern regions of Russia (Vernadsky, 379).

The humiliation suffered by the princes and the town assemblies caused fragmentation of their political authority. This loss of political unity allowed the Church to rise as an embodiment of both religious and national identity while filling the gap of lost political identity (Riasanovsky, 57). The unique legal concept of *iarlyk* (pronounced 'yarlīgh'), or charter of immunity, also contributed to the strengthening of the Church. With the reign of Mönke-Temür, a *iarlyk* was issued to Metropolitan Kirill for the Orthodox Church in 1267. While the church had been under the *de facto* protection of the Mongols ten years earlier (from the 1257 census conducted under Khan Berke), this *iarlyk* formally decreed protection for the Orthodox Church. More importantly, it officially exempted the church from any form of taxation by Mongol or Russian authorities (Ostrowski, 19). And permitted that clergymen not be registered during censuses and that they were furthermore not liable for forced labor or military service (Hosking, 57).

As expected, the result of the *iarlyk* issued to the Orthodox Church was profound. For the first time, the church would become less dependent on princely powers than in any other period of Russian history. The Orthodox Church was able to acquire and consolidate land at a considerable rate, one that would put the church in an extremely powerful position in the centuries following the Mongol takeover. The charter of immunity strictly forbade both Mongol and Russian tax agents from seizing church lands or demanding any services from the Orthodox Church. This was enforced by a simple penalty – death (Vernadsky, 377).

Another prominent reason the church developed so quickly laid in its mission – to spread Christianity and convert those still practicing paganism in the countryside. To strengthen the internal structure of the Orthodox Church, metropolitans traveled extensively throughout the land to alleviate administrative deficiencies and to oversee the activities of the bishops and priests. Moreover, the relative security (economic, military, and spiritual) surrounding hermitages lured peasants from the countryside. As this heightened urban development within the periphery of church properties destroyed the peaceful atmosphere the hermitage was originally established to give, members of the monastery would move further out into the wilderness to establish a new hermitage, beginning the process anew. This system of founding religious settlements continued for some time and contributed to the augmentation of the Orthodox Church (Vernadsky, 377-8).

One last significant change that occurred was the location of the center of the Orthodox Church. Before the Mongols invaded Russian lands, Kiev was the ecclesiastical center. Following the destruction of Kiev, the Holy See moved to Vladimir in 1299, and eventually to Moscow in 1322 (Hosking, 72), helping to bolster the importance of Moscow significantly.

Art

While the arts in Russia first suffered mass deportations of its artists, the monastic revival and the focus of attention that turned toward the Orthodox Church led to an artistic revival. What defined the Russians – at this crucial moment when they were without a state – was their Christianity and ability to express their devout beliefs. During this Time of Troubles, such great artists as Theophanes the Greek and Rublev came into play (Figes, 299-300).

It was during the second half of the Mongol rule in the mid-fourteenth century that Russian iconography and fresco painting began once again to flourish. Theophanes the Greek arrived in the late 1300s. He decorated and worked on various churches throughout the land,

especially in Novgorod and Nizhniy Novgorod. In Moscow, he painted the iconostasis for the Church of the Annunciation as well as worked on the Church of the Archangel Michael (Martin, 233). A few decades after Theophanes' arrival, Rublev would become one of his most aspiring and important students. Iconography came to Russia from Byzantium in the tenth century, but the Mongol invasion in the thirteenth century cut Russia off from Byzantium.

Language

While the linguistic effects may seem at first trivial, such impacts on language help us to determine and understand to what extent one empire had on another people or group of people – in terms of administration, military, trade – as well as to what geographical extent the impact included. Indeed, the linguistic and even socio-linguistic impacts were great, as the Russians borrowed thousands of words, phrases, other significant linguistic features from the Mongol and the Turkic languages that were united under the Mongol Empire (Dmytryshyn, 123). Listed below are a few examples of some that are still in use. All came from various parts of the Horde.

1.	амбар	*ambar*	barn
2.	базар	*bazar*	bazaar
3.	деньги	*den'gi*	money
4.	лошадь	*loshad'*	horse
5.	сундук	*sunduk*	truck, chest
6.	таможня	*tamozhnya*	customs

One highly important colloquial feature of the Russian language of Turkic origin is the use of the word давай which expresses the idea of 'Let's…' or 'Come on, let's...' (Figes, 370-1). Listed below are a few common examples still found commonly in Russian.

1.	Давай чай попьём.	*Davai chai popyom.*	'Let's drink some tea.'
2.	Давай попьём!	*Davai popyom!*	'Come on, let's get drunk!'
3.	Давай пойдём!	*Davai poidyom!*	'Come on, let's go!'

In addition, there are dozens of place names of Tatar/Turkic origin in southern Russia and the lands of the Volga River that stand out on maps of these areas. City names such as Penza, Alatyr, and Kazan' and names of regions such as Chuvashia and Bashkortostan are examples.

Administration and Institutions

Images of totalitarianism spring to mind when one at first ponders that which is Russia: from the current times of Vladimir Putin's presidency, to when the Soviet Union was still a nation, and even before to Imperial Russia. However, in Kievan Rus, a form of democracy did exist. Comprised of all free male citizens, the *veche* (вече) was a town assembly that met to discuss such matters as war and peace, law, and invitation or expulsion of princes to the *veche*'s respective town; all cities in Kievan Russia had a *veche.* It was essentially a forum for civic affairs to discuss and resolve problems. However, this democratic institution suffered severe curtailment under the Mongols.

By far the most influential of the assemblies were in Novgorod and Kiev. In Novgorod, a special *veche* bell (in other towns, church bells were ordinary used for this purpose) was created for calling the townspeople together for an assembly, and in theory, anyone could ring it. In the times after the Mongols had conquered the majority of Kievan Russia, *veche*s ceased to exist in all cities except Novgorod, Pskov, and others in the northwestern regions. *Veches* in those cities continued to function and develop until Moscow itself subjugated them in the late fifteenth century. However, today the spirit of the *veche* as a public forum has been revived in several cities across Russia, including especially Novgorod.

Of great importance to the Mongol overlords was census tabulation, which allowed for the collection of taxes. To support censuses, the Mongols imposed a special dual system of regional administration headed by military governors, the *basqaqi* (баскаки), and/or civilian

governors, the *darugi* (даругы). Essentially, the *basqaqi* were given the responsibility of directing the activities of rulers in the areas that were resistant or had challenged Mongol authority. The *darugi* were civilian governors that oversaw those regions of the empire that had submitted without a fight or that were considered already pacified to Mongol forces (Ostrowski, 273). However, the offices of the *basqaqi* and the *darugi,* while occasionally overlapping in authority and purpose did not necessarily always rule at the same time.

As we know from history, the ruling princes of Kievan Russia did not trust the Mongolian ambassadors that came to discuss peace with them in the early 1200s; the princes regrettably put the ambassadors of Genghis Khan to the sword and before long paid dearly. Thus, in the thirteenth century the *basqaqi* were stationed in the conquered lands to subjugate the people and authorize even the day-to-day activities of the princes. Furthermore, in addition to ensuring the the census, the *basqaqi* oversaw conscription of the local populace (Martin, 150).

Existing sources and research indicates that the *basqaqi* had largely disappeared from the Rus' lands by the mid-fourteenth century, as the Rus more or less accepted the Mongol overlords. As the *basqaqi* left, the *darugi* replaced them in power. However, unlike the *basqaqi*, the *darugi* were not based in the confines of the lands of the Rus; in fact, they were stationed in Sarai, the old capital of the Golden Horde located not far from present-day Volgograd. The *darugi* functioned mainly as experts on the lands of the Rus' and advised the khan accordingly. While the responsibility of collecting and delivering tribute and conscripts had belonged to the *basqaqi*, with the transition from the *basqaqi* to the *darugi* these duties we actually transferred to the princes themselves when the khan saw that the princes could complete such tasks (Martin, 151).

The first census taken by the Mongols occurred in 1257, just seventeen years after their conquest of Rus' lands. The population was divided into multiples of ten, a system that had been

employed by the Chinese and later adopted by the Mongols who extended its use over the entirety of their empire; the census served as the primary purpose for conscription as well as for taxation. This practice was carried on by Moscow after it stopped acknowledging the Horde in 1480. The practice fascinated foreign visitors to Russia, to whom large-scale censuses were still unknown. One such visitor, Sigismund von Herberstein from Hapsburg made note of the fact that every two or three years, the prince conducted a census throughout the land (Wittfogel, 638). Census taking would not become widespread in Europe until the early 19th century. One significant observation that we must make is that the extent to which the Russians so thoroughly conducted the census was not achieved elsewhere in Europe for another 120 years or so, during the Age of Absolutism. The impact of the Mongol Empire at least in this area was obviously deep and effective and helped to create a strong central government for Russia.

One important institution that the *basqaqi* oversaw and maintained was the *yam* (a system of posts), which was constructed to provide food, bedding, horses, and either coaches or sleds, according to the season (Hosking, 89). At first constructed by the Mongols, the *yam* allowed relatively rapid movement of important communiqués between the khans and their local leaders, as well as a method of quickly dispatching envoys, local or foreign, between the various principalities across the vast the empire. Each post had horses ready for use by authorized persons as well as to replace tired horses for especially long journeys. Each post was usually located about a day's ride from the nearest post. The local people were obliged to maintain the posts, to feed the horses, and to meet the needs of emissaries traveling through their posts.

The system was quite efficient. Another report by emissary Sigismund von Herberstein of the Hapsburgs stated that the *yam* system allowed him to travel 500 kilometers (from Novgorod to Moscow) within 72 hours – much faster than anywhere in Europe (Wittfogel, 639-40). The

yam system helped the Mongols to maintain tight control over their empire. During the twilight years of the Mongol's hold on Russia in the late fifteenth century, Prince Ivan III decided to continue the use of the idea of the system of the *yam* in order to keep an established system of communication and intelligence. However, the idea of a postal system as we know it today would not come into existence until after the death of Peter the Great in the early 1700s.

Some such institutions brought to Russia by the Mongols transformed to meet Russian needs over time and lasted for many centuries after the Golden Horde. These greatly augmented the development and expansion of the intricate bureaucracy of the later, imperial Russia.

The Rise of Moscow

Founded in 1147, Moscow remained an insignificant town for more than a hundred years. At that time, the location lay at the crossroads of three major roads, one of which connected Moscow to Kiev. The geographic location of Moscow merits attention, as it sits on a bend of the Moscow River, which connects to the Oka and Volga River. Via the Volga River, that allows access to the Dniepr and Don Rivers, as well as the Black and Caspian Seas, huge opportunities for trade and commerce with distant lands have always existed. With the Mongol onslaught, droves of refugees began to arrive from the devastated southern portion of Rus, namely Kiev (Riasanovsky, 109). Moreover, the actions of the Muscovite princes in favor with the Mongols helped Moscow's rise as the center of power.

Leading up to the point that the Mongols granted Moscow the *iarlyk*, Tver and Moscow were constantly struggling for power. The major turning point surfaced in 1327 when the populace of Tver started to rise in rebellion. Seeing this as an opportunity to please the khan of his Mongol overlords, Prince Ivan I of Moscow took a huge Tatar contingent and quashed the rebellion in Tver, thereby restoring order in that city and winning the favor of the khan. For his

show of loyalty, Ivan I was also granted the *iarlyk* and with this Moscow took yet another step towards prominence and power. Soon the princes of Moscow took over the responsibilities of collecting taxes throughout the land (and in doing so, taking part of these taxes for themselves) and eventually the Mongols gave this responsibility solely to Moscow and ended the practice of sending their own tax collectors. Yet Ivan I was more than a shrewd politician and exchequer of good judgment: he was perhaps the first prince to replace the traditional lateral line of succession with the vertical line (though this would not be fully achieved until the second Prince Vasilii's reign in the mid-1400s (Hosking, 71-2)). This change brought more stability to Moscow and thus strengthened her position within the realm. As Moscow grew wealthier through being the main tax collector of the lands, its authority over several principalities became greater and more consolidated. The lands that Moscow gained equated with more taxes and more access to resources, and thus more power.

During the time that Moscow grew wealthier and more powerful, the Golden Horde was in a state of general decay, wrought with rebellions and coups. Prince Dmitrii decided to attack the Kazan khanate in 1376 and was successful. Not long after, one of the Mongol generals, Mamai, sought to create his own horde of sorts in the steppes west of the Volga River (Hosking, 79) and he decided to challenge the authority of Prince Dmitrii on the banks of the Vokha River; Dmitrii defeated Mamai, exciting his Muscovites and, naturally, angering the Mongols. However, Mamai chose to fight again and organized a contingent of 150,000 men; Dmitrii matched this number and their two armies met near the River Don at Kulikovo Pole (Kulikovo Field) in early September of 1380 (Dmytryshyn, 140). Dmitrii's army, though suffering losses of some 100,000 men, defeated Mamai; Tokhtamysh, one of Tamerlane's generals, soon captured and executed

the general. Prince Dmitrii became known as Dmitrii Donskoi (*of the Don*). However, Moscow was soon sacked by Tokhtamysh, and once again had to pay tribute to the Mongols.

Yet the great battle of Kulikovo Pole in 1380 was a symbolic turning point. Even though Moscow suffered retribution for attacking Mongol armies, the power that Moscow welded would continue to grow and its influence over other Russian principalities would continue to expand. Novgorod finally succumbed to future capital in 1478, and Moscow soon shed any allegiance to the Mongol and Tatar overlords thus ending over 250 years of Mongol control.

Conclusion

As the evidence stands, the effects of the Mongol invasion were many, spread across the political, social, and religious facets of Russia. While some of those effects, such as the growth of the Orthodox Church generally had a relatively positive effect on the lands of the Rus, other results, such as the loss of the *veche* system and centralization of power assisted in halting the spread of traditional democracy and self-government for the various principalities. From the influences on the language and the form of government, the very impacts of the Mongol invasion are still evident today. Perhaps given the chance to experience the Renaissance, as did other western European cultures, the political, religious, and social thought of Russia would greatly differ from that of the reality of today. The Russians, through the control of the Mongols who had adopted many ideas of government and economics from the Chinese, became perhaps a more *Asiatic* nation in terms of government, while the deep Christian roots of the Russians established and helped maintain a link with Europe. It was the Mongol invasion which, perhaps more than any other historical event, helped to determine the course of development that Russian culture, political geography, history, and national identity would take.

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The Impending Price of Ignorance: Demographic Politics of Sexual Education in Post-Soviet Russia

By: Jeanne-Marie Jackson

In the context of escalating international speculation as to the determining factors behind Russia's demographic crisis, the HIV epidemic is lent increasingly heightened significance. Such attention indicates an ever-more conspicuous absence, and thus an immediate need for the implementation of, sexual education on a national scale. A political climate, however, characterized by widespread Orthodox resurgence and efforts to reassert "traditional Russian values" in contrast to a perceived introduction of Western debauchery has contributed to official hostility towards international educational initiatives. Complex historical precedents for the mistrust and scapegoating of the West, together with a still-floundering economy, a reluctance to acknowledge the severity of the HIV problem, and the absence of Soviet models for such programs, simultaneously necessitate and complicate international dialogue aimed at establishing an effective, nationally standardized sexual education and HIV-prevention curriculum. Such Western organizations face the formidable task of addressing Russian resistance to develop programs which recognize, through a willingness to deviate when appropriate from standard Western models for such curricula, the socio-historical idiosyncrasies and dominant religious presence of post-Soviet Russia.

The reluctance of the Russian government to accept large-scale international assistance in inaugurating more widespread preventative educational measures is attributable to a combination of ill-informed tactics and ideological hostility. Yet, statistics indicate a distressing need for the implementation of such programs. A recent poll indicates that 2/3 thirds of respondents who understood the connection between AIDS and HIV also maintained that the disease is contracted

through kissing, while ¾ were certain of its transmission by mosquitoes (Specter, 66). In a country in which, T.A. Gurko concludes in the Russian Social Science Review, "The early onset of sexual activity among adolescents...is taking place under conditions that are quite specific... <including> a low level of contraceptive awareness..."(59), and where "...at least 86 percent of those aged 17 and older are sexually active..."(Graves and Titova) alarming rates of both sexually transmitted diseases that are traditional harbingers for HIV (100 times those in Western Europe at 136 cases of syphilis per 100,000 verses a mere 1.5 per 100,000) (Kornienko), and abortion (roughly 13 abortions for every 10 live births) (Greenall) warrant particular attention. The introduction of sexual education and awareness programs becomes far more than grounds for perpetual moral debate. Addressing it is, rather, a matter of immediate demographic sustainability not afforded the luxury of promulgating ideology based on untenable conclusions.

There is little evidence, furthermore, to refute the feasibility and chances for success of international partnerships; on the contrary, past small-scale, foreign-backed educational projects have demonstrated great local promise. Efforts capitalizing on the decentralization of the Soviet school management system in 1987 and political openness directly following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 met with the greatest success, as evinced by a 1992 collaboration between the Ministries of Education of the Former Soviet Union and the Netherlands. The first such initiative, this progressive alliance yielded encouraging results. As part of an experimental sex education program coordinated by the Dutch Ministry of Education and CROSS (Coordination Education Cooperation with Russia), a Dutch agency responsible for cooperative education programs in Central and Eastern Europe, prospective sexual health educators from more than 40 schools in the Krasnoyarsk region attended a two-day training seminar. Encouraged by the positive local response, the governor of Krasnoyarsk allocated funding for the initiative, and

abortion rates among 15-19 year olds in the region had declined by 15% as of 2001 (Hermans-Servaas and Mayorova). In St. Petersburg, which registered 5,417 new HIV cases in 2000 compared to 440 in 1999 (Graves and Titova), a joint Russian-Swedish educational venture has thus far yielded similarly encouraging results. As reported in the St. Petersburg Times:

> Aiming to share Western Europe's strong tradition of sex education and provide a comprehensive network of institutions to assist young people and risk groups free of charge, the project was organized by the Swedish Institute for Infectious Disease Control and supported by the city and the oblast's health committees, the Ott Institute of Obstetrics and Gynecology at the Russian Academy of sciences, and the WHO Collaborating Center and Uppsala University." (Kornienko)

St. Petersburg project coordinator Natalya Vorobyova notes that from 1998-2003 rates of primary syphilis among 15-19 year olds decreased by five times and gonorrhea by 2.5, in addition to a 20 percent decline in chlamydia and nearly 50 percent decline in trichomoniasis (Kornienko). Both the Dutch and Swedish initiatives have worked to address hindrances to sexual education unique to the former Soviet Union, namely through comprehensive training programs geared towards creating a pool of qualified educators capable of working in conjunction with health care providers. An egregious neglect by the Soviet Union of reproductive health in schools and literature available to the public, conflated with the widespread belief that sexual health is a taboo subject and solely the domain of medical specialists, has resulted in a paucity of adequate knowledge on the part of adults and teachers. Training is thus a critical component of such programs, and provides perhaps the most convincing argument in favor of international partnerships to quickly and efficiently qualify a sufficient amount of educators to deal with reproductive topics.

While these types of local initiatives have typically met with official encouragement, Russia's policies have been far less tolerant on a national level. The official line in regards to cries of inadequate funding for sexual education and HIV awareness programs, for which a

meager one million dollars per year is designated as of the compilation of this research, cites the struggling economy and need for stringent budgetary prioritization. Yet, though Russia invested only four million dollars in 2003 in its own federal AIDS program, it allocated twenty million to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS. Brazil, in striking contrast considering its comparable population and lower per capita income, allocates nearly one billion dollars annually to such programs (Specter, 69). The more likely factors behind a refusal to accept foreign assistance are far more ideologically complex, and Russia has been steadfast in its efforts to maintain an image of power and stability. Recent examples of flagrant expenditures under Putin provide the most convincing proof of a growing focus on image over substance, including upwards of $1.3 billion spent in preparation for St. Petersburg's 300th anniversary celebration in 2003, $300 million of which funded the renovation of the Konstantinovsky Palace in anticipation of a lavish celebration for international leaders (Weir). The 2001 raising of the Kursk submarine, estimated at a total cost of $80 million, provides further insight into pecuniary priority being given to issues of national pride, specifically those which garner widespread international publicity. Christof Ruehl, former chief economist at the World Bank, notes of the pervasive attitude towards HIV spending, "you will see the President and all the ministers and the economic advisers going out and saying to the world, with great pride, 'Russia is a donor country. We are one of you. We are going to help solve this health crisis for these poor nations'"(Specter, 69). These sentiments are echoed by Vinay Saldanha of the Canada AIDS Russia Project, who states that "the problem...is that Russia doesn't want to be seen to be begging to the international community"(Mainville). This seems to be the general consensus among specialists working to address HIV in Eurasia. Murray Feshbach, a senior scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center, draws an identical conclusion: "The country can only become more unstable as it becomes sicker, but its leaders

cling to their view of Russia as it existed when there was a Soviet Union"(Specter, 68). A definitive acknowledgement of the severity of the HIV problem and the concomitant necessity of funding sexual education would, then, be psychologically defeating and an embarrassment to Russia on the international stage.

This conclusion is further substantiated by Russia's frequent unwillingness to accept even volunteer assistance. Though the government's declining a hundred-and-fifty-million-dollar loan from the World Bank is attributed officially to a desire to avoid incurring further foreign debt, other, seemingly less significant policy decisions framed in this context indicate more paranoid political motivations. In 1999, for example, Peace Corps volunteers were reprimanded for producing and distributing 25,000 copies of an AIDS informational pamphlet and ordered to stop by the Education Ministry (Graves and Titova). Joseph Smith, a regional officer of the Salvation Army's St. Petersburg branch, cites a similar example of a visit by heads of the United Nations' AIDS project in the same year, during which Russian officials "talked about <AIDS in Russia> as if it were not a problem at all—basically they sat there and said, 'There is no problem'"(Graves and Titova). In April 1999, the charity-funded NAMES Foundation claims that the St. Petersburg administration refused financial support for its AIDS awareness event, and went so far as to attempt to charge them to host it (Graves and Titova). Michael Specter of *The New Yorker* provides a fitting summation of Russia's passivity even amidst the action of world organizations in his description of a recent Moscow press conference for a new European Union AIDS awareness initiative: "There are many efforts in Russia now to focus attention on the epidemic—from the E.U., from the United Nations AIDS Program, from American researchers, and from the multinational relief organizations. The only groups that seem to be missing are Russian"(61-62).

Such measures taken to inhibit the implementation of sexual health and HIV prevention programs are justified by the government on account of a fundamental mistrust of all-things Western, including the moral impetus behind the efforts of international organizations on either end of the political spectrum. The most notable defeat suffered by sexual education advocates is generally considered to be the blocking of a 1996 UNESCO project, undertaken at the request of the Russian Ministry of Education and in collaboration with the United Nations Population Fund, due primarily to pressures from the recently-allied Communist Party and Orthodox Church. The project, which sought to evaluate the attitudes and knowledge of students and develop a workable, nationally tailored sexual education curriculum over a span of three years, quickly became a highly contentious political issue. Noted Russian scholar Igor S. Kon describes his dismay at the project's fate:

> Before it was even born, the project came under fire and was labeled as a "Western ideological plot against Russian children". An aggressive group of Pro-Life activists filed a complaint with the communist-dominated Parliament's National security committee. In some Moscow district towns people were asked in the streets: "Do you want children to be taught in school how to engage in sex? If not, please, sign the petition to ban this demonic project". Priests and activists told their audiences that all bad things in Western life were rooted in sex education, that Western governments are now trying to ban or eliminate it, and that only the corrupt Russian government, at the instigation of the "World sexological-industrial complex", was acting against the best interests of the country. All this was supported by pseudoscientific data (for example, that in England boys begin to masturbate at 9 years of age, and at 11 they are already completely impotent) and other lies.

The notion of an alliance of Western powers in direct opposition to a renewed Russian Orthodox Church has proven pervasive and highly potent. Kon goes on to note that, "At an important round-table in the Russian Academy of Education on March 6, 1997, influential priests declared that Russia does not need any sex education whatever in the schools, because this had always been done successfully by the Church..." The force that the Orthodox Church exerts over policy-making and public opinion is powerful, the import of which is especially significant given its vehement opposition to any form of contraception. "The Russian Orthodox Church has objected

to cinema ads promoting safer sex, and billboards promoting the use of condoms raised complaints from the authorities that they were harming public morals," reports Irena Maryniak for *Eurozine*.

While Russia, generally regarded as being in the midst of a sexual revolution, largely ignores documented common practice in informing relevant official policy, this compartmentalization is highly detrimental in the context of a public health crisis. Maryniak continues, "But official prudery apart, Russians take pride in sleeping around, and the possibility of heterosexual transmission raises few real qualms. Sex is freedom, risk is joy, and hygiene or sanitation are not always the highest priorities." International organizations are consequently left frustrated in the face of this insistence on an unrealistic level of moral piety to the exclusion of statistical warnings, causing them to be still more suspect in the eyes of a government with which they have long been at odds. Elements hostile to such initiatives, furthermore, are adroit at manipulating this historical tension to justify a lack of decisive action and failure to distribute accurate information to the public regarding sexual health. In light of the absence of such readily available information prior to *glasnost'*, guidance in this direction is naturally found in existing Western models, contributing to a vicious cycle of resentment and suspicion. If non-Orthodox, morally-lax foreign societies and their collective media are to bear the onus for Russia's infiltration by sexually transmitted diseases and the practices through which they are spread, it follows that prevention attempts are to be equally distrusted.

Somewhat paradoxically, Russia's escalating HIV infection rate, which most galvanizes and warrants the involvement of the global community in developing preventative educational programs, is often presented to the Russian public as a key incentive against Western involvement and awareness campaigns. The interpretation of HIV and AIDS as foreign

afflictions indicative of moral decadence provides a tangible and persuasive alternative to which the Orthodox Church and conservative governmental elements juxtapose themselves, resulting in a stigma that brands prevention and treatment of the diseases as an unworthy cause. HIV is viewed instead as deserving of legal punishment on account of its historical ties to drug use and homosexuality, an approach that becomes increasingly antediluvian as infection rates skyrocket in the heterosexual community.

Michael Specter states that "AIDS was portrayed as the most ruinous manifestation of Western decadence, the Supreme Soviet had already introduced some of the strictest anti-AIDS laws in the world, among them a five-year prison term for infected people who knowingly exposed others to the disease"(61). As the Russian public struggles to reclaim its Orthodox history and the Communist party its political influence, efforts to introduce HIV, a topic inherently sexual in nature, into the educational agenda are labeled as pro-Western and thus somehow opposed to rebuilding traditional Russian values. "This is the first country with a declining population that AIDS has hit in this way," says Steven Solnick, chief Ford Foundation representative in Russia. "And that changes everything. It makes the problem more urgent, of course, but in the Kremlin it creates a complicated political dynamic. AIDS gives the forces that are hostile to change a reason to enforce a conservative social order" (Specter, 62). Many go so far as to view AIDS, in spite of the escalating population deficit, as a kind of purifying force affecting only those undeserving of effort or funding. "The argument that the Russian government gives is simple: if there are not enough syringes in hospitals to treat young children, if the old babushka who has lived through so much is without support, why should we spend money on drug users?" confirms UNAIDS representative Arkadiusz Majszyk (Mainville). The government, then, is a primary source of anti-HIV invective, exacerbating animosities towards

organizations striving to distribute preventive information and challenge dated attitudes towards the threat to the heterosexual, non-drug using community. Specter notes in his article that "One Russian woman I have known for years, a prominent liberal, said, 'AIDS might be a good thing, in a way, because it is killing people who only destroy the country anyway'"(66). Anthropologist Michele Rivkin-Fish points out, as well, that AIDS discussion is conspicuously absent even among the efforts of many sexual health advocates. She attributes its stigma as a foreign problem largely to its comparatively late impact on Russia:

> While health providers demonstrated great concern with the rapid rise of STDs such as syphilis, it is ironic that AIDS went virtually unmentioned—especially given the fact that the former is a harbinger of HIV. This...is likely a reflection of having relied on their own clinical experiences in shaping their lectures. By the midpoint of 1996, fewer than 200 cases of HIV infection had been reported in St. Petersburg, and approximately 600 were documented in Moscow (Specter, 1997). ...In conversations with me, several physicians explained that they considered it a relatively remote, 'foreign' preoccupation…'(Rivkin-Fish).

Russian taboos regarding HIV and the demographic groups it primarily affects are incontestably rooted in legitimate observations as to the disease's initial impact on the country, and it is understandable given both Soviet silence on sexual issues and its treatment by conservative political forces that government officials, educators and the population at large are loath to acknowledge its wider impact. The rapid spread of sexually transmitted diseases throughout the young, heterosexual community, however, belies these social conceptions, which are only perpetuated in the absence of an educational agenda addressing such concerns.

Increasing widespread alarm over Russia's population decline functions also as ammunition for opponents of sexual education and HIV prevention programs. A firm belief that Western, specifically American, authorities are committed to systematically weakening Russia through manipulation of HIV statistics or the disease itself prevails. It follows in such a line of reasoning that sex education, a Western tradition and the movement towards which receives massive international support, is an ideal forum for indoctrinating beliefs and urging practices

which will further this undermining mission. An ISAR (Initiative for Social Action and Renewal in Eurasia) report touches upon the population panic fueling much of the anti-sex education movement, asserting that "...nationalist politicians may be swayed by arguments that limiting access to family planning and contraception will ensure a Russian majority population. ...The opposition to family planning and sex education as a threat from the West is alarming and deserves attention"(Dorsch and Peterson). Michael Specter writes, "I was even told, by Aleksandr Goliusov, of the Ministry of Health, that the infection rate in Russia wasn't nearly as bad as Western experts have asserted, and he implied that the West was simply trying to humiliate Russia by inflating the figures and comparing them to Africa's. 'Isn't much of this coming from your C.I.A.?' he asked, with some justification"(65).

The fact that a rampant AIDS epidemic in Russia is especially germane in the international community due to a potential security threat is indisputable; however, this line of reasoning is effectively and underhandedly utilized to convince the public of Western *encouragement* of a population crisis, a strategy that, if executed, would be decidedly self-detrimental. A distortion of the Russian Planned Parenthood Association's official slogan, "The birth of healthy and wanted children, responsible parenthood," in the communist journal *Pravda* and religious news publications as "One child per family" illustrates this insistence on proving a Western objective of depopulation. Igor Kon notes that according to the Orthodox website <zhizn'.orthodoxy.ru.htm>,

> ...the main danger for Russian children and their parents are not abortions, HIV and syphilis but the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF), which expresses the interests of the contraceptive industry, and the United Nations Population Fund, which is interested in the depopulation of Russia, so that the West can appropriate its natural resources. Parents are being taught how to sabotage any attempts to introduce sex education, even including taking their children out of the schools. They are told that condoms are inefficient against both HIV or STDs, and also against pregnancy.

Planned Parenthood educational efforts in particular have encountered vehement media resistance, and for many conservative voices, have come to embody these putative depopulation objectives. Dr. Elena Dmitrieva, Chair of Public Affairs at the University of St. Petersburg, reports for the IPPF that "The author of another article...describes sex education as a means of decreasing the birth rate and thus the Russian population. ...The authors of these articles are of the opinion that <state-funded sex education> would force the Russian tax payer to pay for its own decrease"(Dmitrieva). The recognition by the Russian public of the immediacy of population decline lends such critics of sex education particular resonance and creates an opportunity for easy distortion of facts, contributing to the spread of HIV and a continued reliance on abortion through a perpetuation of widespread ignorance as to reproductive health.

The political polarization of Russia's sex education debate is especially extreme given the moral and religious tones of *both* proponents and opponents of establishing such programs. While the Western model is typically based in an insistence on biological accuracy aside from moral assertions, Russian educators envision themselves as redefining sexual boundaries and morality in direct opposition to repressive Soviet policies. Sexual health educators make no efforts to distance programs from religious beliefs, attempting to work rather within the context of the Orthodox Church's renewed significance in society and in conflict instead with what they deem as overly conservative Soviet forces. Kon points out that "Sexual symbols and values, which earlier had been peripheral to the ideological nucleus of culture, now became a sort of watershed dividing 'right' and 'left', as well as the generations. Sexuality quickly began to polarize and politicize. This created a host of very acute political, moral, and aesthetic problems that society was just as ill-equipped to understand—let alone resolve—as had been the universally damned state power"(Rivkin Fish). Rivkin-Fish observes in a 1999 study that

Russian sexual education lectures, in contrast to the scientific approach of most Western models, oppose themselves in a primarily moral way to Soviet practices of reproductive ignorance and neglect: "...only a minimal amount of time was devoted to descriptions of physiological processes surrounding puberty, menstruation, and conception. ...Most lectures...concentrated explicitly on conveying moral concerns about sexuality and reproduction"(Rivkin Fish).

Educators are faced with the difficult task of reversing what they see as the deeply inculcated repression of the Soviet regime, and this objective becomes the foremost concern. Rivkin-Fish goes on to notice of one such educator, "...he saw himself working in explicit opposition to the views promulgated by the Soviet regime... With a substantial dose of sarcasm, he opposed the content of his lectures to 'the taboos' constructed by 'our wonderful Soviet regime', explaining that the silence surrounding sexuality was harmful and inappropriate." It is clear, however, that these proponents of sexual education, while advocating programs that are radical in comparison to the treatment of reproductive matters in the Soviet Union, have very strictly defined parameters of acceptable sexual behavior, and do not go so far as to look outside religious conceptions in informing their tactics. "By naturalizing sexual desire but containing it within the bounds of self-pleasure or marriage," concludes Rivkin, "sex educators hope to undo the attitudes promoted by the Soviet regime without opening the doors to an 'anything goes' policy. Individual self-consciousness and self-knowledge may now be necessary, but are only acceptable as long as they lead to practices sanctioned by the laws of 'human nature' as ordained by God." She goes on to provide an appropriate excerpt from one such lecture, highly personal in approach, emphasizing the divinity and naturalness of sexuality:

> ...Stay home alone, so nobody will see you or disturb you. Light some candles, put on music—not technopop that gets your neck out of joint—but Mozart, Vivaldi, Bach, and get into the atmosphere. Put on your best dress, stand in front of a large mirror, look at yourself and tell yourself, 'I'm beautiful, I'm unique and irreplaceable...Consider yourself a creation of divine significance...'

This particular educator further elucidates his motivation in admonishing Rivkin-Fish, "You must understand, Michele, we humans must not play God. We must recognize the laws of nature and the laws of God." There is thus an inherent conflict between the Western emphasis on the objective provision of information regarding sexual health and contraception, and the Russian desire to frame such initiatives in a uniquely post-Soviet, moral context.

In light of Russia's lack of domestic initiative in establishing effective sexual education programs, supported by the renewed voice of the Orthodox Church and conservative political factions including the Communist party, it seems natural that world organizations seek involvement in developing and helping fund a preventive curriculum. The debate over participation is fueled largely by conflict between ideological inflexibility and empirically-based necessity, namely Russia's hesitance to be perceived as a fallen superpower in need of international succor; its categorization of HIV as a manifestation of Western decadence and consequent lack of attention to the problem; and an inherent conflict in Western and Russian approaches to sexual education. It is imperative, however, that Russia take steps to address this widespread sexual health ignorance through fostering a national sexual education curriculum and comprehensive HIV awareness campaigns, and that international organizations recognize the cultural, historical and political idiosyncrasies that influence educational methodology. Ideally, international partnerships might serve as a means of finding an effective, nationally tailored equilibrium between the willfully blind official piety that currently pervades, and comparatively amoral Western model programs. In the context of the impending demographic crisis and its ineluctable global impact, it seems that there is little choice as to the incumbent nature of such cooperation.

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Disillusionment on the Grandest of Scales: Finnish-Americans in the Soviet Union, 1917-1939

By: Emily Weidenhamer

From the time of the Russian Revolution onward, the Bolsheviks were often portrayed in mainstream American media as the "enemy."[1] Many Americans, however, chose to go to the Soviet Union despite public opinion, and the Soviets welcomed them. Transitioning from a rural economy of peasants to an industrial economy of proletariats required technological expertise. Four distinct groups of Americans chose to move to the Soviet Union. African-Americans, both Communists and non-Communists, were recruited as agricultural experts to Central Asia to aid in cotton production.[2] Others, primarily skilled workers and specialists, were recruited to factories or construction projects in Ukraine or the Urals; Kharkov, Cheliabinsk, Magnitogorsk, and Kuznetsk were all home to large industrial projects—and hence many foreigners.[3] Some Jewish-Americans made their way to Eastern Siberia, where Stalin had created a Jewish Autonomous Region in Birobidzhan, a sparsely populated area just north of Manchuria.[4] The fourth group was a cohort of Finnish-Americans who settled in Karelia, an autonomous region in northwest Russia bordering Finland.

Why did these Americans choose to go to the Soviet Union? The role of the Great Depression, which struck the United States in 1929, cannot be ignored as a factor of immigration. Some Americans, finding no work commensurate with their qualifications in the United States, found in the Soviet Union a

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[1] See, for example, Peter Filene, *Americans and the Soviet Experiment, 1917-1933* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), 21.

[2] Yelena Khanga and Susan Jacoby, *Soul to Soul: A Black Russian American Family, 1865-1992* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992), 74.

[3] Andrea Graziosi, "Foreign Workers in Soviet Russia, 1920-1940: Their Experience and Their Legacy," *International Labor and Working Class History*, 33 (1988): 40. On Magnitogorsk, see John Scott, *Behind the Urals: An American in Russia's City of Steel* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1942).

[4] The region came into existence in 1931, when the Central Executive Committee of the USSR decreed that a Jewish region would be founded in Birobidzhan. It was not officially established as an autonomous region with its own government until 1934. See Robert Weinberg, *Stalin's Forgotten Zion: Birobidzhan and the Making of a Soviet Jewish Homeland: An Illustrated History, 1928-1996* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1998), 35.

willing employer. Amtorg, the Soviet trade mission in New York, received an astounding 100,000 requests for immigration in an eight-month period in 1931.[5] Most requests were not granted, but as many as 11,000 Americans were employed in the Soviet Union in 1932.[6]

Like other Americans who immigrated to the Soviet Union, some Finnish-Americans considered emigration as possessing material benefits. Sylvi Hokkanen, an American who lived in Karelia for seven years, wrote: "Of course we didn't expect to find wealth and material comforts in the Soviet Union, but we did feel that there would be an opportunity to work for a better life with a good chance of success."[7] Others were drawn by the lure of a free education for them or their children, like Eino Tuomi. He pointed out proudly that he had "managed to give all three of our daughters an education of their own choice."[8]

Most Finnish-Americans, however, did not go for primarily economic reasons. Many of them were fairly well-off economically, owning homes, cars, farm equipment, and the like. They paid their own way to the Soviet Union, and they emigrated with entire families.[9] Why, then, did Finnish-Americans choose to emigrate? For many, the decision was based in politics.

Finnish-American Politics

"We were not traitors. It has to be understood that we were the children of idealists. Their idealism was worded in communist ideals—that there should be equality for all." —Mayme Sevander [10]

The Finnish-American community in the United States was often politically radical, heavily influenced by left-wing socialist and communist movements. This trend was rooted, in part, in the Finnish national awakening. The national revival took place from 1885 to 1907, a time period corresponding to the main wave of Finnish immigration to America. Included in this cultural revival were strong socialist,

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[5] "6,000 Americans to work in Russia," *New York Times*, August 24, 1931, p.7.
[6] Graziosi, 40. She writes: "By the second quarter of 1932, when the peak was probably reached, 42,230 foreign workers and specialists… were working in the yards…. About 50 percent were Germans or Austrians. Americans (the 5,234 American and Canadian Finns who had reached Karelia by 1932 perhaps included) made up another 25 percent."
[7] Lawrence and Sylvia Hokkanen, *Karelia: A Finnish-American Couple in Stalin's Russia* (St. Cloud, Minn.: North Star, 1991), 9.
[8] Mayme Sevander, *Red Exodus* (Duluth, Minn.: OSCAT, 1993), 176.
[9] Paula Garb, *They Came to Stay: North Americans in the U.S.S.R.* (Moscow: Progress, 1987), 30.
[10] Mark Stodghill, "Harsh Lessons in Idealism," *Duluth News-Tribune*, Dec. 15, 1996, p. 1E

temperance, women's rights, and workers' movements. These movements also took root among the Finnish émigrés in America.[11] In America, Finnish immigrants often labored in lumber camps or mines under terrible working conditions. Their anger at the exploitation they and other immigrants suffered from found its outlet in radical political movements—the labor union movement, socialism, and eventually communism.[12] At the time, workers across the country were unionizing, and Finns joined them in demanding better working conditions and pay. Finns played large parts in major miners' strikes in the Mesabi Range of northern Minnesota in 1907 and in Michigan's Copper Country in 1913.[13]

By 1903, forty Finnish-American clubs had formed the *Imatra* League and had begun to take steps to promote socialist ideas among the clubs. The *Imatra* League had 23,697 members in 1908, almost all of whom were Marxist in orientation.[14] A Finnish-American Workers' League was also founded in August 1904. In 1906, delegates at a conference in Hibbing, Minnesota, formed the Finnish Socialist Federation and affiliated themselves with the American Socialist party. The initial group was formed from socialist clubs with approximately 2,500 members. A few years later, in 1912, the Federation had grown to 13,667 members.[15]

The Federation's activities centered on "Finn Halls." These halls—the cultural centers of the Finnish-American community—became political centers as well. There, Finns could dance, watch theater, and absorb and discuss leftist politics.[16] Many of the children of Finnish-American socialists were

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[11] Carl Ross, "The Utopian Vision of Finnish Immigrants: 1900-1930," *Scandinavian Studies* 60 (1988): 482-483. Hereafter Ross, "Utopian Vision."
[12] Eugene Van Cleef, *The Finn in America* (Duluth, Minn.: Finnish Daily Publishing, 1918), 28-29; Sevander, *They Took My Father* (Duluth, Minn: Pfeifer-Hamilton, 1992), 4-6.
[13] Carl Ross, *The Finn Factor in American Labor, Culture and Society* (New York Mills, Minn.: Parta, 1977), 106-118. Hereafter Ross, *Finn Factor*.
[14] Albert Joseph Gedicks, Jr., *Working Class Radicalism Among Finnish Immigrants in Minnesota and Michigan Mining Communities* (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1979), 151.
[15] Ross, "Utopian Vision," 487-488.
[16] Hokkanen, 6. For a discussion of the role of theater in Finnish halls, see Timo Riipa, "The Finnish-American Radical Theatre of the 1930s" in *The Best of Finnish Americana*, ed. Michael Karni (New Brighton, Minn.: Penfield, 1994), 109-115.

raised as socialists from birth. They attended the Finnish halls regularly with their parents, but they also participated in summer camps, demonstrations, protests, and non-religious Finnish Sunday Schools.[17]

The Finnish Socialist Federation on several occasions experienced dissension and even splits. After the 1913 copper miners' strike in Michigan, many Federation members joined the Industrial Workers of the World (I.W.W.). The Federation was strongly influenced by communism after the founding of the Communist Party in the United States. The socialist and communist Finns split over these influences, and communist Finns formed their own Finnish halls.[18] In 1923, the Federation officially affiliated itself with the Workers' Party, the public organization of the Communist Party in the United States.[19] Federation members made up about 40 percent of the Workers' Party in the 1920s.[20]

By 1921, four major Finnish-American radical newspapers were printed regularly: *Työmies* (*Working Man*), *Raivaaja* (*Pioneer*), *Toveri* (*Comrade*), and *Eteenpäin* (*Forward*). These publications represented a range of political views across the leftist spectrum.[21] *Työmies* was the official mouthpiece of the Finnish Socialist Federation, and later of the Finnish section of the Workers' Party.[22] *Eteenpäin* and *Toveri*, like *Työmies*, were linked to communism. *Raivaaja* was the newspaper of the Social Democrats, a group that broke from the Federation and retained its links to the American Socialist Party. Carl Ross estimates the circulation of the Finnish Communist press alone to have been nearly 40,000 at its peak; if the circulation figures of *Raivaaja* and *Industrialisti* (the I.W.W. organ) are added, the total circulation of the Finnish radical press numbered around 60,000. Because newspapers are almost always shared with

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[17] Sevander, *Red Exodus*, 16-18; Aili Jarvenpa, *A Coming Home for Me* (New Brighton, Minn.: Sampo, 1994), 4; Sirkka Tuomi Holm, "Daughter and Granddaughter of the Finnish Left," in *Red Diapers: Growing Up in the Communist Left*, ed. Judy Kaplan and Linn Shapiro (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois, 1998), 36. For more recollections of Finnish halls and their impact on the children of the Finnish-American community, see Irja Beckman, *Echoes from the Past* (New York Mills, Minn.: Parta, 1979).

[18] Holm, 35-36.

[19] Ross, "Utopian Vision," 489-490.

[20] Ross, *Finn Factor,* 164; Gedicks, 165.

[21] These were not the only newspapers of the Finnish-American left; countless smaller newspapers were also published in the U.S. and Canada. In her memoirs, Ruth Engelmann recalls anarchist newspapers that her Finnish-American family used to receive. See *Leaf House: Days of Remembering* (New York: Harper and Row, 1982), 99.

[22] Kaarlo Tuomi, "Karelian Fever: A Personal Memoir," in *The Best of Finnish Americana*, ed. Michael Karni (New Brighton, Minn.: Penfield, 1994), 118.

others, this represents a substantial radical movement within an immigrant community of roughly 400,000.[23]

Not all Finns in the United States, of course, were members of radical political movements. Many Finns were "Church Finns"—members of the Lutheran Church, far more conservative, and advocates of temperance.[24] These Finns did much to distance themselves from their more radical brethren. In the wake of the Mesabi strike of 1907, for example, the conservative Finns were so opposed to the striking miners' socialism that they established the "True Finns Movement" (*Tosi-suomalaisliike*) in February 1908. The movement claimed to be the true voice of Finnish-Americans and asked the mining companies not to judge all Finns as radical. They accused Finnish-American socialists of devastating the reputation of Finns everywhere and blamed them for the miners' "blacklist." The leaders of this movement reportedly recommended that the U.S. Department of Immigration deny Finnish socialists entrance to the country.[25]

Despite the divisions within the community, speakers traveling among Finnish-American communities to recruit immigrants to Karelia found a welcome there. Americans and Canadians were recruited primarily by two organizations: Amtorg, the Soviet trade mission in New York, and Soviet-Karelian Technical Aid (*Neuvosto-Karjalan Teknillinen Apu*).[26] Mayme Sevander's father was head of Soviet-Karelian Technical Aid for a time. She recalls that he told Finns in his recruiting speeches that:

> Karelia …needs strong workers who know how to chop trees and dig ore and build houses and grow food. Isn't that what we Finns have been doing in the United States for the past thirty years? And wouldn't it be wonderful to do that same work in a country that needs you, a country where there is no ruling class, no rich industrialists or kings or czars to tell you what to do? Just workers toiling together for the common good.[27]

The recruiting speeches were often the source of a person's "Karelian fever." Estimates of the number of Finnish-Americans who caught "Karelian fever" vary, but a widely accepted figure is approximately

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[23] Ross, *Finn Factor*, 163-164.
[24] Sevander, *Red Exodus*, 23.
[25] Ross, *Finn Factor*, 116.
[26] Kero, 232; U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Soviet Union 1933-1939* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1952), 661, note 75.
[27] Sevander, *They Took My Father*, 19.

6,000.[28] The fever was particularly concentrated and widespread in 1931 and 1932. The vast majority of immigrants arrived in Soviet Karelia in these years; few immigrants arrived after 1933.[29]

Many groups had farewells appealing to communist sentiment printed in Finnish newspapers:

> We the undersigned, leaving behind this country of capitalistic exploitation, are headed for the Soviet Union where the working class is in power and where it is building a socialistic society. We appeal to you, comrades, who are staying behind, to rally round communist slogans, to work efficiently to overthrow capitalism and create the foundation of a Republic of Labor.[30]

In order to be accepted to go to Soviet Karelia, potential emigrants did not have to be members of the Communist Party. They only had to be in good health, be willing to work hard and endure difficulties, and receive a reference from a Communist-affiliated organization.[31] All the emigrants, however, had in common at least an openness to consider new, often utopian ideas.[32]

It is a matter of some debate within the historical community whether ideology or ethnicity more strongly motivated the Karelian fever. Alexis Pogorelskin argues that ethnicity was the primary factor both for the recruitment of the emigrants and for the emigrants' decisions to leave.[33] Mayme Sevander and Richard Hudelson, on the other hand, argue that ideological motivations for emigration outweighed nationalist ones and that Finnish ethnic identity "did not exist in isolation from ideological factors."[34]

Two facts, however, seem to indicate that neither nationalist desires nor Marxist ideology can explain the Finnish-Americans' emigration completely. First, recruiters to Karelia did not target churchgoing, Suomi Synod Finns. The recruiters generally spoke in Finn halls, where radical politics reigned supreme. This seems to indicate that it was not simply Finns who were wanted in Karelia, but a

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[28] Sevander, *Red Exodus*, 41; Kero, 232.
[29] Kero, 232, 235.
[30] *Työmies*, Oct. 3, 1931; qtd. in Sevander, *They Took My Father*, 36.
[31] Tuomi, 117.
[32] Varpu Lindström and K. Börje Vähämäki, "Ethnicity Twice Removed: North-American Finns in Soviet Karelia," in *The Best of Finnish Americana 1978-1994*, ed. Michael Karni (New Brighton, Minn.: 1994), 142.
[33] "Karelian fever became a fever because the recruiters' message endowed their audiences with a status that American life had so far denied them. In Karelia, the Finns would be wanted. In Karelia, they would be first not last at the immigrants' table. In Karelia, they would acquire new found [sic] status precisely because they were Finns." Alexis Pogorelskin, "Why Karelian 'Fever'?", *Sirtolaisuus/Migration* 27, no. 1 (2000): 26.
[34] Richard Hudelson and Mayme Sevander, "A Relapse of Karelian Fever," *Sirtolaisuus/Migration* 27, no.2 (2000), 31

certain kind of Finns—those who would support the aims of the Soviet Union. Second, it was indeed Finnish Communists (or Communist sympathizers) who were targeted for recruitment. Recruiters did not target any other nationality for settlement in Karelia; they preferred Finns.

Arguing that nationalism was the primary factor, as Pogorelskin does, ignores the fact that most Finns in the United States did not go to Karelia. If nationalism were such a compelling factor, then one would expect a larger portion of the entire Finnish-American community to emigrate. Arguing that political ideology was the dominant motivator, as Hudelson and Sevander do, also leaves something to be desired. There were far more Finnish Communists in the United States than the emigrants who went to Karelia. This seems to indicate that a complex range of factors—ideology, ethnicity, and perhaps others—united to create the Karelian "fever" in the Finnish-American community.

Korenizatsiia and Karelianization: Early Soviet Nationality Policy

After the Russian Revolution and subsequent Civil War, the victorious Bolsheviks faced two pressing questions: How should they unify the various peoples residing within the boundaries of their new country? How were they to, in Stalin's words, make Soviet power "near and dear to the masses of the border regions of Russia?"[35] For centuries, the Russian Empire had dominated the territory of the U.S.S.R. Understandably, perhaps, the non-Russian nationalities of the new U.S.S.R. associated Russians with colonialism and cultural chauvinism. In order to restore order and promote peace, Lenin and his colleagues instituted a policy of *korenizatsiia*. This Russian word, which can be translated roughly as "indigenization," indicated the program to spread Bolshevism among the non-Russian nationalities.

The goal of *korenizatsiia* was to make Bolshevism "comprehensible" to the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union.[36] According to this policy, use of national languages was to be encouraged, both in the educational and public arenas. Also, *korenizatsiia* encouraged the development of national

[35] Josef Stalin, "The Policy of the Soviet Government on the National Question in Russia," in *Works, Vol. 4* (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1953), 370. Hereafter Stalin, Vol. 4.
[36] Stalin, Vol. 4, 370.

Communist parties and the staffing of government organs with nationals.[37] Josef Stalin, who was at the time the People's Commissar of Nationality Affairs, explained in an October 10, 1920 *Pravda* article that recruiting local Communist cadres enabled the masses to see that "the Soviet power and its organs are the products of their own efforts, the embodiment of their aspirations."[38]

The *korenizatsiia* policy had particular success in the area of language and literacy. Many nationalities of the U.S.S.R. did not have written languages until after the Communists were in control.[39] This "fight for literacy" was a crucial element of *korenizatsiia*, and it was, overall, a successful endeavor. By 1939, 87.4 percent of the total population of the U.S.S.R. was literate—a dramatic jump from the 56.6 percent literacy rate just 13 years before, in 1926.[40] It should be noted that these figures are deceiving because they relate to the population as a whole, not ethnic groups; certain ethnic minorities were still overwhelmingly illiterate until after World War II, and a gender imbalance still existed.[41] Nevertheless, the Soviets made large gains in literacy during the period before World War II.

The final element of *korenizatsiia* was the creation of autonomous soviets, autonomous oblasts or okrugs, autonomous republics, and Union republics for different nationalities. The amount of governmental power ranged from significant (Union republics) to very limited (autonomous soviets). This complex subdividing of territory was based on the theory that each national minority deserved a territory of its own, and it was by this rationale that Karelia existed as an autonomous republic.[42]

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[37] Gerhard Simon, *Nationalism and Policy Toward the Nationalities in the Soviet Union: From Totalitarian Dictatorship to Post-Stalinist Society*, trans. Karen and Oswald Forster (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), 21; Jeremy Smith, *The Bolsheviks and the National Question, 1917-23* (New York: St. Martin's, 1999), 108.
[38] Stalin, Vol. 4, 370-371.
[39] The Karelian literary language was not created until after the era of *korenizatsiia*, however.
[40] Simon, 48-49.
[41] John Dunstan, *Soviet Schooling in the Second World War* (New York: St. Martin's, 1997), 19. Dunstan gives the literacy rate in 1939 as 89.1 percent, slightly higher than Simon's figure. According to Dunstan's inspections of Soviet records, rural women were the least literate group within the USSR. Only 79.2 percent of rural Soviet women in 1939 were literate, as opposed to 97.6 percent of urban Soviet men (the most literate group).
[42] Terry Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001), 33, 68.

The Bolsheviks gained control of Karelia early in the Russian Civil War, and the Karelian Workers Commune was created on June 8, 1920. The area became the Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in 1923.[43] In most of the western territories of the U.S.S.R., developing local Communist cadres under the *korenizatsiia* policy was not a problem. In Karelia, however, much of the population was illiterate, and inexperienced at industrial work. Because of the general lack of education among the ethnic Karelian population, Finns—refugees from capitalist Finland and immigrants from North America—dominated the government.[44] The ethnic Karelians in the region spoke a language similar to Finnish.[45] The leaders of Karelia, after examining the Karelian language, decided that it was only a Finnish dialect. They resolved to develop local dialects through improved education and to eventually use standard Finnish throughout the region.[46] The official languages of Karelia were Russian and Finnish.[47] Those speaking various forms of Finnish (including the Karelian "dialect") were supposed to be taught Russian, and those whose mother tongue was Russian were supposed to be taught Finnish. This met with mixed results at best, and the newspaper *Punainen Karjala* (*Red Karelia*) criticized the language barrier that still existed between Russian and Finnish-speaking workers in July 1933.[48]

The term "Karelianization" was common beginning in the mid-1920s, but often nationality policy in Karelia was really Finnicization, in large part because of the efforts of Edvard Gylling, the leader of the Karelian Autonomous Republic.[49] Gylling began to worry in the mid-1920s that immigration of Russians and other non-Finns to the region would overwhelm the Karelian population. According to the 1920 census, the population of the Karelian Workers Commune was 145,753. Of these, 60.8 percent were

[43] M.I. Shumilov, "Rozhdenie sovetskoi vlasti v Petrozavodske i Karelii," in *Voprosy Istorii Evropeiskogo Severa* (Petrozavodsk: Petrozavodskii Gosudarstvennyi Universitet, 1999), 93.
[44] Gelb, 1105.
[45] Reino Kero, "The Role of Finnish Settlers from North America in the Nationality Question in Soviet Karelia in the 1930's," *Scandinavian Journal of History* 6, no. 3 (1981): 229.
[46] Kero, 231.
[47] Kero, 236.
[48] Kero, 231-234.
[49] Kero, 230.

Karelian, 37.4 percent were Russian, and 1.8 percent were of other ethnicities. In 1923, when the area became the Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, several primarily Russian districts were annexed to the republic. This, along with persistent Russian immigration, shifted the population ratio considerably. In 1925, only 41.7 percent of the population belonged to one of the Finnic nationalities—Karelians, Finns, or Veps—while a full 56.7 percent were Russian.[50]

Gylling persuaded government authorities to recruit Finnish workers from North America and Finland; in this way, much of the culture of the region could be preserved (as Finns and Karelians are ethnically similar). Because many Finnish-Americans were also skilled lumberjacks and industrial workers, their presence would help Karelia fulfill its quotas for the first Five Year Plan.[51] There are also references to Finnish-Americans in the Kuznetz basin, Rostov, and Karelia as early as 1921.[52] Still, the majority of Finns arrived only in the early 1930s, after the full-fledged recruitment campaign had begun.

Upon their arrival in Karelia, the Finnish-Americans found a culture that was not very different from the one they had left behind. The Finns had concert halls, theaters, social clubs, and schools; they could (and often did) spend most of their time in Finnish-language venues.[53] Finnish culture in Karelia during the period of *korenizatsiia* flourished. A major Finnish-language Communist newspaper, *Punainen Karjala* (*Red Karelia*), was published regularly.[54] Finnish was the medium of instruction in many schools. The Karelian Pedagogical Institute, based in the regional capital of Petrozavodsk, trained teachers for both Finnish-speaking and Russian-speaking middle schools and secondary schools.[55]

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[50] Tuominen, 284. Russian immigration persisted throughout the 1920s and 30s. According to Karelian archives, 13,868 settlers from elsewhere in the Soviet Union moved to Karelia in 1931-35. See G.I. Mezentsev, ed., *Rabochii Klass Karelii v period postroeniia sotsializma v SSSR* (Petrozavodsk: Kareliia, 1984), 14. [*The Working Class of Karelia in the Period of Building Socialism in the USSR*]

[51] Michael Gelb, "Karelian Fever: The Finnish Immigrant Community During Stalin's Purges," *Europe-Asia Studies* 45, no. 6 (1993): 1092; Kero, 230-232.

[52] Sevander, *Red Exodus*, 54-57.

[53] Sevander, *Red Exodus*, 45.

[54] Hokkanen, 85.

[55] Hokkanen, 30.

Petrozavodsk was home to the frequently touring Finnish Dramatic Theater. One such tour in 1936 took eight actors by skis on a 1200-kilometer trek to isolated settlements and lumber camps.[56]

Petrozavodsk also boasted a Finnish opera company; Jukka Ahti and Katri Lammi, husband and wife singers who had emigrated from the United States, were among its brightest stars.[57] The Karelian Radio Symphony Orchestra was made up nearly entirely of Finnish-American musicians, and a beautiful Philharmonic hall was built in Petrozavodsk for them.[58] Brass bands were another Finnish-American cultural contribution to Karelia. Lauri Hokkanen, another immigrant, was a trumpeter in a ski factory band that was composed primarily of Finnish-Americans. The group was called on to perform at funerals, dances, and civic functions.[59] By 1932, Petrozavodsk had five men's and two women's baseball teams.[60]

Despite their achievements, life was not easy for the new arrivals. As soon as they arrived, the immigrants came face to face with the human costs of Stalin's collectivization campaign. The train stations were filled with starving, exiled "kulaks." Immigrant Kaarlo Tuomi writes:

> All the stations were packed with hordes of exiled peasants from the steppes of Russia and the Ukraine…. They were literally dying of starvation before our eyes; rags hung on one, and the silent entreaty of the children was unbearable as they went back and forth through the train begging for bread…. 'You can't make an omelette without breaking some eggs,' Lenin once quipped, and we accepted this grimly. But it was easier to joke about broken eggs than to see broken people and hear their pitiful cries.[61]

Faced with the realities of Soviet living conditions, between one-third and one-half of the immigrants returned to America.[62] Some immigrants returned immediately after reaching the desolate Petrozavodsk train station.[63] A June 1931 *New York Times* article reported that of a group of 40 Finnish-Americans who traveled to Karelia, 22 requested transit visas from Finland to return to America a month later.[64]

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[56] Hokkanen, 85; Sevander, *They Took My Father*, 56-57
[57] Sevander, *Red Exodus*, 110.
[58] Sevander, *Red Exodus*, 93-94. The Philharmonic hall was later destroyed by Soviet forces during World War II.
[59] Hokkanen, 45.
[60] Sevander, *Red Exodus*, 168-169.
[61] Tuomi, 121-122.
[62] Gelb, 1091; Tuomi, 125. Gelb gives the figure as "possibly half," while Tuomi places it at "at least a third."
[63] Sevander, *Red Exodus*, 47.
[64] "American Reds Seek Return From Russia," *New York Times*, June 3, 1931, p. 12.

Those who made it past the train station encountered living conditions far below what they were accustomed to. Most families were initially assigned one spartan room in a barracks; some families even had to share rooms. The barracks had no running water, no indoor plumbing, no central heating, and an abundance of bedbugs and roaches.[65] At first, foreigners had the privilege of shopping in *Insnab* (Supplies for Foreigners) stores. These stores carried more items than stores for ordinary citizens and provided "luxury" items such as white bread, fresh fruit, sweets, caviar, and butter.[66] All foreigners' special rationing privileges were removed in the autumn of 1935, and they then had to contend with the crowded, poorly stocked Soviet stores.[67] Some foreign workers never had such privileges because they were too far from an Insnab store. Americans working on collective farms in 1931, for example, subsisted on soup and black bread, with occasional porridge or dried fish.[68]

Although the living conditions were more primitive than they were used to, the Finnish-Americans had generally positive experiences in the era of *korenizatsiia*. They arranged Finnish schools and activities, socialized with other Finns, were active in music and sports in the republic, and were tolerated—even welcomed—by the government. This was not to last. Changes in nationality policy in the mid-1930s marked the beginning of much harder times.

Nationality Policy Changes

In the 1930s, the Soviet Union's nationality policy made a distinct shift toward Russification. Efforts to achieve proportional representation of nationals ceased, the Russian language was emphasized

[65] Hokkanen, 17, 50; Sevander, *Of Soviet Bondage*, 23
[66] Hokkanen, 55; Eva Stolar Meltz and Rae Gunter Osgood, *And the Winds Blew Cold: Stalinist Russia as Experienced by an American Emigrant* (Blackburg, Va.: McDonald and Woodward, 2000), 74; Sylvia R. Margulies, *The Pilgrimage to Russia: The Soviet Union and the Treatment of Foreigners, 1924-1937* (Madison, Wisc.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1968), 94.
[67] Kero, 240; Stolar Meltz, 73-75
[68] "Russians Elated by Farm Success," *New York Times*, June 7, 1931, Section 3, p. 4. See also Margulies, 92-99, for a discussion of the differences in living conditions of foreign specialists favored by the state and foreign workers living in provincial areas.

again, national military units were disbanded, and local cadres were punished for nationalism. This dramatic change marked the beginning of the Stalinist terror.

Although the changes in nationality policy may have seemed abrupt, *korenizatsiia* was never intended to be permanent. In a 1930 address at the 16th Party Congress, Stalin explained:

> It may seem strange that we who stand for the future *merging* of national cultures into one common (both in form and content) culture, with one common language, should at the same time stand for the *flowering* of national cultures at the present moment, in the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat. But there is nothing strange about it. The national cultures must be allowed to develop and unfold, to reveal all their potentialities, in order to create the conditions for merging them into one common culture with one common language in the period of the victory of socialism all over the world.[69]

Before cultures could assimilate, Stalin argued, they first (paradoxically) had to develop on their own. *Korenizatsiia*, this "flowering of national cultures," was only a temporary means to reach the final end of unity in a single, worldwide, socialist culture. This culture would most likely be Russian, as events following Stalin's speech would prove.

During the first Five Year Plan (1928-1932), the Communist Party upheld Stalin's viewpoint that the U.S.S.R. was in the period of "flowering cultures." In the mid-1930s, however, Stalin began to pursue a nationality policy that indicated that the U.S.S.R. was progressing toward the "merging" phase.[70] This period in nationality policy moved all regions of the Soviet Union, including Karelia, towards Russification. The first step was removing local leaders who were seen as too nationalistic. In 1933 and 1934, 1.3 million members were expelled from the Communist Party in the most comprehensive purge of the party to that point. The purge was especially concentrated in rural areas. Non-Russian republics suffered 12 to 14 percent more expulsions than industrial areas.[71]

In 1933, a plenum of the Central Committee in Karelia decreed that local nationalism was the greatest danger in the republic. According to the declaration, Karelia's leadership had

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[69] Josef Stalin, "Political Report of the Central Committee to the Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.)," In *Works*, Vol. 12, (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1955), 380. Italics in original.
[70] Simon, 137-138.
[71] Simon, 31.

purposely pursued a policy of Finnicization "with the goal of annexing Karelia and uniting her to Finland under the slogan of a 'Great Finland' extending all the way to the Urals." One of the specific practices condemned under this decree was the recruitment of Finnish settlers from North America.[72] Once Kirov, the head of the Party in Leningrad, was killed, the campaign against nationalism in Karelia intensified. Kirov was replaced with Zhdanov, who in 1935 began to launch attacks on "Finnish nationalism" in Karelia. A midsummer festival happened to fall on Finland's Flag Day (June 24), and Soviet authorities alleged that blue and white Finnish flags had been flying at the event. Moreover, they said, the leadership of Karelia "had [not] noticed anything improper in this fascist blasphemy."[73]

The organizers of the festival said that they had not seen any blue and white flags, nor had they known that the date was Finland's Flag Day. The explanations were not accepted, and Karelia's leadership soon felt the results. Kustaa Rovio, the secretary of the Communist Party in Karelia, was ousted from his post that same summer. Edvard Gylling was removed from his post in November of the same year. Accused nationalists, whatever their credentials, were removed from the Party.[74] The commander of the Karelian army was removed from his post and banished to Moscow after allegations that the officers conspired with the Finnish army.[75] Arrests continued to occur throughout Karelia in 1936 and early 1937 under the direction of Zhdanov's associate Irklis, a Latvian.[76] On July 25, 1937, Irklis himself was arrested and charged with espionage. This day marked what Finns called the beginning of the "Great Hate"—the Stalinist mass arrests, or great purges.[77]

Throughout the Soviet Union, similar events occurred as nationality policy shifted. By 1937, the topic of *korenizatsiia* had completely vanished from the media and had become taboo.[78] The increased

[72] Martin, 357.
[73] Tuominen, 294-295.
[74] Tuominen, 295-296.
[75] Gelb, 1098.
[76] Tuominen, 299; Gelb, 1098.
[77] Tuominen, 299.
[78] Simon, 41.

Russification of the Soviet Union became a legal reality in a series of March 1938 decrees. National military units were abolished on March 7, which effectively made Russian the sole language of the Red Army. Until then, the units had made it possible to draft young men who knew no Russian, since the official language of each of these units was the language of the republic which the unit was from. National military units had also served to develop cadres of non-Russian officers for the Red Army.[79]

On March 13, the Central Committee and Council of People's Commissars passed a resolution requiring compulsory instruction in Russian for all non-Russian schools in the Union Republics and autonomous republics. Most schools for national minorities (that is, people living outside of their ethnic group's designated territories) disappeared from the educational system. Efforts to introduce minority languages to the higher education system were stopped, and Russian became the sole language of instruction at the post-secondary level. This gave Russian children preference and better educational opportunities in all Union Republics. One of the arguments used to justify the necessity of Russian was the need for all soldiers to know Russian, given universal conscription. [80]

Not only were changes in policy carried out, but also the earlier policies of *korenizatsiia* were denounced. Nikita Khrushchev was the head of the Ukrainian CP at its Fourteenth Party Congress in June 1938. At the Congress, Khrushchev viciously accused *korenizatsiia* as having been a tool of capitalist domination.[81] Resolutions of the Congress represented a complete break with the earlier policies.

As nationality policy shifted, xenophobia increased across the Soviet Union. Anyone with foreign citizenship or ties to a foreign country fell under suspicion. A January 1936 decree from the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI) ordered fraternal parties, that is, the Communist

[79] Simon, 153.
[80] Simon, 150-153. This was, of course, less than a week after the national military units were abolished.
[81] Simon, 152.

parties of other countries, to assess the political reliability of their members who lived in the U.S.S.R.[82] These verifications (*proverki*) resulted in deportations, arrests (usually on accusations of espionage), and executions.[83] In August 1936, a trial was held in Moscow for the members of an alleged "Trotskyite-Zinovievite terrorist center" that supposedly planned the 1934 murder of Kirov. In open court, the defendants testified that "there existed an international Trotskyist conspiracy with ties to foreign governments and intelligence agencies."[84] These "confessions" only fueled the fire of xenophobia. A January 1938 Politburo decree extended the "operation for the destruction of espionage and sabotage contingents made up of Poles, Letts, Germans, Estonians, Finns, Greeks, Iranians, Kharbinites, Chinese, and Rumanians."[85] This order extended to citizens of the U.S.S.R. and foreign nationals alike.[86]

All foreigners, though, not only those of the nationalities listed in the Politburo decree, came under suspicion because of their foreignness.[87] Possibly 20 percent of all those arrested in the purges' peak years of 1937 and 1938 were foreign-born.[88] Communications from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow to the U.S. Secretary of State reveal that Embassy visitors in 1938 were repeatedly stopped for questioning after leaving the complex. Embassy documents reveal that the mother of Elmer John Nousainen, an American citizen with dual nationality, notified the American Embassy that her son had disappeared. Nousainen apparently did not return home after a visit to the American Embassy on July 18, 1938. His traveling companion, one Mr. Ranta, also did not return home.[89] Nousainen was accused of

[82] William Chase, "The Origins of the Polish Operation and the Rise of Soviet Xenophobia, 1929-1938" (unpublished paper, 2002), 16.
[83] Chase, 18-19.
[84] Chase, 19.
[85] Chase, 30; Terry Martin, *An Affirmative Action Empire: Ethnicity and the Soviet State, 1923-1938* (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1996), 776. Hereafter Martin, Ph.D. diss.
[86] Chase, 30.
[87] See, for example, Gelb, 1102.
[88] Chase, 31.
[89] U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Soviet Union 1933-1939* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1952), 661-662.

espionage and sentenced to eight years in the Gulag; he returned home only after 16 years.[90] His experiences would be shared by many other Finnish-Americans in the late 1930s.

The Experiment Goes Awry

During the increased xenophobia of the 1930s, the Finns fell under suspicion because of their foreign connections. This suspicion of foreigners manifested itself first in pressure, beginning in 1935, to become a Soviet citizen. Michael Gelb argues that inducing foreigners to renounce their foreign citizenship was little more than a tactic to subject them to the repression of the secret police.[91] Often, immigrants were either tricked or forced to take Soviet citizenship.

A Finnish-American couple in Petrozavodsk was tricked into taking on Soviet citizenship in 1936. Sylvi Hokkanen was preparing to teach Finnish and English, but she was suddenly told that she would need a Russian passport to teach. Because things were still going fairly well for the couple, she and her husband Lauri decided to apply for a Russian passport, not realizing they were renouncing their American citizenship. Lauri Hokkanen writes: "We went ahead and applied for a Russian passport not realizing by doing this, we were becoming Russian citizens and thereby losing our American citizenship."[92] Within a year, the Great Terror would begin, and the Hokkanens would come to regret their decision to apply for a Soviet passport. After much effort, the Hokkanens were able to reinstate their U.S. citizenship and return home in 1941.[93]

Arthur John Kujala, a Finnish-American immigrant, was pressured to take Soviet citizenship every time the police renewed his residency documents, but he refused to renounce his US citizenship. In

[90] Sevander, *Of Soviet Bondage*, 112.
[91] Gelb, 1096.
[92] Hokkanen, 73.
[93] Hokkanen, 105-109.

September 1937, his passport was stolen, but he was arrested when he reported the theft and spent two years in prison camps before the U.S. Embassy managed to have him deported.[94]

Beginning in 1937, the campaign against foreigners intensified in Karelia and was no longer restricted to citizenship issues. The Finnish language was outlawed, and all Finnish institutions were shut down. The Finnish language was then replaced with Soviet Karelian, a language that was created by a Leningrad philologist.[95] Nearly half of the words in this new language came from the Russian-influenced Aunus dialect of Karelian, and the rest of the words were pure Russian. Russian grammatical endings were used for the words, and the language was written in Cyrillic script. Even Karelians with a good knowledge of Russian had trouble understanding the new language.[96]

Finnish teachers were fired from their positions and all schools became Russian-speaking. Students at the Karelian Pedagogical Institute who had been preparing to teach in Finnish were suddenly told that they had to pass their final exams in Russian. Only a few were successful; others were forced to drop out or spend extra time learning the Russian required.[97] Finnish-Americans were terrified that their language might mark them as enemies of the state.[98] Their fears likely were justified; Finns were among a list of nationalities classed as suspicious in a January 1938 Politburo decree.[99]

The arrests of the purges decimated the Finnish-American community in Karelia. In the Karelian ASSR during the Great Terror, ethnic Karelians were more than three times more likely to be arrested than ethnic Russians. Ethnic Finns, however, were nearly 38 times more likely than ethnic Russians to be arrested.[100] Other statistics, too, indicate that arrests of ethnic Finns were particularly widespread. Finnish

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[94] Gelb, 1096; U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Soviet Union 1933-1939* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1952), 914-915.
[95] Martin, Ph.D. diss., 787; Tuominen, 305.
[96] One Karelian teacher told the Finnish Communist Arvo Tuominen: "Well, yes, a language of our own we have but hardly anything do I understand." Tuominen, 305.
[97] Sevander, *They Took My Father*, 101-102.
[98] Sevander, *They Took My Father*, 100-101.
[99] Chase, 30; Martin, Ph.D. diss., 776
[100] Martin, book, 426-427

historian Auvo Kostiainen says that only 8,300 Finns (from Finland and North America) remained in Karelia in 1939; there had been 12,100 Finns residing in Karelia in 1933.[101] Arvo Tuominen declares that at least 20,000 ethnic Finns (not only Finnish-Americans) were arrested in the purges and sent to prison camps.[102] A study of Finnish-Americans who immigrated to Karelia conducted by Mayme Sevander listed 2,384 immigrants, living and deceased, who were accountable for at the time of her research.[103] Of these, she asserts that 526 were arrested during the purges. A mere 46 of those arrested ever returned to their families, and those that did were in prison camps for eight to fifteen years.[104] If Sevander's statistics hold true, then a full 22 percent of the Finnish-American community was arrested during the purges, and 20 percent of the community perished during the purges.

Vignettes and stories may reveal the human cost of the purges in Karelia better than statistics. One morning half the Karelian Symphony Orchestra was absent from rehearsal; they had all been arrested overnight.[105] In Cheliabinsk, a city in the Urals, a tractor factory employed many Finnish-Americans. The Finns were told one day in the summer of 1937 that all adults were to report to an assembly hall at a certain time. After assembling, *every single one*—more than 300 people—was arrested. Only two, women who still held American passports, ever managed to escape the prison camps.[106] Over one hundred Finns were arrested from the lumber camp of Vonganperä; only one of them ever returned.[107] Among Lauri Hokkanen's coworkers in the machine repair division of the Gylling ski

[101] Kostiainen*, Loikkarit: Suuren lamakauden laiton siirtolaisuus Neuvostoliittoon* (Keuruu, Finland: NP, 1988), 195.
[102] Tuominen, 234.
[103] Sevander, *Red Exodus*, 41.
[104] Sevander, *Red Exodus*, 184.
[105] Sevander, *They Took My Father*, 77.
[106] Tuominen, 303.
[107] Tuomi, 127.

factory in Petrozavodsk, 23 were arrested in one night in July 1938.[108] One Karelian village was so decimated by the purges that only a 16-year-old boy and a 60-year old man remained.[109]

Many more men than women in the Finnish-American community were arrested, but many Finnish-American women and children were exiled.[110] Those living close to the border were exiled to lumber camps farther inland, since it was dangerous for "enemies of the people" to live so close to the border of Finland.[111] Some residents of Petrozavodsk were sent to the lumber camp of Kalajoki to work. Other Finnish-Americans, including the famous Finnish-American opera singer Katri Lammi, were sent to Lime Island, an island in Lake Onega where poisonous lime was mined. Lammi reportedly put on a show as she was being exiled, parading around in her opera costumes and singing a Soviet patriotic song at the top of her lungs.[112]

Though young Finnish-Americans were generally not arrested, the children of the Finnish-American community were deeply affected by the purges, too. In many families, the main breadwinners were arrested. The children were then compelled to work their way through high school or college, if they wanted to continue their education.[113] In some families, both parents were arrested, and younger children were placed in orphanages. Some of these children lost their ethnic identity as a result.[114]

Conclusion

This study ends in the year 1939, but the story of the Finnish-Americans does not end there. Some immigrants were drafted into the Soviet Army to fight in the Winter War with Finland, where some were killed and others taken prisoner by the Finnish army. Those who were POWs often returned amidst suspicion and were placed in Soviet labor camps after their liberation. Many civilians, not drafted, were

[108] Hokkanen, 93.
[109] Tuominen, 306-307.
[110] Tuomi, 129.
[111] Sevander, *Red Exodus*, 107-108; Tuomi, 129.
[112] Hokkanen, 95; Sevander, *Red Exodus*, 109-110.
[113] Sevander, *Red Exodus*, 18.
[114] See Sevander, *Red Exodus*, 121-122, for stories of two such Finnish-American children.

evacuated during World War II to the Urals or other distant regions of the Soviet Union. Others died during the fateful Siege of Leningrad. After the war, the immigrants and their descendants were scattered across the Soviet Union – to Kazakhstan, Estonia, Ukraine – and others even to Western countries.[115]

Still, by 1939, the damage was done. The North American Finnish community, who had come to help the Soviet Union build socialism, was decimated in the purges of the 1930s. The mass arrests took away nearly an entire generation of Finnish-American men, and the effect on the community was profound. One early study of Karelia, published in Finland in 1934, reaches a conclusion that sums up the experiences of the entire community, particularly in the later 1930s: "Rarely have honest workers been so tragically deceived, for the contrast between the fine promise and the dreary reality is so sharp that even the most red-hot communists have turned snowy white in their political opinions in a very brief period."[116] The disillusionment, for the Finnish Americans, began shortly after arrival in the Soviet Union. After witnessing the truth of Soviet life, nearly one-half of the immigrants returned to the United States. Of those who remained, more might have chosen to leave except for the fact that they held Soviet passports and could not.[117]

In another sense, too, the experience of the Finnish-Americans reflects broader trends in history. Although the Finnish-Americans were immigrants and not natives of the Soviet Union, they reflect the experience of most national minorities. National minorities across the Soviet Union experienced the same trends in nationality policy—the development of local language and culture, the crackdown on nationalism, the arrests, and the return to Russification. The Finnish-Americans, then, are a useful case study in Soviet nationality policy and its effects on ethnic and linguistic minorities.

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[115] For more on the fates of individual immigrants, see Sevander, *Red Exodus*, 153-157, 162, 184.
[116] Gelb, 1104; Akateeminen Karjala-Seura, *East Carelia: A Survey of the Country and its Population and a Review of the Carelian Question* (Helsinki: NP, 1934), 112. Aino Kuusinen, the wife of the secretary of the Finnish Communist party, reached the same conclusion, calling the Karelian recruitment a "monstrous swindle" and a "disgraceful business." *The Rings of Destiny: Inside Soviet Russia from Lenin to Brezhnev*, trans. Paul Stevenson (New York: Morrow, 1974), 95.
[117] Michael Gelb argues that virtually all those who could leave Karelia did. Gelb, 1091, 1096.

As a targeted nationality during the Stalinist purges, the Finnish-Americans learned to fear the Soviet regime and even their own neighbors. Mayme Sevander writes: "The fear. How can I describe that fear? Russians' lives have been ruled by fear since the days of Ivan the Terrible. As adopted Russians, we American Finns shared that fear."[118] The optimism that the Finnish-American immigrants had once had for their adopted homeland was largely erased as they experienced the realities of the Soviet Union in the 1930s. Theirs is a story of disillusionment on the grandest of scales.

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[118] *They Took My Father*, 98-99.

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The Lay of Igor's Campaign and the Works It Has Inspired

By: Katherine Owens

In A.D. 1185, as the Kievan Rus Empire was starting to deteriorate, a little known prince on the eastern Russian borders led his outnumbered men into battle against Mongolian invaders, the Polovtsians (Kumans). This battle and its aftermath would become the topic of the Russian literary epic, "The Lay of Igor's Campaign." Its conclusion was not what one would expect; the hero was not a fearless Beowulf, a mighty Roland, nor even a betrayed Siegfried. Igor Sviatoshlavich's only claim to fame resulted from a bad military decision stemming perhaps from cockiness, pride or stupidity. Yet, its outcome remained true to the great epic form; the ending was not an overwhelmingly happy victory or love affair. Rather, it was subdued with a ray of hope that things would be better in the future.

As a frontier prince, it was Igor Sviatoshlavich's job to protect his domains (Novgorod-Seversk) and consequently the rest of Russia from invasion. Igor's defeat and capture in 1185 (he eventually escaped) was not a major military set-back, but for the literary world it would constitute a small but persistent thematic thread in musical presentation after Musin Puskin rediscovered the lost lay in 1792.[1]

The three works inspired by the lay were all named Prince Igor: Borodin's opera, Serge de Diaghilev's ballet, and the Soviet musical movie that combined and elaborated upon both the opera and ballet, creating one huge cinematic feat. This paper will examine the changes "The Lay of Igor's Campaign" has undergone both in the narrative of events and the development of the persona over the last 200 years. Part I, the larger part of this paper, will provide a historical

[1] "The Tale of Igor's Campaign," Wikipedia, Wikipedia Project, 25 Nov 2004, 28 Nov 2004, <http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wik/The_Tale_Of_Igor%27s_Campaign>.

background (on the authors and the works) as well as synopses of all four versions to show the evolution of Igor's narrative. Part II will provide a brief discussion of seven characters that reflect the traditional "Russian soul:" endurance, composure, pride and determination.

Part 1: The Works

There are two translations of Igor's tale: "The Lay of Igor's Campaign," which will be used for this paper, and "The Lay of the Host of Igor," which is more poetical and prone to flourishes while limiting the substance. Although the copy of the lay that Pushkin found was lost when Napoleon burned Moscow, his attempted translation had been published and so survived the War of 1812.[2] Pushkin's translation contained some confusing passages.[3] In the 1940's, S.D. Likhachev attempted to retranslate "The Lay of Igor's Campaign," from Pushkin's translation, in an attempt to clarify it.[4] One portion that did not need to be clarified was the very beginning where an eclipse is mentioned as being a bad omen. This solar eclipse occurred on May 01, 1185, and was recorded in the Novgorod Chronicle for that year, although, ironically, Igor's campaign is not mentioned at all.[5] The battle that Igor commanded was part of a larger war headed by his cousin, the Grand Prince of Kiev, Sviatoslav Vsevolodich, who had defeated and captured a large part of the Polovtsians in 1184.[6] Khun Konchak, leader of the Polvtsians, who will center importantly in all the works dealing with Igor, had united the Polovtsians in 1171, and was called "The Wild Polovtsy."[7] He disrupted Russian life and pillaged towns on the frontier during the 1170's and 1180's.[8] The actual date of the lay's composition is unknown, but there are two likely possibilities: in 1187, the year Igor returned from captivity, or between 1194 and

[2] Serge A. Zenkovsky, ed, Medieval Russia's Epics, Chronicles, and Tales, (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co, Inc, 1963), 137-138.
[3] Zenkovsky, 138.
[4] ibid
[5] Robert Michell, trans, The Chronicle of Novgorod 1016-1471, vol. XXV, (New York: AMS Press, 1970), 32.
[6] Janet Martin, Medieval Russia 980-1584, Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 131.
[7] ibid
[8] ibid

1196. The latter period is more likely because Igor, his brother, Vsevolod (d.1196), and Igor's son, Oleg/Vladimir, are wished long glorious lives, but the Grand Prince of Kiev, Sviatoslav, who died in 1194, is not mentioned.[9]

"The Lay of Igor's Campaign" is broken down into fifteen parts with each focusing on a different segment of the battle's story. There are also frequent jumps within the narrative. We are told that Igor is a brave and courageous man preparing his men for battle. But before leaving Putivl there is an eclipse that the people interpret as a bad omen. Igor is apparently not superstitious and he tells his men that it is better to die in battle than to be captured. He then hastens to add that they will defeat the Kumans (Polovtsians) on their own land near the Don River. He is carried away with ambition and invents a ballad in his own honor. Then Igor's brother, Vsevolod, arrives and tells Igor that his men are ready, and inquires about the readiness of Igor's men. Igor climbs up onto his golden saddle and leads his men into battle. During the march, other bad omens are seen but again Igor is not concerned. The Russians are led to the Don River by Igor and Vsevolod, while, simultaneously, the Kumans are moving towards them. The Russians easily crush the enemy and take lots of booty. On the second day of battle, there are two Kuman Khuns; Gzu (Gzak) and Konchak, and they attack the four Russian princes (Igor, his son Oleg/Vladimir, Igor's brother, Vsevolod, and Igor's nephew, Sviatoslav). The Kumans surround all the Russians. The bravery of Vsevolod is highlighted, and even though his death is implied it is not clearly stated. The narrative then shockingly switches to a history of a feud among the Russian princes led by Igor's grandfather, Oleg Sviatoslavovich. Again, there is a leap in the narrative back to the battle with the Russians holding out for several days before Igor is forced to surrender and apparently mourn the death of his brother.

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[9] "On the Campaign of Igor," J.AV. Haney, Eric Dahl, 1994, 28 Nov 2004, <http://faculty.washington.edu/dwaugh/rus/tests/igorintr.htm>.

The narrative again strays from Igor to a battle from 1183 or 1184 in which Igor's cousin, the Prince of Kiev, Sviatoslav III, captures Khun Kobiak. Suddenly, we are inside Sviatoslav III's head where he dreams of his funeral. Another jump in the narrative shows Sviatoslav mourning the defeat and Igor's capture. Sviatoslav is upset that they were so greedy for honor and did not wait for him to send re-enforcements. Now, for some unknown reason, Sviatoslav is unable to send help and none of the other Russian princes will help Igor. As the lay is coming to an end, the reader learns that Igor is married and his wife is still a pagan. Yaroslavna (she is introduced as Euphrosinia) invokes the three forces of nature (wind, river, and sun) to save her husband. Returning to Igor, we learn that God has helped Igor escape through the assistance of Igor's servant, Ovlur, who helps him get away from the Kumans. When he and Ovlur reach the Donets River, it speaks to Igor and assures him he will have joy yet, while Igor tells the river how nice and pleasant it is to be near it. Meanwhile, the Khuns, Gzu and Konchak, search for Igor, whose son, Oleg/Vladimir, is still their prisoner. Gzu (Gzak) wishes to kill Igor's son Oleg/Vladimir, but Konchak thinks it would be better to entice him into marrying one of their maidens. Igor returns home and goes to the church that holds an icon of the Holy Virgin of Pirogoshch. The bard Boyan is quoted as saying that just as much as a body needs its head so does a country need its prince and so all of Russia rejoices when Igor returns home.[10] The lay ends on a very happy note when Igor returns to lead his countrymen again, even though his son remains a captive. After "The Lay of Igor's Campaign" was translated by Pushkin, it became popular in nationalistic circles and offered vast potential for composers of musical mediums.

In 1890 at the Mariinsky Theatre in St. Petersburg, Russia, the opera Prince Igor, by the then late Alexander Borodin, was staged for the first time.[11] Alexander Borodin was not a

[10] Zenkovsky, 139-160.
[11] Standley Sadie, ed, The New Grove Book of Operas, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 506.

composer by profession, but by choice and for leisure. After Borodin's first musical composition was published in 1862, the critic Vladimir Stasov convinced Borodin to write a nationalistic opera about Prince Igor, with Stasov's assistance writing the operatic outline.[12] It was Stasov who coined the moniker "The Great Five," of whom Borodin was one.[13] When Borodin died in 1887, he had not completed Prince Igor and so his close friend and fellow composer, Rimsky-Korsakoff, and his two assistants, Liadov and Glazunov, finished it.[14] Because Vladimir Stasov was the man who provided Borodin with a story-line for the opera, it was very likely he, and not Borodin, who drastically changed the opera from the lay. Very little of the lay was included in the opera, except for the eclipse, Igor's capture, and his escape. The lay's marginal characters: Igor's son, wife, and his servant Ovlar, were given greater importance, while the girl that Khun Konchak wanted Igor's son to marry becomes the Khun's own daughter. Stasov and Borodin added several characters: Galitsky, the brother of Igor's wife, who apparently replaces Igor's brother and nephew; boyars (noblemen); and two deserters from Igor's army, who provide comic relief. Igor's cousin, the Grand Prince of Kiev, has been eliminated completely, despite his importance in the lay. The lay gave Igor's son two names, Oleg and Vladimir, and Igor's second wife is also known by two names, Euphrosinia and Yaroslavna. In the opera, ballet, and Soviet movie they are known as Vladimir and Yaroslavna. Despite the opera changing almost every aspect of the lay, the feeling remains pro-Igor and sympathetic to the Russians.

The opera starts with a prologue in the town of Putivl and shows Igor and his men preparing to leave. There is an eclipse which alarms Igor's wife, Yaroslavna, and the people, who beg him to stay. Two men desert. In Act One Igor's debauched brother-in-law, Galitsky, is

[12] "Alexander Borodin," David Bündler, 31 Jan 2001, 28 Nov 2004, <http://www.angelfire.com/music2/davidbundler/hero.html>. Standley, 507.
[13] Bundler.
[14] Standley, 508.

seen singing with his followers and the two deserters while bragging how he, Galitsky, abducted a young girl from her house. The girl's friends enter asking Galisky to let her free. The maidens are mocked and shooed out. Galitsky's followers claim that they will make him prince and get rid of Igor. Meanwhile, in her room, Yaraslavna is dreaming of evil tidings when the maidens rush in to beg the release of their friend. They leave in a hurry when Galitsky enters. He begrudgingly agrees to his sister's demand that he return the girl to her home. On Galitsky's heels comes bad news from Igor's boyars that they have returned from the battlefield to tell Yaroslavna that Igor and his son, Vladimir, have been defeated and taken prisoner. As they finish delivering this news, an alarm is sounded that Polovtsians are attacking the city.

In Act Two, Borodin lets the viewer know immediately that Khun Konchak's daughter, Konchakovna, is in love with Vladimir and that she and her maidens care for the nutritional needs of the Russian prisoners. One of the Russian prisoners' guards, Ovlar, has been secretly baptized and he watches for an opportunity when he can speak to Igor. Vladimir appears and hides in Konchakovna's tent where she joins him after returning from attending to the other Russian prisoners. They run off when Igor appears and as Ovlar approaches Igor about escaping. However, escaping is dishonorable and Igor will not listen. Then Konchak is seen coming and Ovlar leaves. Konchak inquires about Igor's health; he openly admires his prisoner and this admiration increases when Igor refuses to accept freedom if it means becoming his ally. Konchak's fellow Khun, Gzak (Gzu), returns with his men after having raided Igor's principality. They return with a lot of booty, which naturally upsets the Russian prisoners very much. Konchak decides to cheer his "guest" and provides the Polovtsians drink before they begin a dance to celebrate their good fortune. After the Polovtsians become drunk, the Russians urge Igor to escape with Ovlar, and Igor agrees, but only if he can take his son. However,

Konchakovna does not want Vladimir to leave, and after an argument she rushes to awaken her people. Igor manages to escape, but Vladimir is recaptured. Konchak spares Vladimir's life if he will marry Konchakovna. Meanwhile, Yaroslavna is pining for her husband, and on the day of his return she is on the city walls and recognizes him as he nears. When Igor is greeting his wife the two deserters appear and rush into the town to announce Igor's return. The opera ends with a massive outpouring of joy, possibly for the same reason in the lay, a body needs its head and a country, its leader.[15] Within twenty years of Borodin's opera's first production, a second musical composition was performed, this time by dancers.

Serge de Diaghilev's ballet Prince Igor was first performed in 1909 and was created to embellish the Polovtsian dances from Act Two of Borodin's opera.[16] The ballet expands the Polovtsians party celebrating Khun Gzak's profitable pillaging trip in Igor's province, and Khun Konchak turns this celebration into a huge entertainment for Igor. Prince Igor was one of the original works included in Diaghilev's larger ballet series, the Ballet Russes.[17] This little-known ballet is still performed as part of a gala night showcasing Diaghilev's short ballets.[18] In complete contrast with both the lay and the opera, the ballet does not focus on Igor – the focus is now on the Polovtsians. Diaghilev's ballet has a pro-Polovtsian feel instead of a pro-Russian feel. This unexpected change may be, in part, because Borodin's Act Two offered the best subject for a ballet, or perhaps Diaghilev wanted to honor the origins of Russian dance.

We know that Igor and his son were captured, and that Vladimir loves the Khun's daughter. The ballet consists of the Polovtsian Khun showing off his tribes' native dances to Igor

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[15] Standley, 508-510.
[16] "Nicholas Roerich," artnet, Macmillan Publishers Limited, 2000, 28 Nov 2004, <http://www.artnet.com/library/07/0726/T072668.asp>.
[17] "Time Travels Ballets Russes Thrills," San Francisco Chronicle, Octavia Roca, 16 Feb 2003, 28 Nov 2004, <http://www.sfgate.com/cgi?bin/article.cgi?f=/chronicle/archive/2003/02/16/PK6577.DTL>.
[18] I have not been able to find any information on why this topic for a ballet was chosen, or even any information on it at all. I did find however, on several websites, from different ballet companies or critics giving information on ballet performances, that this ballet is still performed and apparently quite a show.

and Vladimir. It starts with the women dancing prior to the men going off to battle, and then the battle is acted out, at the end of which the Khun shouts, "Victory," several times.[19] The dance moves back to the camp and the women dance and the men join in, until the music calms and only eight young people dance. Suddenly, the warriors rush forward to demonstrate how they won the battle and they shout, "Victory," several more times. After the dance ends, the Khun continues his good treatment of his captives, even offering Igor an honorable position in the Khun's army. Igor indicates to his host that he is a Rus and that he will escape at the earliest opportunity and return to his people, raise a new army and defeat the Khun and the Kumars. The Khun is an admirer of brave men, and he lets Igor know that he admires him. Returning to the operatic narrative, the treacherous Polovtsian, (Ovlar), helps Igor escape. The Polovtsians are angered, but the Khun will not let them pursue Igor because he is a brave man, and besides, if the situation had been switched, the Khun would have tried to escape just as Igor did. In the end Vladimir marries the Khun's daughter, and surprisingly a treaty is made between the Rus and the Polovtsians.[20] Unlike the opera, instead of returning for inspiration to the lay, Diaghilev's ballet delves deeply into one scene (Polovtsian celebration) that Stastov/Borodin invented to embellish the storyline. The third and last composition did more than embellish the story; it narrated and provided visual finesse.

The Soviet movie Prince Igor was directed by Roman Tikhomirov in 1970.[21] This movie was loosely based on the opera and the ballet. Most of the scenes Tikhomirov added were battle scenes, which are not found in the opera or the ballet, however there are battle scenes in the lay. Just as Diagheliv did in the ballet, Tikhomirov used Borodin's music as the score to his movie.

[19] Adapted by Louis Untermeyer, Tales From The Ballet, Illustrated. A. and M. Provensen. (New York: Golden Press, 1968), 51-53.
[20] Untermeyer, 51-53.
[21] "Prince Igor," IMDB, 1990-2004, 28 Nov 2004, <http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0170115/>.

The production was not limited to the theater, but filmed in the open air, which changed some of the dynamics present in the opera and the ballet. Because the movie was filmed in the Russian countryside, the battle scenes were more realistic, the eclipse looks real, the cast is not limited to several rooms, and Ovlar, the Polovtisan traitor, approaches Igor from within a boat on a river so that his identity is not readily apparent to the viewer. The ballet has also been changed slightly and shortened, and Tikhomirov follows the lay's "cut and slice" narrative, back and forth between different people in different places. The feeling is pro-Russian, but sympathetic to the Khun, who is portrayed as a congenial person.

To distance his production from the opera and the ballet, Tikhomirov opened the movie with Polovtsian horsemen either leaving a battle or ravishing the countryside. Then, Tikhomirov returns to the operatic storyline to show Igor gathering his men for the coming battle. Just before the Russians leave there is an eclipse and everyone begs Igor not to leave yet. He does not heed anyone; he leaves his wife in her brother's care as his men march off to battle. The two deserters from the opera slip away unnoticed after the eclipse. The brother-in-law, Galitsky, was left to look after the town and its people, but instead he ravishes a maiden and gets drunk with his followers. The girl's friends enter and beg for their friend to be returned, but they are mocked and the men toy with them. After the maidens have fled, Galitsky's followers decide that he will be the new prince and the two deserters are portrayed loudly proclaiming these sentiments. Suddenly, we see Igor and his men fighting the battle and being defeated. Igor is wounded in the battle and he and his son are surrounded by Polovtsians and taken prisoner. After the battle, Tikhomirov includes a scene in which the viewers are introduced to the Khun's daughter, Konchakovna, showing her as an independent spirit who does as she pleases - so she rides out from camp to meet her father. The scene changes and the viewer sees an unhappy Yaroslavna

longing for her husband as she enters her house to get out of the rain. The maidens rush into the courtyard to tell her what Galitsky has been doing, but they flee when he appears. He laughs at his sister and mocks her while she persistently asks about the girl. Galitsky dreams of being the prince, but she threatens to tell Igor when he returns. When this does not make an impression on her brother, she says she will throw him out of the house and have him led to their father in chains and under guard. He relents and leaves when Igor's boyars are announced. Unlike the opera, they do not tell Yaroslavna what has occurred, they stand around looking grim until she guesses the truth. As she deduces the truth there is shouting, alerting the town to a Polovtsian attack. Yaroslavna dresses in armor and rallies her men throughout the fight.

Meanwhile, an unhappy Igor is prisoner of the Polovtsians, but he is free to move about and the viewer sees him wandering away from camp onto the plains above a river. He is lamenting his defeat, his wound, and his capture, but mostly he feels guilt over having gone to battle when there were bad omens. He walks down to the river where out of the rushes emerges a boat, and the baptized Polovtsian, Ovlar, who rows up and tells Igor that he will help him escape. This is dishonorable and Igor refuses. Vladimir is not interested in escape or the dishonor of being a prisoner because he frolics with Konchakovna. Khun Konchak views Igor not as the enemy, but as a friend, and he tries to tempt Igor by offering him various possessions, but Igor is not moved. Finally Konchak tells Igor that he will give Igor his freedom on one condition, a treaty. Igor refuses, but joins Konchak to watch the tribal dances. It is here that Diaghilev's ballet is inserted into the film. Konchakovna and Vladimir run off into a field to talk about their desire to be married. Igor finally consents to escape, and accompanied by Ovlar, Igor leaves to find Vladimir who, when he learns what his father is doing, does not want to leave. Konchakovna begs to be taken along, but Igor refuses. Infuriated, she gives the alarm while Igor, Ovlar, and the

reticent Vladimir flee. Vladimir is quickly re-captured, but the other two escape. Konchak prevents his men from killing Vladimir and blesses the union between him and his daughter.

The narrative returns to Igor's town, which is mostly burned down after the Polovtsian attack. While telling the people to prepare to desert the town, Yaraslavna wanders around outside and prays that her husband will return. She is the first person to see two horsemen quickly approaching, and recognizing one as Igor she rushes to greet him. Just as in the opera, the two deserters come out of the town and upon seeing Igor they first think of hiding, but then decide to alert the town about Igor's miraculous return. True to his word, upon his return, Igor raises another army and on the day he prepares to leave for battle there are no bad omens. He leaves his wife in charge. Having learned of his brother-in-law's debauchery and inability to defend the town, Igor leaves his brother-in-law standing in the gateway, and casts a look of "no-confidence" in Galisky's direction as he leaves town. Tikhomirov borrowed liberally from the opera and ballet, but unlike Diaghilov, Tikhomirov's movie indicates that he returned to the lay to include battle scenes while adapting everything to work on a larger scale and in front of a camera.

It is very interesting to note that the three works that have been the vehicle for Igor's elevation from obscurity had something in common with the original lay that is not obvious in a narrative comparison: music. Music is the strongest thread these works have despite the seven hundred year gap between the lay and the three works. All four works were or are sung, even the ballet to some extent. Music has the power to express emotions not present in print because of nuances within the musical fabric. When there are words with the music, not only spoken language is used to convey moods and emotions, but the music strengthens what is said. The opera, ballet, and movie, go a step further in one other sense and that is the visual impact of these three arts. The combination of spoken word, music, and visible action are a strong mix that

allows the viewer to understand what exactly the author or composer is trying to convey. This connection is strongest in the movie, because unlike the opera or ballet, which would be static in a concert hall, the movie conveys a much stronger feeling of reality. Music not only links these works closely together, it also expresses the action in a clearer manner than mere prose.

Part 2: Character Growth Depicted Through the Works

Igor's character growth through the four works is fairly limited, although one or two surprises emerge. In the lay, the author apologetically portrays, "Poor Igor," as a man who was trying to be a good defender of his people but becomes overly cocky and wants honor and glory; other than this character defect, we are left to conclude that he is a beloved leader who made a mistake. It is not specifically stated whether he felt that escape was dishonorable, but after his escape he goes on a pilgrimage to an icon of the Virgin Mary. In the opera, Igor's mistake is conveyed as his readiness for battle and not wishing to tarry along the way. He remains honorable and courageous even in defeat (which bring him the respect of Khun Konchak), even though he does resort to escape as a last option when he realizes how much his people need him. He seems to want to bolster his injured pride and so he tries to create a barrier between Konchak and himself. In the ballet he is not an important character, but he clearly indicates that he will not enslave and humiliate his people by signing a treaty with Konchak. At the end of that ballet he surprisingly does sign a treaty with Konchak. Finally, his portrayal in the movie is very similar to the opera. He remains cold and aloof towards Konchak and spends a lot of time thinking over his problems and those of his people. Having ignored the bad omens, the viewer is led to believe that Igor does not wish to look weak and superstitious in front of his wife or people. Besides, he is determined to fight the enemy and he will not delay his plan. When he is offered a chance to escape his pride stands in the way, but when he does decide to escape, he decides quickly, and

upon his return to his people, he does not seem upset by his son's captivity. He, however, does raise another army. Igor remains proud and cold throughout the works; he only rarely considers others. In all of the works he remains a good Catholic leader, never wavering in what he feels is his Christian duty to God and man.

Yaroslavna is a more dynamic figure than her husband. In the lay, Yaroslavna appears as a loving wife who clings to the old religion and when in despair she turns to the old gods. She never appeared in the ballet because she was not important to the flow of the narrative. In the opera, she is a loving and submissive wife, but she is not reticent to deal with a situation, e.g. her brother's obsession with women. Mirroring the opera, the movie highlights something that was not even implied in the lay, and that is her hidden strength. She leans on her husband as much as she can, emphasizing her submissiveness to him, but when a situation crops up and her husband is not there, she takes over and becomes an effective administrator, e.g., the Polovtsian attack, which is clearly seen with her donning armor and leading her men in their defense of the town. Unlike Igor, who remains a steadfast Christian in all the works, in the lay Yaroslavna is a pagan, but in the opera and the movie, she has become a good Christian who prays to God and Blessed Mother. However, her love for Igor never waivers.

Yaroslavna's brother, Galitsky, in the opera and the movie, is merely a vehicle to allow Yaroslavna's strength to shine. If he were not a spineless, immoral character, lacking any ability to lead men, Yaroslavna's ability and strength would not appear extraordinary and commendable. Galitsky is well-developed for the part he plays, although the only growth in his character is found at the end of the movie when he realizes that he could have done a better job of living up to the trust Igor had placed in him at the beginning of the movie.

Igor's character remains largely static between the four works while his son Vladimir has no character growth at all. In the opera and the movie, where he appears for a substantial amount of time, he is simply portrayed as a young man in love. In the opera, he wants Konchakovna's love, but he also wants to do his duty to his father and country. However, he is not overly excited about returning to his country and he is easily recaptured. In the movie he is portrayed as a weak and pathetic character, although his recapture surprises him and is a result of his lack of horsemanship. After he has been recaptured, he retains an air of pride and indifference to his situation. Vladimir is simply a vehicle for a love narrative in the story because he is not a dutiful son nor is he as upset about captivity as his father.

As with Igor, Khun Konchak's character growth remains constant throughout the four works, but with a few surprises. In the lay Khun Konchak is the voice of reason among his tribe, while his fellow Khun Gzu (Gzak) is a voice of violence and revenge. Konchak's importance remains strongly present in the other three works. In the opera and the movie he becomes a magnanimous host, although he clearly remains the leader of his people and Igor's captor. In the ballet, Konchak is not so much a magnanimous host, but as the victor gently flaunting his victory in the face of his defeated enemy. In the opera, ballet, and movie the Khun is portrayed as someone who wants to make Igor his best friend and ally, and the only way to do that is to have Igor in his power, while not making him feel like a prisoner; this same feel is not as strongly present in the lay although the Khun seems to be sympathetic to Igor.

Konchak's daughter, Konchakovna, is also a minor character introduced by Borodin for the love story. She is never mentioned in the lay. The character she replaces is a woman Khun Konchak suggests Vladimir marry. As with Vladimir, her two places of prominence are in the opera and the Soviet movie. In the opera she follows her father's lead and appears to be a

magnanimous hostess. On the other side she is self-centered like Igor, but for a different reason; Igor wants honor and glory, Konchakovna wants Vladimir. In the movie, Konchakovna is a forceful character with boundless independence. She is portrayed as a person who would be quick in love or hate. When she and Vladimir are married there is no doubt that she would be the stronger spouse and completely dominate Vladimir. Konchakonva is the fiercest person of any importance in the works about Igor.

Unlike any of the other featured characters in Igor's tale, Ovlar is the only person whose portrayal is completely flipped even though he remains a minor character in all of the works. In the lay, Ovlar is described as Igor's faithful servant who helps Igor escape. In the opera, ballet, and Soviet movie, Ovlar becomes a Polovtsian traitor. Despite his minor role, Ovlar is pivotal in both the lay and the variations because without Ovlar, Igor would never escape.

The best developed characters in Igor's tale and its three variations are Igor and his wife, Yaroslavna. They represent the perfect couple, with the wife respectfully letting her husband be the head of the house and the ruler. Only when he is absent does she take over and get herself, her family, and her people out of a difficult situation. The relationship between Vladimir and Konchakovna is exactly the opposite. Konchakovna is the dominant figure and not submissive. It is doubtful if she would let Vladimir do anything, except what she wants. The Khun remains a solid and predictable rock while Ovlar is completely changed and Galitsky is a minor character of little importance. Except in the ballet where the Khun becomes the central character, Igor remains clearly in the fore of all the action.

Part 3: Conclusion

The topic of Igor is an interesting one for an epic poem because the defeat of the Russians rests wholly on the hero. Although most epics end with the death of the hero, the fact

that Igor does not die could indicate that unlike other heroic epic figures who die because of heroic deeds and through no fault of their own, Igor is given a second chance to die a more honorable death, and to atone for his error and for the death of all his men. Igor becomes a good vehicle for stories other than an epic lay because he represents every man's human nature, faults, and desires for glory, which are strongly represented in the music by Borodin. It remains unknown why a minor, historic event and personage should be elevated to epic status by an anonymous author who apparently wanted posterity to know that, despite his faults, Igor was a beloved leader of his people.

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Time Spent on the Trans-Siberian Railway

By: Matt Scott

The Tran-Siberian Railway is the ultimate rail journey: the longest in the world - possibly the coldest if you go at the wrong time of year. A journey of almost mythical proportions that spans two continents while staying in a single country; without leaving your seat you clatter your way along almost a third of the globe.

There are three routes that travellers can take to explore the Siberian expanse: The Moscow-to-Vladivostok route at over 6000 miles, and two routes from Moscow to Beijing: one through Mongolia, taking six days and almost 5000 miles or one which takes almost a week to complete and travels via Manchuria.

My journey started on a Tuesday night at Yaroslav Station in Moscow. Platform Three was packed with traders loading up the train with rugs, stereos, clothes, underwear and a host of other goods that I assumed were being transported to other cities. I expected to see many world-wise travellers on the platform, waiting to take this epic journey, but I saw none. I appeared to be the only person who had not brought half a market as part of my luggage.

I pushed my way past bags of what smelt like horse blankets to find my carriage. There were about eight compartments to a carriage. Each consisted of a small table next to the window and two beds on either side. A further two beds hung from the sides but were stowed upright to give the illusion of space. It was about the size of the bathroom in the apartment I had just left.

There was no one else in the carriage as I went through my ritual of taking off my hat, gloves, coat and the several other layers I was wearing to keep out the Russian winter. It was early January and below minus twenty outside.

Wondering what to do next, I went into the corridor and looked out the window. Until I reached Ulan Bator in five days time, this was going to be the way I would see the world. The remaining passengers were loading wares; a few waited patiently on the platform while others rushed; at first bags and boxes were stacked in the corridors, but as time pushed on, they were thrown into the vestibules at the end of each carriage. Passengers running late would have to tackle this final obstacle before boarding the train.

There was no whistle, no 'all aboard' announcement. I did not even notice the collective bang of closing doors to herald our departure; the train simply began to move slowly away from the platform - an uneventful start, I thought.

Behind me, a few people had walked into the compartment and were discussing who belonged in which bed. I had already staked mine out, but began to see the issue as six people laid claim to just three beds. There had been an obvious error; everyone's ticket appeared to show identical seat numbers. Someone went to search for a train staff member to help.

'Where are you from?' I pose the clichéd backpacker conversation starter to the woman on the opposite bed, finally having a chance to practice my Russian in a 'real situation.'

'Moskva' comes the reply, followed by much more that I didn't quite catch, except the word, '*universitet*'

'You study what?'

'Pedagogy'

'You want to be a teacher?'

'Yes'

I realised that two years of Russian was not nearly enough; I didn't know what else to ask. The others in the carriage, all men, had walked to the end of the carriage for a cigarette. We sat in silence, occasionally making eye contact and exchanging embarrassed smiles.

The uncomfortable silence did not last long before the train guard appeared. He gestured to me and I followed: down the hall, across into the other carriage, stepping over various bags and boxes that still blocked the corridors. We passed between several cars, with icy drafts of wind hitting us as we stepped between the doors. I caught several glimpses into other compartments as their occupants tried to find space for their goods.

It was a few minutes walk before we stopped and I was gestured into another sleeping compartment; similar to the one I had just left, but with only two beds, and no other occupants.

'Good' said the man, as more of a statement than a question before he returned the way we had come.

'It's better isn't it?' said the girl back at my original compartment, but I had no chance to reply as my bags disappeared down the corridor, dragged by the guard.

'So long' came shots in Russian as I passed the men smoking at the end of the carriage. 'Leaving already?' I'm sure one said, but my dictionary wasn't on hand to check the vocab.

I spent the evening alone in my room, sipping strong tea from the samovar at the end of the carriage. Outside, the high-rise flats of Moscow turned into countryside dotted with towns. Many appeared to be little more than a few shacks in a clearing. Orthodox churches appeared in almost every town, lit up against the surrounding hills, covered by snow. The yellow tinge of streetlights highlighted only a few features before they disappeared into the dense forest. Then, only the silhouette of a few trees was visible against the black sky. There was not enough time to

appreciate the beauty before it passed by and something else would appear to spark my interest. It was how I spent much of the journey.

I was disappointed not to be surrounded by Russians with whom I could practice my language. However, my thoughts quickly turned to the journey and the train itself; mainly why the train, weighing several tonnes (if not more) riding on just two smooth tracks, can move around as much as it did. Sitting with my back against the wall, I was rocking quite alarmingly, spilling my tea as I did so.

Each carriage had its own attendant, a *provodnitsa*; as stern as anyone I'd met, she was not interested in making conversation, answering questions with a harsh *da* (yes) or *nyet (no)*. *S*he would clean neurotically, which included checking the small toilet at the end of the carriage – unlocking the door and walking in regardless of whether it was in use. She eyed me suspiciously every time I used the samovar - lest I spill a drop of water on her recently cleaned floor - and spent a great deal of time shouting at passengers if they had trudged snow into the carriage, dirtied the windows, left food in the corridor or opened the windows. The train was very hot and I spent much of the journey trying to vent the compartment with fresh air; I was never successful and the window was quickly slammed shut, with a stern look to boot.

The train makes frequent stops to pick up new passengers and let others alight. Ekaterinberg, Omsk, Novosibirsk, Irkutsk and Ulan Ude, near Lake Baikal are just some of the great cities on the Trans-Siberian route. With the train stopping for only an hour or so, there is little time to sightsee. If you miss the departure it can be a week before another is able to take you to Mongolia; finding your luggage, I'm sure, would take much longer. However, the architecture of the buildings surrounding the stations was worth settling for.

People would approach the train with local goods: decorated glasses and crystal, paintings, fur hats or carvings were offered through the small windows, or pushed through the busy doorways, to whomever was interested. Once taken though it was difficult to hand the item back: hard cash was more readily accepted than a returned gift. Local workers, often paid in part with the goods they produce, find the passing trains a good source of 'real' income.

Old women, many stooping with age, stood close to the tracks in the subzero temperatures offering hot meals of chicken and vegetables or meat and potatoes, as well as soup and biscuits. I often enjoyed a three-course meal from the window of my compartment and while the floury potatoes and grey meat did not look very appetising, in the cold Siberian air the meal was as welcome as any. Every day brought a new version of meat and potatoes, carrots and pies and a different broth or sweet pastry. I tasted a variety of drinks, snack and meals, ranging from regional specialities to European imports; some were truly delicious, others not so much.

The freeze-dried meals I'd brought from the UK - instead of nourishment - provided entertainment with many of those that I dined with. Laughs would erupt as I poured boiling water into the foil packages of dehydrated dust, creating shepherd's pie, meat stew or pasta sauce - whatever I pulled out of my bag that day. I preferred the local meals and passed round the dry mix for others to enjoy (or not, if their faces were anything to go by).

It was at the end of the second day that someone joined me in the room. Elenor was a young mother from Perm, her striking Kazakh features were off set by a delicately embroidered blouse and hand knit shawl. She spoke terrible English, and I terrible Russian; we got a long well. We spent the day talking about her children and our journeys. She was on her way to visit her sick mother in Ulan Ude and was amazed anyone would take the train 'just for fun'. She showed me a picture of her 16-year-old daughter (who shared her striking features but had

unusually fair hair), asking for my address so she could practice English. I promised to hand it over before we parted.

As I lay on my bed that night, Elenor wrapped her shawl around me and began to sing; if she was singing me to sleep, or just to herself I couldn't tell, but quickly fell asleep in the rhythm of train; pushing its way deeper into the winter landscape. In the morning, I awoke to a warm tea by my bed and a breakfast of Russian biscuits. I could not have asked for better company.

Elenor had a supply of shopping bags that she was selling to pay for her journey. As the train pulled into a station we would both lean out of the windows waving the colourful bags, yelling '*sumki sumki'* ('bags bags'). I never knew what price to charge, but everyone on the platform seemed to know exactly what to pay; I took whatever someone offered.

The 400 roubles I made my first time on the job thrilled Elenor, but after that, I never sold many. My quick delve into Russian consumerism gave the opportunity to participate in the frenzied atmosphere at the stations - which appeared to continue regardless of the time or weather. I often woke up in the night to calls of '*Kobra, Kobra*': the family in the next compartment trying to sell some kind of perfume. Thankfully, Elenor left her trading to the daylight hours only.

I began to join in with my own goods but not wanting to take money, I swapped them for provisions. A pair of warm socks got me a huge bag of berries that I could enjoy for the rest of the journey and my book: *2001, A Space Odyssey* got me a new pair of gloves.

A lady walked into our compartment and without hesitating took a seat on Eleanor's bed. As an old hand at Russian train travel, Elenor welcomed her and accepted the small gift of chocolates she was offered. The woman talked in slow, heavily accented Russian, difficult to

understand. After making some tea for us I removed myself from the conversation, not having the concentration.

The train was a moving version of student dorms, long corridors with people moving between rooms for a change of company or scenery. There were vestibules at the end of each carriage where the smokers would congregate and the dining car served as the communal gathering place where many would meet before a night on the town, which consisted of vodka in someone's compartment. My favourite place was the corridor, where windows stretched the length of the carriage, giving stunning views over the Siberian wilderness.

Like in any Russian household, visitors are warmly welcomed on trains and I was quick to catch on as various people popped by. If we did not want to receive guests we simply closed the sliding door on the compartment and were never disturbed. It was a few days before I had the courage to move to other compartments. Merely poking my head around the door, I met with open arms and an invitation to food or drink. This welcome was often repeated a second time once I had sat down and introduced myself as being from Britain. I took along my bag of berries as a guest offering and received with a brief *'spasibo'* before everyone delved in.

Accepting gifts is often a demonstration in nonchalance. Before leaving the UK, I had spent hours selecting and choosing in gifts for the family I was to stay with in Moscow. Preserves and biscuits, books, pictures and handicrafts had all been carefully chosen to reflect the area where I lived and were presented in individual baskets and bags for each member of the family. On presentation, rather than studying each item with (perhaps mock) enthusiasm, after a brief look they were set down with only a simple 'thank you.' Far from being rude, the family explained to me later (perhaps due to my fallen looks after the event) gifts are part of Russian custom and are gratefully accepted, but without fuss. 'You would not thank someone very much

for taking off their shoes before they entered your house in England. You expect them to, so say nothing'. It was of no surprise that my offerings were accepted in a similar manner on the train.

The days passed quickly, too quickly, and the boredom that I had feared never set in. Every morning I would open the curtains, wondering what kind of scenery would greet me as the train moved from the Urals into snow-covered forest to steppe and large expanses of snowy nothingness. It was hard to get bored of the view and the anticipation of another beautiful sunset; knowing you've travelled almost a thousand miles, and another time zone, since the night before.

I had been waiting eagerly to see Lake Baikal, the deepest lake in the world, which we passed early one morning. This huge lake covered in crystal white ice stretched to the mountains on the horizon but was visible for only a few minutes before the train turned a corner and headed back into the forest.

'You were sleeping so well, I didn't wake you earlier' Elenor said as I explained how excited I was to see something so beautiful.

'There was more?'

'Much more. I am sorry'

'That's fine. Now I have an excuse to come back'

Shortly after, we arrived in Ulan Ude, Elenor's stop. She left me a shopping bag to remember her by and as we said goodbye I promised to write, but after she had gone I realised we never swapped addresses.

Sara, the only female doctor in Mongolia (if I understood correctly) now occupied the other bed in my compartment. Sara was perhaps 30, but given her harsh Mongolian features it was hard to tell, she was just as welcoming and friendly as Elenor, but we didn't find much to talk about after the initial pleasantries. She asked if I would help with her English.

Having swapped my books for various meals the only English text I had was *Lonely Planet: China* and Sara spent the day reading passages on various sights. I would often get lost in the descriptions of the countryside and cities, the culture that I was eager to experience. Alone in my thoughts, I would leave Sara stuck on a word, needing a nudge before correcting her.

A man from Lake Baikal, Valery, joined us, wondering about the 'two English people' (with which Sara beamed with delight). He carried a healthy glow in his cheek, which many in this region seem to have, perhaps due to the cold, but Sara suggested that vodka was responsible.

Valery was animated and cheerful as he spoke and I became engrossed in his descriptions of the region, his *dacha*, and how he copes with winter temperatures below negative 40C. He talked passionately about Lake Baikal and how 'you can catch fish with just your arms,' jumping onto the floor, wrestling an imaginary fish before presenting it to Sara. We tucked into some food he'd caught earlier: caviar, black bread, cured fish, biscuits and other delights appeared out of his bag, and with every mouthful Valery described the small house that produced the biscuits, how the fish was cured or why the caviar is so expensive. We ate until full, and then finished off the leftovers swapping tales of home as we did so. After almost five days, I was able to join in with barely a thought to conjugation or vocabulary. Although, I'm sure the vodka helped.

Some time that evening, after lengthy customs and immigrations checks at the Mongolian border, I fell into a deep sleep that I didn't wake from until we reached Ulan Bator the next morning. I was hoping to enjoy a last breakfast and have the chance to say goodbye to those I had met, but there was just enough time to gather up my belongings and rush off the train.

While the Trans-Mongolian route of the railway continued for another 1000 miles to Beijing, I would not join it for another four days, after spending time in the Mongolian capital. I

would then join another train and spend a final day reaching my final stop in China; completing one of the longest journeys on the planet.

Some time that evening, after lengthy customs and immigrations checks at the Mongolian border, I fell into a deep sleep that I didn't wake from until we reached Ulan Bator the next morning. I was hoping to enjoy a last breakfast and have the chance to say goodbye to those I had met, but there was just enough time to gather up my belongings before rushing off the train.

Stepping onto the platform, this station had a very different feel. There was not the usual slush of muddy snow on the ground, barely a piece of ice was visible - being so far inland precipitation is limited - but the air was noticeably colder and my cheeks quickly felt tender. A number of bodies wondered around the train, several dressed in traditional *dils* - a long colorful robe, accompanied by a pointed hat - some sold wares or food, others waited to board. There were still many Russian words to be heard but Mongolian prevailed.

Sara had been following close behind as I walked away from the train, but as the crowds thinned I realized she was nowhere to be seen. I scanned for her fur hat, but everyone modeled a similar design; even Valery had disappeared into the melee.

Passengers were quickly scattering through the exits, and it seemed like just minutes before the platform was practically empty, leaving behind the traders and a handful of people - like myself on a previous day - who were waiting for the train to depart. I took a moment to look at the paper Sara had given me just before we left the train, it bore an address with a short message: 'Please visit me.'

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Mandate of the Fatherland: Denis Fonvizin's Translation of Neo-Confucianism into the Politics of Enlightened Absolutism under Catherine the Great

By: Jeffrey D. Burson

Born in 1745, Denis Fonvizin was one of eighteenth-century Russia's premier playwrights, and among the reform-minded intellectuals and future statesmen educated at the University of Moscow in the 1750s who became instrumental in the successful coup d'état of 1762 which brought Catherine the Great to the throne. Motivated by the urge to transform the Russian autocracy into a benevolent despotism ruling within a state of fundamental laws, these officials, Fonvizin among them, coalesced into a more or less self-conscious court faction under the patronage Nikita Panin, tutor to Crown Prince Paul, and head of the College of Foreign Affairs from 1763 to 1781.[1] Haltingly, and ultimately with little success, the so-called Panin Party tried to convince Catherine to provide a system of fundamental laws for the realm. Because of changes in Russian foreign policy and the outbreak of the disastrous Pugachev peasant uprising after 1773, Catherine became increasingly wary of allowing limitations on her prerogative powers at a time when Russia was feeling the strains of her foreign wars and was still reeling from domestic revolt. Significant members of the Panin party, including Fonvizin who would not compromise their political principles in the interests of political survival, were forced into either political irrelevance or political opposition.[2]

But this standard account of Fonvizin's vote at the court of Catherine does not capture the dynamism and eclecticism of Fonvizin's political thought. Though parts of Fonvizin's collected

[1] Cynthia Hyla Whittaker, *Russian Monarchy: Eighteenth-Century Ruler and Writers in Political Dialogue* (DeKalb, Ill.: Northern Illonois University Press, 2003) p. 231 n. 93.
[2] Walter Gleason, "Political Ideals and Loyalties of Some Russian Writers of the Early 1760s," *Slavic Review* 34: 3 (Sept. 1975): pp. 560-75; also Gleason, "Introduction: State and Nationality in Fonvizin's Writings" in *Political and Legal Writings of Denis Fonvizin*, pp. 1-21; David L. Ransel, *The Politics of Catherinian Russia: The Panin Party* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1975).

works have been translated, the corpus itself remains in Russian and very difficult to find.[3] The bulk of what has been translated is Fonvizin's celebrated dramatic works.[4] By comparison, Fonvizin's surviving works on political topics are small indeed; Walter Gleason's collection of Fonvizin's political and legal writings remains the best, most complete anthology of his works in translation. More recently, the two pieces for which this author is most indebted here – Fonvizin's translation of an expert from the Confucian *Ta Hsüeh*, and *A Discourse on the Permanent Laws of State* – are reprinted by Marc Raeff in his anthology of Russian Intellectual History.[5] Yet, Fonvizin's important contribution, first, to the crafting of an early form of Russian nationalism, and second, to a political discourse inspired by political thought from Western Enlightenment and Chinese sources, with the potential of legitimizing opposition to the Tsar, warrants a renewed attention by Russian scholars.

Specifically, this article will be concerned with the specific language through which Fonvizin articulated his mature thoughts on the legitimacy of the Russian Tsar, and the duties and rights of her citizens. What follows is, first, a discussion of the ideals and activities of the Panin Party throughout the 1760s and 1770s, and how the journey of Fonvizin, the man, sparked

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[3] *Sobranie sochineii*, ed. G.P. Makogonenko 2 vols. (Moscow-Leningrad: Goslitizdat, 1959).

[4] The most recent complete bibliography of Denis Fonvizin's corpus, in Russian and in English translation, is to be found in Gleason, *Political and Legal Writings of Denis Fonvizin*, pp. 144-45; compare with Alexis Strycek, *Rossia epokhi prosveschcheniia* (Moskva: Prometei, 1994); E. B. Rogachesvskaia, Aleksandr Griboyedov, *Ot russkogo klassitsizma k realizmu: D. I. Fonvizin, A.S. Griboedov* (Moskva: Schkola-Press, 1995); Stanislav Borisovich Rassadin, *Fonvizin* (Moskva: Iskusstvo, 1980); Peter Hiller, *D. I. Fonvizin und P. A. Pavil'scikov: ein Kapitel aus der russischen Theatergeschichte im 18 Jahrundert* (München: O. Sagner, 1985); Rassadin, *Satiry smelyi vlastelin: kniga o D. I. Fonvizine* (Moskva: Kniga, 1985); M. Muratov, *Denis Ivanovich Fonvizin* (Moskva: Gos. Izd-vo detskoi lit-ry, 1953); L. I. Kulikova, *Denis Ivanovich Fonvizin* (Leningrad: Prosveshchenie [Leningradskoe otd-nie] 1966; *Dramatic Works of D. I. Fonvizin* (Kantor: Marvin Publication; Bern: Herbert Lang; Frankfurt: M. Peter Lang, 1974; N. D. Kochetkova, *Fonvizin v Peterburge* (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1984).

[5] D. I. Fonvizin, "A Discourse on the Permanent Laws of State" in *The Political and Legal Writings of Denis Fonvizin*, trans. Walter Gleason (Ann Arbor, MI: Ardis Publishers, 1985) pp. 172-73. The English translation of the political writings of Fonvizin to which this author is indebted, are reprinted wholesale from the English translations of Robert Hingley in *Sobranie sochineii* as long ago as 1959. Hingley's translation is reprinted completely in Gleason's anthology of Fonvizin's political works, and excerpted in Marc Raeff (ed.) *Russian Intellectual History: An Anthology* (New York: Humanity Books, Imprint of Promethius Books, 1999; Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1966), pp. 87-105; compare with *The Great Learning (Ta Hsüeh)*; excerpted in *A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy*, ed. and trans. Wing-tsit Chan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963) pp. 92-3.

the eclectic and provocative synthesis of political thought from West and East that occurs in his later writings. Second, this article will lay hold of Fonvizin's prescriptions for Catherine the Great and his notion of "Imperial Legitimacy" by a close reading and parallel analysis of Fonvizin's partial translation of *Ta Hsüeh* and *A Discourse on the Permanent Laws of State* – quite literally the prologues to the last major legal reform proposal submitted unsuccessfully to Catherine the Great between 1779 and 1781, and a fascinating blend of Confucian and Western Enlightenment political thought with potentially explosive consequences.

In these years after 1771, when Fonvizin worked most closely with Panin in the College of Foreign Affairs overseeing correspondence between the college and Russian embassies in Europe, he coined the term "fatherland" (*otechestvo*) in his critical assessment's of Catherine's foreign policies, and basis for opposition to Catherine's autocratic policies at the expense of the social and legal reforms for which he and Panin had striven throughout the 1760s.[6] As these criticisms found in Fonvizin's correspondence with his patron, friend, and mentor, Nikita Panin, grow more strident, "fatherland" takes on a more emotive and ethical rather than legal definition in opposition to the bellicosity of Catherine's policies of war and expansion, and to her domination by upstart favorites made possible by the lack of any legal limits on the Russian autocracy in the creation and maintenance of its bureaucracy and inner counsel.[7] In Fonvizin's later writings, "The bonds between ruler and ruled," as Gleason admits, "were emotional and instinctual rather than rational and contractual."[8] Yet, for this transformation of the concept of "fatherland" into "a standard by which to evaluate Catherine's policies," Fonvizin was forced to arrive at original conclusions on the nature of Russian nationality and its relationship to the

[6] Gleason, *Political and Legal Writings of Denis Fonvizin*, p. 13.
[7] *Ibid,* pp. 14-15
[8] *Ibid*, p. 15.

powers of the Tsar.[9] In crafting this original political discourse, Fonvizin's debt to German Natural Law and Cameralist thought has been emphasized in the existing historiography, yet this article will argue that a plausible case can be made for a Neo-Confucian component to his conception of Imperial power, legitimacy, and nationality.[10]

No pretension is made to the manifest absurdity that Fonvizin knew Mandarin, or was in any way more a Confucian than a scion of the Russian Enlightenment. As discussed below, his exposure to Chinese thought came undoubtedly via his travels in France, where Jesuit translations of Confucian classics into French had ignited a lively debate over the religious implications of Chinese philosophy. Instead, one might argue that a conjuncture of circumstances – 1) Fonvizin's concerns over the direction of Catherine's autocracy, 2) his sudden realization during his travels in France (1778-79) that the "enlightened" West so revered in Russia was as decadent as the "backward" Russia itself, and 3) finally the last attempt by Fonvizin and Panin to foist a set of fundamental laws on to Catherine II in the early 1780s – all conspired to make Fonvizin's unearthing of a French translation of Chu Hsi's edition of the *Ta Hsüeh* a crucial foundation for his argument that imperial legitimacy depended on the virtue of the sovereign, evinced by her willful obedience to her own laws, and by her proper choice of counselors. Fonvizin's translation of the *Ta Hsüeh* and his accompanying *Discourse on the Permanent State of Laws* were in every sense designed by Fonvizin as paired companion volumes in their last attempt to propose to Catherine and to the public opinion (i.e. the literate elites who mattered to them) a set of fundamental laws for the Russian Monarchy in the early 1780s.[11]

[9] See for quoted portions *Ibid,* p. 16.
[10] *Ibid*, pp. 13-15.
[11] The companionate nature of these documents is noted in nearly all the secondary literature. See *Ibid*, p. 16; W. Gleason, *Moral Idealists, Bureaucracy, and Catherine the Great* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1981), p. 189; Ransel, p. 272; Piotr Zaborov, "Denis Fonvizine et ses *Lettres de France,*" in Denis Fonvizine, *Lettres de France (1778-1779)* trans. Henri Grosse, Jacques Proust, Piotr Zaborov (Paris: CNRS Editions; Oxford:

The most sophisticated attention paid to Fonvizin's political writings is found in the monographic studies, anthologies, and articles of Walter Gleason. Yet even Gleason finds Fonvizin problematic and contradictory, minimizing rather typically Fonvizin's translated fragments of *Ta Hsüeh*. For example, Gleason summarizes Fonvizin's argument in *A Discourse on the Permanent Laws of State* thusly:

> Malfeasance on the part of the sovereign led unavoidably to revolution. Obviously, Fonvizin invoked only the specter of social revolution rather than the real item. By publishing his essay in 1779 he could play on the recent memory of the Pugachev revolt.[12]

Yet Fonvizin's *Discourse*, as will be analyzed below, does in fact provide *post facto* legitimacy for any revolt that might chance to take place because of the "malfeasance" of the Tsar. The concept of the Mandate of Heaven – the colloquialism attached to the political ethics described in the Chinese *Ta Hsüeh* - provides just such an allusive, *post facto* justification. Without taking Fovizin's Confucian dabbling seriously, Gleason and other scholars remain at a loss to explain *why* Fonvizin would be of potential interest to later Russian revolutionaries; this oversight derives from Fonvizin having been read *only* through European lenses.[13]

Voltaire Foundation, 1995) pp. 7-8. All references to Fonvizin letters, unless otherwise noted, derive from this edition of Fonvizin's letters from France (see below, n. 45).

[12] Gleason, *Political and Legal Writings of Denis Fonvizin*, p. 16; cf. Gleason, *Moral Idealists, Bureaucracy, and Catherine the Great,* p. 190.

[13] Though considerably beyond the scope of this article, and merely alluded to by way of conclusion, the manner in which Fonvizin's use of Chinese political thought may have been useful to later generations of Russian revolutionaries remains a topic worthy of closer study. Some of Fonvizin's later works, though not widely circulated, were known to the Decembrists in some form via Fonvizin's relative, M.A. Fonvizin, and may have resonated in moments of crisis as far removed as the aftermath of the 1905 Revolutions: see Andrzej Walicki, *A History of Russian Thought from the Enlightenment to Marxism*, trans. Hilda Andrews-Rusiecka (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1979), pp. 32-4. This Decembrist connection will be elaborated in somewhat greater detail at the conclusion of this paper, but Walicki's suppositions are long overdue for more thorough study. Much existing scholarship in English deemphasizes the potential radicalism of Fonvizin, perhaps in part because the radical implications of the Confucian language of the Mandate of Heaven, when transposed into European political discussions, has not been more fully studied. David Ransel and Charles Moser have both seen in Fonvizin, and others who worked under the patronage of Nikita Panin, the last gasp of concerted aristocratic opposition to Romanov autocracy: see Ransel, pp. 268, 281; also Charles A. Moser, *Denis Fonvizin* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1979), pp. 98-102, 105. In some respects, however, Moser and Ransel are not far removed from a handful of Soviet scholars who saw in the Panin Party a nascent but weak movement in favor of a constitutional monarchy that would be historically analogous to the English Civil War or the so-called "aristocratic phase" of the French Revolution from 1787-89. For Soviet scholarship on Fonvizin or the Panin Group, see G. Makogonenko, *Denis Fonvizin: Tvorcheskii put'* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1961); Makogonenko, *Ot Fonviziana do Pushkina* (Moscow, 1969); K.V.

Rather unlike German Natural Law theorists, especially Pufendorff, Gleason notes that Fonvizin's political views after his return from Europe around 1780 focused on a more ethical as opposed to legal definition of the 'contract' between ruler and ruled. "Fonvizin," Gleason writes perceptively, "gave priority to the moral hierarchy of God, virtuous ruler and ethically sound subjects over the legal hierarchy of a deist God, legal ruler, and law-abiding citizens."[14] With understandably Eurocentric Myopia, Gleason is at a loss to explain the apparent contradiction in Fonvizin between his debt to German enlightened absolutist thought, and his statements which argue for a society bound together by moral and emotive sinews, one in which rulers can lose their legitimacy by neglecting their moral duties and love for their people. When faced with such paradoxical thinking, Gleason dismisses Fonvizin's call for an "immutable state of laws" as a sham, a mere knock-off of Franco-German enlightenment notions of contractual sovereignty engrafted on to the writings of a Russian bureaucrat.[15]

Denis Fonvizin, his brother Pavel, and other figures of the Panin Circle like Bogdanovich were students in the nobles' boarding school at the University of Moscow. Fonvizin began his studies in 1755, and it was here that Fonvizin, Novikov, and Bogdanovich studied closely under professors who, in turn, owed their appointment to Gerhard Friederich Müller, a celebrated historian, publisher, and graduate of one of the premier centers of the German Enlightenment,

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Pigarev, *Tvorchestvo Fonvizina* (Moscow, 1954); G. Gukovskii, *Ocherki po istorii russkoi literatury XVIII veka: Dvorianskoia fronda v literature 1750-kh-1760-kh godov* (Moscow, 1936); cited in Gleason, *Slavic Review* 34:3, p. 560 n. 1 and 2; for a rebuttal to Soviet exaggeration of Fonvizin's opposition to Catherine the Great, see Moser, pp. 107-12. For the somewhat dated, rather 'Marxist-friendly' periodization of the French Revolution's "aristocratic phase" see Crane Brinton, *A Decade of Revolution, 1789-1799* (New York, Evanston, and London: Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 1934; rpt. 1963).

[14] Gleason, *Political and Legal Writings of Denis Fonvizin*, pp. 17-18; Gleason, *Moral Idealists, Bureaucracy, and Catherine the Great,* p. 191; cf. for contrast, Samuel Pufendorf, *Le Droit de la nature et des gens, ou système générale des principes les plus importans de la morale de la jurisprudence, et de la Politique*, traduit du Latin par Jean Barbeyrac, 2 vols (Amsterdam: Veuve de Pierre de Coup, 1734). The Moscow University scholars were not likely to have read him in the original Latin, but most Russian aristocrats were more proficient in French than Russian by the middle eighteenth century.

[15] Gleason, *Moral Idealists, Bureaucracy and Catherine the Great*, p. 125; Gleason, *Political and Legal Writings of Denis Fonvizin*, p. 18.

the University of Leipzig. Müller and the professors who closely supervised the academic training of Fonvizin were immersed in the methods and manner of natural law jurists such as Samuel Pufendorff. Many German Natural Law writers, Pufendorff foremost among them, were concerned with synthesizing Thomas Hobbes' view that political society derives from individual self-interst with the view of Hugo Grotius that man is naturally a social being.[16] The ideal polity was, therefore, one designed to maximize the individual aspirations of its citizens by teaching them sociability and curbing their passions through a regime of just, impartial laws, based on the application of universal reason to political science.[17] Fonvizin's training in German Natural Law proved a fortuitous coincidence since Catherine II, the recent German usurper to the throne of her husband, Peter III, was trying to distance herself from the policies of her husband. The new German empress strived to cultivate an image of herself as the spiritual heir to Peter the Great, and promote herself as a virtuous matriarch of her people, intent upon ruling in relative peace with her European and Islamic neighbors according to a state of enlightened, fundamental laws. Thus, the ideals of Fonvizin and his fellow students at the University of Moscow appealed to Catherine the Great in the early years of her reign, and Fonvizin was granted an appointment to the College of Foreign Affairs in 1762. Yet as the reign progressed, Catherine came to believe that there were greater risks involved in pursuing a peaceful foreign policy and a unified law code. At this point, the members of Fonvizin's circle were faced with a choice between career and principle. Fonvizin, by the late 1770s, looks to have opted for the latter.[18]

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[16] Peter Schröder, "Natural Law in Enlightenment France and Scotland – A Comparative Perspective," in *Early Modern Natural Law Theories: Contexts and Strategies in the Early Enlightenment*, ed. T. J. Hochstrasser and P. Schröder (Boston and London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003), p. 297; cf. Walter J. Gleason, "Pufendorf and Wolff in the Literature of Catherinian Russia," *Germano-Slavica* 2 (1978): 427-37.
[17] Ian Hunter, *Rival Enlightenments: Civil and Metaphysical Philosophy in Early Modern Germany* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 7-9.
[18] Gleason in *Slavic Review* 34:3, pp. 572-74, and for quote see p. 574.

Fonvizin's dilemma, and his quest for new ways to express the true basis of imperial legitimacy in relationship to the Russian fatherland, began with what would become the classic problem of the Russian monarchy even on its deathbed after 1905: the lamentation of Radishchev, written not long after Fonvizin's *Ta Hsüeh* and *Discourse*, that never would a sitting Tsar "willingly let go of any of his power." Educated men of principle, like Fonvizin, were compelled into opposition, irrelevancy, or later, even outright hostility to the tsar.[19]

Fonvizin and his colleagues caught the eye and were thrown the lengthy coattails of Count Nikita Panin, one of the masterminds who brought Catherine to power. He would later be honored with the appointment of tutor to the Tsarevich. But, rule by favorites had resulted in neglect of domestic order and costly foreign wars. The decisive but Janus-like involvement in the Seven Years War against Prussia and the rapid abandonment of the war effort essentially at the whim of Peter III had destabilized the constellation of power in St. Petersburg and Panin wanted to insure that Catherine II would rule by fundamental laws – meaning for Panin and Fonvizin, stabile and appropriate bureaucratic procedures concerning the Tsar's inner circles of council.[20] Panin's attempt to limit the autocracy through a legal code and an imperial council was motivated by this concern for stabilizing the personnel and the procedures of the bureaucratic state. When Fonvizin and many of his colleagues came within the clientele of Panin, they were forced to adapt German Enlightenment political theorists in order to justify Panin's proposal.[21]

Fonvizin's deployment of German Natural Law theorists may have been more on principle than Panin's accession to Fonvizin's justifications. Nikita Panin's principal concern

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[19] See above and for quote, A.N. Radishchev, "Pis'mo k drugu," in *Izbrannye filosofkie I obshchestvenno-politicheskie proizvedeniia* (Moscow: Goslitizdat, 1952), pp. 218-19; qtd. in Cynthia H. Whittaker, "The Reforming Tsar: The Redefinition of Autocratic Duty in Eighteenth-Century Russia," *Slavic Review* 51:1 (Spring, 1992), p. 96 n. 77.
[20] Gary Marker, "The Age of Enlightenment, 1740-1801" in *Russia: A History*, ed. Gregory L. Freeze (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 116.
[21] Gleason, *Moral Idealists, Bureaucracy, and Catherine the Great*, pp. 108-12, 117; Ransel, pp. 280-81.

was that Catherine was extremely vulnerable to relying on her favorites (very often her lovers) for political advice. Panin and many of his clients realized that, if reliance on legitimate counselors were not institutionalized by a control over the imperial bureaucracy exercised jointly by the tsar and an aristocratic council, the situation prevailing under Elizabeth and Peter III would forever repeat itself. Indeed, Peter III's constant rule by favorites seems to have been the grounds by which Panin justified supporting this overthrow; on these grounds alone, Peter had "automatically forfeited his legitimacy."[22] To these ends, the German Natural Law background of Fonvizin provided an ideal justification for these endeavors.[23] Its main virtue, as far as Panin's more politic associates were concerned, was insuring that the rightful representatives of the Russian state (like Panin) would be protected by the monarch.

However, there is no Western Enlightenment discourse (faithfully translated) that is capable of justifying regicide by a palace coup on the basis, essentially, of the monarch's unwillingness to appoint a rightful counsel to office.[24] Panin, Fonvizin, and Catherine, herself, proceeded as though the very success of the coup, accompanied by her (admittedly contingent) promise to rule according to laws established by and for rightful elites, was sufficient to legitimize the new regime and de-legitimize Peter III. This political outlook seems to have been commonplace enough among the governing elites at the apex of the imperial state in Russia as to require no further comment in 1762. But for Fonvizin, who was not advocating another palace coup as such, but sought to admonish Catherine by justifying whatever insurrection might occur

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[22] See above in Moser, pp. 1-5; also Ransel, pp. 280-81.
[23] Gleason, *Moral Idealists, Bureaucracy and Catherine the Great,* p. 118.
[24] The reader is here referred to three classic studies on the British Political thought and the regicide: J.G.A. Pocock, "Retrospect" to *Ancient Constitution and Feudal Law* (Cambridge University Press, 1987); J.P. Sommerville, *Politics and Ideology in Stuart England, 1603-1640* (London and New York: Longman, 1986), pp. 38-9, 46-7, 69-80; Corinne Weston and Janelle Greenberg, *Subjects and Sovereigns: The Grand Controversy over Legal Sovereignty in Stuart England* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Barry Coward, *The Stuart Age: England 1603-1714,* 2nd ed. (London and New York: Longman, 1994), pp. *224*-77; for the ideological background and implications of the regicide of the French Revolution see François Furet, *Revolutionary France, 1770-1880,* trans. Antonia Nevill (Oxford and London: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1992; 8th rpt., 2000), pp. 101-50.

if her abusive policies continued, a new language of political argument had to be found. The language of justifying Fonvizin's opposition to the Empress had, in essence, to come from elsewhere – a combination of nascent Russian nationalism (his concept of the fatherland), expressed in the language of the Confucian Mandate of Heaven.[25]

Two events of signal importance for the development of Fonvizin's political thought occurred in 1768. The first was Catherine's war against the Ottoman Empire (the first of two which would not end until the 1790s) and arguably conducted with expansionist designs on the Bosporus and the Dardanelles. Secondly, after having rejected Panin's proposals for a council, Catherine turned to other court factions with their own ideas for the establishment of an aristocratic council. Though the influence of the Panin faction had been secured in other ways and Panin had been temporarily convinced to drop much of their reform program, the later proposal for a council, emanating from some of Panin's rivals, was a direct assault on the position of Panin, Fonvizin, Bogdanovich and Novikov. In short, reform had been co-opted by the opposition, and Fonvizin and Panin found themselves in the awkward position of opposing a watered down version of their original concept which had been temporarily embraced with suitable modifications and reserved enthusiasm by Catherine, herself.[26]

Fonvizin and Panin first attempted to discredit the new council. Rather than attack the institution, a move which would have been blatant hypocrisy as well as dangerously impolitic, Fonvizin, Novikov, and Bogdanovich devised arguments which emphasized the moral obligations of socio-political groups to fulfilling their place in the hierarchical state of Imperial

[25] Thus, when some fifteen years later at another key point in his life, Fonvizin would not have found these words from the French translation of the *Ta Hsüeh* to be an alien concept: "If a monarch has not the confidence of spirit to summon merit from afar to receive honors, if he puts from him the pat of merit and lets thorns grow on it, if he puts his trust in men whose malice is known to him or does not remove his entire confidence from them immediately, then it is himself whom he strikes down, opening the door to the greatest calamities." See "Ta Hsüeh or That Great Learning which Comprises Higher Chinese Philosophy," trans. Denis Fonvizin; excerpted in *Russian Intellectual History*, ed. and trans. by Raeff, pp. 94-5.

[26] Ransel, pp. 280-81; Gleason, *Moral Idealists, Bureaucracy, and Catherine the Great*, p. 127, p. 168.

Russia. An individual's fidelity to one's personal responsibilities to others and fulfillment of one's duty to social superiors became the basis for an ideal Russian state that would mirror and serve the patriarchal society of the Russians. These same moral norms (essentially ethical, spiritual and patriarchal) regulated all associations of individuals in the performance of their obligations to the entity representing the collective self of Russian society. Individuals and the state were equally obligated to behave according to the normative, hierarchical nature of the Russian fatherland.[27] These arguments which established Russia as an association of individuals bound by hierarchical moral obligations enabled the Panin faction to attack the personnel of the imperial council – as noted above, a potentially serious accusation which was tantamount to suggesting that Catherine was neglecting her moral obligation to her rightful counselors by preferring upstarts from the lesser aristocracy, and vaunting them beyond their station.

Prior to the late 1760s, Fonvizin and other members Panin's clientele took issue with the Empress on matters of procedure and bureaucratic reform. For the first time, the Panin group was attacking the moral legitimacy of those chosen to occupy the imperial council; Catherine, as a party to the overthrow of her late husband, would have recognized immediately the fine line between loyalty and opposition these men were treading. For Fonvizin, however, these arguments increasingly expressed in correspondence with Nikita Panin are significant because they demonstrate that Fonvizin's own notions of the ideal, ethical relationship between ruler and ruled, developed nearly a decade before his encounter with Neo-Confucian political thought, would have resonated with the language he found in the *Ta Hsüeh* at a later date. In one particularly revealing passage of Fonvizin's rendering of the *Ta Hsüeh*, we read:

> The magnificence of a state is a fruit of the sovereign's wisdom and virtue; anyone who presumes to think that it is the effect of his riches has a base soul and lacks cordial feelings. Unhappy the

[27] Gleason, *Moral Idealists, Bureaucracy, and Catherine the Great*, p. 156-57, and for quote, p. 130.

> sovereign who hearkens to a minister conversing with him in this wise, and who gives his power into such a minister's hands. All the wise men of the state together will not be able to fill in the pit which he is digging beneath his feet, or to prevent him from falling into it.[28]

But first, Fonvizin and several members of the Panin group cultivated a conception of the Russian nationhood – in Fonvizin's case, the term was usually rendered "fatherland" – that conceived of the Slavic Russians as a spiritual community averse by nature to militaristic and opportunistic ventures by the state. The fatherland was seen as a self-regulating, organic whole over which the Imperial state presided, but could only manipulate autocratically to the detriment of itself and ultimately the fatherland as well. Nation and State were considered by Fonvizin as a complimentary duality, necessarily interdependent and harmonious.[29] Catherine's illegitimate bureaucratic reforms, her unwillingness to establish fundamental, procedural boundaries to her autocracy, and her increasing addiction to war was, in Fonvizin's view, to vaunt her own power to the unnatural detriment of the fatherland. In a letter to Count Panin's brother in May of 1772, Fonvizin all but equates patriotism with opposition to the contemporary policies of the empress: "Your patriotic [*patrioticheskie*] discussions about peace, dear sir, do not of course find any opposition from any true citizens."[30] By the dawn of the 1770s, Fonvizin was caught between fatherland and empress, and for the first time, he distanced himself privately from the latter.[31]

Fonvizin's reconfiguration of imperial legitimacy vis-à-vis the Russian fatherland along lines increasingly distant from those of his early affinity to the German Enlightenment, grew in

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[28] "Ta Hsüeh" in Raeff, *95*

[29] Frederick W. Mote, *Intellectual Foundations of China*, 2nd. ed. (New York, et al: McGraw-Hill, 1989; 1971), p. 62.

[30] Fonvizin, "Letter to Peter Panin 2 May, 1772" in *Sochineiia D.J. Fonviziana. Polnoe Sobranie original'nykh proizvedenii*, p. 276; qtd. Gleason, *Moral Idealists, Bureaucracy, and Catherine the Great*, p. 170; This conception of Russian nationality is not completely unique to Fonvizin. Another celebrated literateur of the Panin group, Bogdanovich, wrote a play known as *The Slavs* that dates from this period. In *The Slavs*, Bogdanovich invents an illicit love affair between Alexander the Great and a Slavic slave woman. Addressing her warlike lover, the Slavic woman attempts in one scene to convince Alexander that her people are uniquely inimical to the need to be prodded by an aggressive state to convince them to fulfill their duty to one another. See in I.F. Bogdanovich, "Slavaiane" in *Sochineiia Bogdanovicha* v. 2 of 2 (St. Petersburg: Izdatel'stvo A Smirdina, 1848); qtd. Gleason, *Moral Idealists, Bureaucracy, and Catherine the Great*, p. 168.

[31] *Ibid,* p. 170.

sophistication throughout his travels in Europe during the middle 1770s, as evinced from his collected letters from France to Panin and his family back in Russia from 1778-1779. Fonvizin's own intellectual and political readjustment was complicated by a demoralizing reappraisal of Western culture – a sacrosanct cultural idol for many aristocratic Russians in the eighteenth century. In France he found many freedoms provided by law, which the arrogance and impudence of men of society, and the oppressive dictates of all powerful Parisian "taste" (we might say "peer pressure" or "status anxiety" today) rendered impossible to enjoy in practice.[32] "True law," Fonvizin writes, "is the one which is recognized by the reason as just and which therefore engenders some sort of internal obligation within us to obey voluntarily."[33] This key theme of the need for internal obligation to obey what reason dictates was later magnified by his contact with Chinese political philosophy, and it would find its way into the conclusion of his *Discourse on the Permanent Laws of State* discussed below: "The ordinance, 'Be good'…would be futile to engrave…on signboards and set…on desks in government institutions; for if it be not engraved on men's hearts all administrative offices will be badly managed."[34]

Fonvizin thus became convinced by his rocky political career and by his disillusionment after 1778-79 with the Parisians in the very Mecca of Enlightenment that true freedom is only possible if a State of Laws is designed chiefly to insure virtuous leadership in the highest councils of the administration. In this way, the virtuous monarch would mobilize and maximize

[32] Moser, pp. 90-5; Hans Rogger, *National Consciousness in Eighteenth-Century Russia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 1960), p. 78, pp. 80-1.
[33] Moser, p. 106.
[34] Fonvizin, "Discourse on the Permanent State of Laws," in *Political and Legal Writings*, pp. 178-79; this theme of educating the head but neglecting the heart becomes salient in Fonvizin's characters as well. Ransel believes the character of Mr. Starodum in his famous play, *The Miner*, was deliberately modeled on Fonvizin's friend and mentor, Nikita Panin. Rogger believes that the tutor in *The Adolescent* is similarly constructed. See Ransel, p. 270; see also Rogger, pp. 76-77; cross reference these observations of Ransel and Rogger with Fonvizin's praise for Panin in his role as tutor to the future Paul I in "Life of Nikita Ivanovich Panin" in *Political and Legal Writings,* pp. 185-87.

the latent virtues of the fatherland, inspiring individual Russian subjects, by example, toward virtue by teaching them the internal obligation to obey what reason dictates is just.[35]

At the same time Fonvizin was arriving at these conclusions through independent means, he found in Paris a translation of the *Ta Hsüeh* by the Jesuit Abbé, Pierre Martial Cibot (1727-80), in the larger work, *Mémoires concernant l'histoire des sciences, les arts, les moeurs, les usages, etc. des Chinois.*[36] These *Mémoires* are the fruit of a scholarly exchange lasting from 1763 to 1773 and patronized originally by the Jesuits and Louis XV. Abbé Cibot lived and worked in Ch'ing, China, while two young Chinese students spent three years studying the languages and cultures of Europe with members of the Royal Academy of Science. Though the Chinese scholars returned to their homeland in 1766, the collaboration with Jesuit missionaries continued resulting in fifteen encyclopedic volumes between 1776 and 1791 that include biographies of celebrated Chinese monarchs, poets, and scholars; descriptions of Chinese customs, divination, natural science, and politics; whole translations of Confucian classics; and finally, erudite studies of the Chinese language by Jesuits such as Joseph Marie Amiot and Pierre Martial Cibot as well.[37] At the time of Fonvizin's sojourn in France, the first three volumes of

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[35] *Ibid,* pp. 117-18; Fonvizin's conclusion answered a very practical dilemma for those like Panin and Fonvizin who wanted to extend the privilege of nobility which had accrued slowly since the early 1760s in Catherine's Great Charter while yet enhancing participation of the high nobility in government. As Ransel astutely notes, "Since enforced service contradicted the very essence of the noble estate and merely enhanced the autocratic power, they [the Panin Faction] could not advocate a return to the obligatory service requirement of Peter I's time. The answer was rather to convince people of their *moral obligation* to serve": see Ransel, pp. 75-76. Nobles associated obligatory service with despotism, but the remedy for imperial favoritism required nobles to serve. Fonvizin's renewed emphasis on the ethical bond between autocracy and fatherland, therefore, was an attempt to answer this dilemma, and he found a kindred emphasis in the political thought of the *Ta Hsüeh* – one uniquely amenable to plausibly addressing answer this dilemma.

[36] Proust, "Lettres de France dans l'espace littéraire française" in *Lettres de France (1777-1778)*, p. 30; Raeff, *Russian Intellectual History: An Anthology*, p. 88 (see explanatory note).

[37] Joseph Marie Amiot, François Bourgeois, Pierre Martial Cibot, Aloys Kao, Charles Batteux, Louis Georges Oudart-Feudrix de Bréquigny, "Preface," *Mémoires concernant l'histoire, les sciences, les arts, les moeurs, les usages, &c. des Chinois: par les missionaries de Pékin*, v. 1 of (Paris: Chez Nyon, 1776) pp. i-vi; henceforth cited *Mémoires*, v. 1 (1776) pp. i-vi; see also Pierre Martial Cibot, "Essai sur l'ecriture et les caractères Chinois" in *Mémoires* v. 8 (1782), pp. 133-266; Cibot, "Suite de l'Essai sur l'ecriture et les caractères Chinois" in *Mèmoires* v. 9 (1783), pp. 282-440; The translation of the *Ta Hsüeh* in the first volume of the *Mémoires* is known to be by Abbé Cibot because he cites his own translation an extensive note in *Mémoires* v. 9 (1783), pp. 411-12; both Cibot and

the *Mémoires* were already completed and Cibot's translation is contained in the very first volume.[38] Cibot's translation was most likely the "orthodox" version of this Confucian classic (usually rendered into English as *The Great Learning*) by the seminal twelfth century scholar of the Southern Sung Dynasty, Chu His, and still in use in the Ch'ing Dynasty.[39] Jacques Proust, one of the commentators and editors of Fonvizin's letters from France, directly asserts that Fonvizin came into contact with Cibot's translation in 1777-78.[40] Chiefly, the Jesuit familiarity with Ch'ing Dynasty China and its philosophy had caused quite a flurry in France. Chinese dynastic chronicles and Confucian classics like the *Book of Rites* (of which *Ta Hsüeh* was originally the forty-second chapter)[41] sported chronologies of the world which flew in the face of all accepted chronologies of human history derived from Genesis. China had also been for some time a serious problem for the Jesuits because it was, first, a society apparently run by philosophers (Confucian) with a state "religion" and a highly sophisticated moral philosophy, but lacking a belief in a personal, monotheistic deity. This immediately had shorn eighteenth century Jesuits of one of their signal empirical "proofs" of God – that is, believe in his existence by universal consent of mankind. Montaigne and a host of other skeptics throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth century had used Chinese society to argue for the feasibility of a secular morality based on accepted usage and an innate, human intuition of the laws of nature. Perhaps more importantly, however, Cibot's translation had been published in 1776 immediately before

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Joseph Marie Amiot (the general editor of the *Mémoires*) were well-known scholars of Chinese language: see also Joseph Marie Amiot, *Dictionnaire tartare-mantchou françois composé d'après un dictionnaire mantchou-chinois, par M. Amyot…rédigé et publié avec des additions et l'alphabet de cette langue, par L. Langlès* 3 v. (Paris: F. A. Didot l'ainé, 1789-90); also Amiot, *Abégé historique des principaux traits de la vie de Confucius, célèbre philosophe chinois; orné de 24 estampes in 4, gravées par Helman, d'après des dessins originaux de la Chine, envoyés à Paris par M. Amiot, missionaire à Pékin et tirés du cabinet de Mr. Bertin* (Paris: Chez l'auteur et chez M. Ponce, graveur [1788?]).

[38] Abbé Cibot, "Ta-Hio" *Mémoires* v. 1 (1776) pp. 432-58.

[39] Valerie Hanson, *The Open Empire: A History of China to 1600* (New York: Norton, 2000), pp. 295-97.

[40] For Proust, see above n. 40.

[41] *The Great Learning* in Chan, p. 85 n. 5.

another scandal broke out surrounding a work by De Maila and published by a French abbé as the *Histoire générale de la Chine* in 1777.[42] Fonvizin would almost certainly have been aware of the book's suppression, and one could speculate that this controversy may have been, in part, what peaked his curiosity about Chinese political thought and led him most certainly to the Cibot translation of Chu Hsi. Although it should be noted that the partial collection of Fonvizin's correspondence from France contains no explicit reference to the Cibot translation.[43] Yet, Marc Raeff, Walter Gleason, and the commentators of Fonvizin's letters from France all agree that the Cibot translation was Fonvizin's inspiration, and the very close affinities between the translations of Fonvizin and the Abbé Cibot are impossible to ignore.

Ta Hsüeh provided a language in which to articulate (to the empress and to the literate elites in Russia) the reflections on imperial legitimacy and political opposition that had preoccupied him since the late 1760s. After returning to his homeland, Fonvizin then published his translation of Cibot's fragment in the *Bulletin de l'Académie* in 1779.[44] This publication is highly significant because it was conducted at exactly the same time Fonvizin and Panin were working, once again, to justify to Catherine the Great the necessity of a fundamental project of legal reform. This last ditch effort at reform was drafted by Fonvizin, as well as Nikita Panin and his brother, Piotr Panin, and addressed both Tsarevich Paul and Catherine. In the event that

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[42] Catherine M. Northeast, *The Parisian Jesuits and the Enlightenment: 1700-1762* (Oxford: The Voltaire Foundation at the Taylor Institution, 1991), p. 122; for signal importance of China to theological disputes within the French republic of letters, see Alan Kors, *Atheism in France, 1650-1729* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).

[43] I found not mention in any of the following, all dating from his period in Paris: "Letter 11: à sa soeur, de Paris, 11/22 mars 1778," pp. 103-9; "Letter 12 à sa soeur, de Paris, 20/31 mars 1778," pp. 111-12; "Letter 13: à Piotr Ivanovitch Panine, de Paris, 20/31 mars 1778," pp. 113-18; "Letter 14: à Iakov Ivanovitch Boulgakov[?], de Paris, 3/14 avril 1778," [Letter Incomplete] pp. 119-22, and see p. 121 n. 7; "Letter 15: à sa soeur, de Paris, 30 avril, 1778," pp. 123-31; "Letter 16: à Piotr Ivanovitch Panine, de Paris, 14/25 juin 1778," pp. 133-40. Despite the lack of any direct mention of Cibot's translation, it should be stressed again that the complete correspondence of Denis Fonvizin has not been translated, and there may be other items in Russian which could shed light on these findings one way or another.

[44] Marc Raeff said it appeared anonymously in May, 1779 in *Sankt-Petersburgskii Vestnik:* see Raeff, p. 88; also Piotr Zaborov, "Denis Fonvizine et ses *Lettres de France"* in *Lettres de France,* pp. 7-8.

Catherine would not comply, or that mass popular rebellion broke out as it had just six years earlier during the Pugachev rebellion, their collaborative reform proposal was to be, first, Paul's blueprint for a reformed imperial state, and second, a bid by the Panins and Fonvizin for the power to organize the reformation.[45] The structure of the proposal itself comprised five items. First, there was Fonvizin's *Discourse on the Permanent Laws of State*, second, a draft constitution, third, eighteen articles on the proposed goals of Paul's reign, fourth, a suggested fundamental law of succession, and finally, two short commentaries on the previous items.[46]

Most significant are the many glaring textual and thematic similarities between Fonvizin's translation of the *Ta Hsüeh* and the *Discourse on the Permanent Laws of State,* which was, at any rate, the prologue to the reform proposal. Walter Gleason goes as far as to consider the simultaneous publication of the *Ta Hsüeh* translation as the public reiteration of his proposals in the *Discourse*, and this is certainly clear from the structure of the proposal. Yet, one must also consider that the Confucian text, itself, just like Fonvizin's *Discourse,* is extremely explicit about the legitimacy of rulers resting on their love of virtue and their love for their people. In this sense, Fonvizin's reform proposal as a whole neatly combines common concerns from both the schools of German Natural Law and Neo-Confucian political thought. From the German Enlightenment on the one hand is the concern for the best means of teaching (or legislating) subjects and sovereigns to internally assent to rational, fundamental laws; from Confucian political thought on the other hand is the analogous concern for instilling internal assent to socio-

[45] Zaborov in *Lettres de France*, p. 8; Ransel, p. 272.
[46] The full text of the reform proposal is reprinted in Russian in the Appendix to E. S. Shumigorskii, *Imperator Pavel I, zhizn' i tsarstovovanie* (St. Petersburg, 1907), pp. 1-35. I am greatly indebted to my friend and colleague Richard A. Moss for his invaluable assistance in consulting this source; also Ransel p. 272 n. 24; for renewed concentration on Paul as a sort of "savior" for the ideals of the Panin-Fonvizin group, see Fonvizin, "A Discourse on the Recovery of His Imperial Majesty the Crown Prince Paul Petrovich in 1771" in *Political and Legal Writings*, pp. 153-54, p. 156; see also "Life of Nikita Panin" in *Ibid*, p. 185.

political roles (the rectification of the mind and will first by the emperor and then, by force of example, his subjects). Fonvizin seems clearly to have emphasized the latter after 1780.

Not only did Fonvizin's *Discourse* and his translation of Cibot's *Ta Hsüeh* find its way into the counsels of Catherine and the crown prince, but it was published. To publish such a provocative statement was not an open call to revolution by any means. Fonvizin's argument, if one reads both the *Discourse* and *Ta Hsüeh* closely, is that uprisings like the disastrous Pugachev revolt are inevitable reactions if needed reforms are not provided and virtuous men of proper noble bloodlines allowed to properly serve. On these grounds, Fonvizin argues, the people – whether nobles or commoners – are bound to revolt again sooner or later – and are justified *if the revolt succeeds*. Sharing, as he did, his readership's fear of another Pugachev, the option is clear. The nobility should be loyal, but if popular uprising and disaster looms, the nobles would be foolish not to depose Catherine and reconstitute the state under the heir to the throne, becoming, in effect, the vanguard of reform, in place of whatever fearful successors of Pugachev may arise.

A close reading of Fonvizin's *Ta Hsüeh* and his *Discourse* shows how seamlessly the traditions of German Enlightenment and Neo-Confucian political arguments are woven together in expressing Fonvizin's thoughts on the nature of the sinews binding ruler and ruled, and under what legitimate – indeed inevitable – circumstances those ligaments are torn. Sovereignty exits for the benefit of the subjects, Fonvizin states in the opening of the *Discourse*. To these ends:

> [God] instituted principles of everlasting truth, unalterable by Himself, whereby He governs the universe and which He Himself cannot transgress. In the same way, a sovereign is like unto God …His almighty power cannot signify his might and worth except by instituting in his state unalterable rules, based on commonweal which he himself could not infringe without ceasing to be worthy sovereign.[47]

Such a statement could be found in the cameralist tradition of many German Enlightenment jurists, or English Newtonian Deists. However, inasmuch as he is addressing Catherine or Paul,

[47] Fonvizin, "Discourse on the Permanent Laws of State" in *Political and Legal Writings*, p. 169.

he makes the ruler the root of the structural integrity holding the fatherland together with the state. Without immutable laws to which the sovereign binds himself, and to which he rectifies his rule, Fonvizin writes, "no common bond can even exist; there is a state but no homeland, there are subjects but no citizens."[48] Without a state of laws set by the ruler, every man, "being subject to the caprice and injustice of those more powerful than himself, considers himself under no obligation to observe when dealing with others, standards which others do not observe" with him.[49] Property and safety are not secure, and because of the chronic whimsy and injustice of the ruler's decrees and choice of undeserving favorites,[50] the ethical bonds of community decay from the center outward. Fonvizin writes:

> Spirits grow despondent, hearts are depraved, and the manner of thinking becomes loose and contemptible. The favorite's vices…become general, all these vices spread abroad and infect the court, the city, and finally the country… And what can hold back the onrush of vice when the idol of the sovereign himself has raised the banner of lawlessness and dishonor in the very imperial palace before the eyes of the whole world.[51]

The focal point which instills by example an upright will among all subjects of the realm – among the whole of the fatherland in relationship to the state – is the ruler. What follows are the very words of the *Ta Hsüeh* filtered through the French translation of Abbé Cibot:

> A great monarch serves as an example for his entire state from within his own palaces. The virtues which he has restored to them, and which flourish around him, attract the eyes of all…And indeed he cannot but be loved and honored, his dignitaries cannot fail to receive respect and obedience, nor can the wretched fail to obtain relief…
>
> Even more effectively does the example of the imperial family open the way for love of virtue and for that inclination toward goodness with which all men are born on this earth… [I]mmitation will increase and multiply these qualities and spread them abroad forever in all families. But if injustice and wickedness enter therein, then all is lost; then will this spark a general conflagration…[A] single man may save everything… In vain does a sovereign forbid that which he permits himself, for then no one will obey him.[52]

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[48] *Ibid,* pp. 169-70.
[49] *Ibid,* p. 172, p. 171.
[50] About the time of Fonvizin's reform proposal which included the Chu Hsi translation and his *Discourse on the Permanent Laws of State*, Catherine II had rather alarmingly turned over a vast amount of official responsibilities to her last favorite, the youthful and power-hungry Platon Zubov: see Whittaker, *Russian Monarchy: Eighteenth-Century Ruler and Writers in Political Dialogue*, p. 175.
[51] Fonvizin, "Discourse on the Permanent Laws of State" in *Political and Legal Writings*, pp. 170-71.
[52] Fonvizin, *Ta Hsüeh*, in Raeff, 92; Elsewhere in the *Ta Hsüeh,* the question of ministers is taken up in almost exactly the same terms as in the *Discourse*: : "'Alas!' cried Wu King…'if my choice should fall on an arrogant man, one who would fear, remove, hide from me, or hem in all those whose ability, knowledge, zeal, obedience, and

The original Confucian classic did not equate the virtue of the ruler with a state of laws of his own making. For elsewhere in the *Ta Hsüeh* is written "The true and worthy glory of a sage consists in drying up the source of litigation and surrounding the throne of justice with virtues." Within the Chinese traditions of political discourse, "legalism" was a dirty word, signifying what was needed when the root of society (the emperor, the Son of Heaven) was corrupt, and therefore, all of society with him.[53] Yet Fonvizin's assimilation of both German Natural Law and Chinese political discourses led him to equate the concept of virtue in the *Ta Hsüeh* with the monarch's personal conduct, choice of ministers, *and also* voluntary creation of proper laws; the addition of the latter to the former two Confucian political virtues is at the root of Fonvizin's originality. Indeed, if one recalls the Panin-Fonvizin group's original conception of "law" as a more standardized, immutable form of existing procedures within the state bureaucracy, binding upon even the tsar, the verisimilitude to the Chinese notion of *li* – a dominant theme of the *Ta Hsüeh* – is even more striking. *Li* was, by Chu Hsi's time, the cosmic, ethical principle underlying the rituals of state and procedures of the Imperial Chinese bureaucracy to which the emperor was bound by the very nature of the universe - by his mandate of heaven - to perpetuate. A similarity exists between, Fonvizin's state of laws as a sort of fundamental procedure corresponding to the nature of the Russian fatherland and to which even Catherine should be subject, and the Chinese *li,* a sort of "foundational ritual and institutional procedure" most consonant with natural order. To perpetuate this order *was* the Mandate of Heaven, just as for Fonvinzin, to create a state of laws and was the mandate of the fatherland for Russian rulers.[54]

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honor might vex his pride and prick his envy – then…such ministers are born to destroy and ruin states. Only a wise sovereign is able to reject their services." See in Raeff, p. 94.

[53] *Ibid,* p. 91; Mote, p. 39, pp. 42-4.

[54] Chan, "Introduction to *The Great Learning*" in *Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy*, pp. 84-5; cf Howard J. Weschler, *Offerings of Jade and Silk: Ritual and Symbol in the Legitimation of the T'ang Dynasty* (New Haven and

The righteousness of the ruler is an inclusive concept for Fonvizin; it synthesizes personal virtue, upright choice of ministers, *and* German Enlightenment Cameralism seeking to reform the law and administration.[55] The "righteousness" of the empress will keep her safe from the "buffeting of passions," and in this way, keep the fatherland safe from the arbitrariness of the state. The more direct translation of the *Ta Hsüeh* from classical Mandarin into English by Wing-tsit Chan describes this relationship thusly:

> Those who wish to bring order to their states would first regulate their families. Those who wished to regulate their families would first cultivate their personal lives. Those who whished to cultivate their personal lives would first rectify their minds. Those who wished to rectify their minds would first make their wills secure.[56]

Self-cultivation by the ruler – rectification of his mind – meant safeguarding himself, and thus also his subjects, from avarice, greed, and favoritism. "When one is affected by fondness to any extent, his mind will not be correct," says the *Ta Hsüeh*.[57] Fonvizin requites this thusly:

> By the righteousness of the heart alone are vices corrected and virtues acquired. But this righteousness, so precious and so essential, cannot stand against the powerful buffeting of passions...Then a man looks and does not see, listens and does not understand.[58]

Yet his translation betrays a curious reversal that may reflect Cibot as much as Fonvizin's Enlightenment bias: "Righteousness…so essential cannot stand against the powerful buffeting of passions." Fonvizin, it seems, makes the willful establishment of a permanent state of laws the

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London: Yale University Press, 1985), pp. 24-30; for a rival tradition of institutional and legal reform as a basis for rectifying society with *li*, with some limited affinity to Fonvizin's proposals to the Russian empress, see discussion of Wang An-Shih's reformism (predating Chu-Hsi by nearly a century) in James T.C. Liu, *Reform in Sung China: Wang An-Shih and his New Policies* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959), pp. 40-5.

[55] William Doyle describes the central problem of German Cameralism and the limits of the German Enlightenment as applied to states. The dilemma that Doyle notes is one that Fonvizin is directly addressing by his injection of Neo-Confucian political morality into his reform proposals. Doyle writes, "The writings of the German cameralists…such as Seckendorff, Becher, Hornigk, Schröder, or Justi were more interested in what states should do than in the authority by which they did it. Their writings were strewn with references to the quality of various forms of government, but there was no unanimity among them and often little consistency in the works of individual writers. None set out to construct a coherent theory of political obligation; a government justified itself in cameralist eyes if it used its power wisely… Cameralism was bureaucratic, rather than political, theory." See in William Doyle, *The Old European Order, 1660-1815*, 2nd. ed. The Short Oxford History of the Modern World Series (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1978; rpt. 1992) p. 235.

[56] *The Great Learning* in Chan, p. 86.

[57] *Ibid*, p. 90.

[58] Fonvizin, "Ta Hsüeh" in Raeff, p. 91.

first moral duty of any sovereign who wishes to rectify his mind and his will; Fonvizin also, by implication, makes it the first *evidence* denoting whether the sovereign actually *has* an upright mind and will. Or, in Fonvizin's own words in the *Discourse*:

> Without permanent state laws, neither the condition of the state nor the sovereign is stable. There is no buttress to strengthen their common powers… Where one man's whim is the supreme law, there no firm common bond can even exist. [59]

If the empress would rectify her rule by securing herself against passion through a fundamental state of laws (i.e, the very one the Panin brothers and Fonvizin were then proposing), she would not "transgress the bounds of [her] rights by…the power of sound reason." And at this point in the *Discourse*, Fonvizin strikes out into what is perhaps the most radical statement of his political career. The statement is a Europeanized re-statement of the Mandate of Heaven doctrine couched within the terms of Fonvizin's notion of the fatherland:

> Righteousness and meekness are rays of divine light, proclaiming to men that the power which rules them has been established by God and that it deserves their reverent obedience; consequently every power which is not marked by…righteousness and meekness, but which gives rise to injuries, acts of violence and tyranny is a power not from God…If a nation in such a disastrous situation finds the means to break its fetters, it *acts very intelligently if it does…* If [the ruler] does not acknowledge truth's supreme authority over him, then…distinction arises between his own welfare and that of his country…In a word, all his power becomes illegitimate [Emphasis mine].[60]

This quote is strikingly similar to the words of the *Ta Hsüeh*:

> By having the support of the people, they have their countries, and by losing the support of the people, they lose their countries. Therefore the ruler will first be watchful over his own virtue. If he has virtue, he will have the people with him. …Virtue is the root, while wealth is the branch. If he regards the roots as secondary and the branches as essential he will compete with the people in robbing each other…*The Mandate of Heaven is not fixed or unchangeable. The good ruler gets it and the bad ruler loses it*.[61]

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[59] Fonvizin, "Discourse on the Permanent State of Laws" in Raeff, p. 96.
[60] Fonvizin, "Discourse" in Raeff, pp. 172-73, p. 174.
[61] *The Great Learning* in Chan, pp. 92-3; Interestingly enough, however, the translation Fonvizin provided for the published edition of 1779 is not nearly as direct: "The love of subjects gives scepters and crowns. Their hatred wrenches them away and shatters them. Wherefore a truly wise sovereign strives to be strong and to increase in virtue, for he knows that the more virtuous he is, the more favor he enjoys amongst his subjects…Virtue is the unshakable foundation of the throne and the inexhaustible source of power; riches are only its adornment. If the sovereign is deceived in this matter and takes the immaterial for the essential, then will his subjects, corrupted by his example cast off the burden of the laws and pollute with plundering and robbery all those channels which his greed will tap to divert himself the sources of wealth…*The supreme governor of our fates does not arrive at the same decision forever. This means that the same hand whereby he sets on the throne sovereigns able to preserve its glory by their virtue and justify its destiny – with that same hand he overthrows others who disgrace the throne with their vices and compel justice to overthrow them.*" [Emphasis mine]. See *Ta Hsüeh* in Raeff, p. 93-4. The English

Fonvizin then elaborates on this mandate of the fatherland inspired directly by Confucianism by rephrasing it in the more familiar contractual terms reminiscent of John Locke. Fonvizin asserts that human societies are voluntary associations, voluntary as much for subjects as for sovereigns, and that whenever one party or the other violates the conditions of the arrangement, intelligent subjects are inevitably going to revolt. As we have seen, Fonvizin came to these conclusions somewhat on his own terms throughout nearly two decades of his political career, but the Confucian discourse he found in Paris galvanized the terms of his proposal. With the *Ta Hsüeh*, Fonvizin provided his readers with a language that was similar to indigenous Slavic notions of imperial power, and loyal to his sovereign, but also potentially more radical due to the Confucian language of the Mandate of Heaven which morally delegitimized the Empress in favor of the Russian fatherland.[62] Yet Fonvizin's reform proposal clearly gave precedence to the fatherland over any individual tsar in the cases of imperial malfeasance. In short, Fonvizin creatively articulated German Enlightenment thought on law and administrative reform and indigenous Russian definitions of the legality of obedience and resistance to authority in the language of Chinese political and ethical thought. In this way, it became very possible for Fonvizin to

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rendering of both the Fonvizin and Cibot translations are virtually identical, and yet the italicized portion above, when compared with the more direct twentieth-century translation of the Chinese into English by Chan, is more oblique. The Abbé Cibot, like Fonvizin's, is judiciously oblique (again, the italicized portion, again, corresponds to the portions italicized from Fonvizin and Chan above): "C'est le cri de tous les siècles: l'amour du Peuple donne les Sceptres & les Couronnes: sa haine les laisse tomber ou les brise. Ainsi un Prince vraiment sage s'applique, avant tout, à s'ancrer dans la vertu, & à s'y perfectionner, parce qu'il fait bien que plus il sera vertueux, plus il sera aimé de ses Sujets… La vertu est le fondement inébranlable du Trône & la source intarissable de l'Autorité; les richesses & les biens n'en sont que l'ornement. Si un Prince s'y trompe & prend l'accessoire pour l'essentiel, ses Sujets corrompus par son exemple secoueront le joug des Loix & souilleront de vols & de brigandages tous les canaux qu'ouvrira son avarice pour conduire vers lui les sources des richessses… *C'est la Loi de tous les siècles: l'injure qui a souillé la bouche en sortant, rentre dans les oreilles en les déchirant: l'avarice du Prince ayant corrompu la probité de ses Sujets, leur iniquité dissipe les trésors qu'a grossi son injustice.*" The long-winded and oblique phraseology of Fonvizin's 1779 published translation departs from both Cibot and the original Ta Hsüeh, and seems to be a fancy pirouette around the censors in a text designed for more public consumption than the *Discourse,* a document which was essentially a rather bold "policy memorandum" meant for the eyes of Paul and Catherine. See Cibot, "Ta-Hio" in *Mémoires* v. 1 (1776), p. 452.

[62] Whittaker, *Russian Monarchy: Eighteenth-Century Ruler and Writers in Political Dialogue*, p. 175.

obliquely threaten revolution without advocating it. For the naturalistic cosmos of Chinese thought conceived of human social relations as highly organic and in a sense predictable. The *Ta Hsüeh* puts it in this way: "To love what the people hate and to hate what the people love…is to act contrary to human nature, and disaster *will come* to such a person."[63] Fonvizin's discourse, which makes use of the ambivalence of Chinese political language, opens the possibility of revolution (limited or not), and justifies it as an inevitable, natural result of misrule. Even to insinuate this to Catherine and her son was, at the very least, a very gutsy maneuver.

According to Fonvizin, in order to avoid the revolution that might occur if favoritism, abuse of serfs, heavy taxation and war abroad continued, Paul (or Catherine) must promote virtue in their councils and regularity in their laws and bureaucratic organization. In this way, the sovereign will be "a good husband, a good father, and a good master of his house…[and he will] establish internal tranquility in all homes, arouse love of children, and in supremely autocratic fashion forbid every man to step outside the bounds of his condition of life."[64] Fonvizin conceives of the tsar as custodian of the fatherland; the autocrat's job is to bring order to the center and in doing so, to insure that "nothing transgresses its proper bounds."[65] Fonvizin's conclusion is derived from his understanding of the ideal ruler found in the Confucian *Ta Hsüeh*:

> [T]he strengthening of his undertakings helped him to correct his inclinations; having ordered his own conduct, he found it easy to institute good order in his house; the order which held sway in his house assisted him in the good administration of his provinces. And finally, ruling serenely over his provinces, he became an example to the whole state and increased virtue therein.[66]

Conclusion

As any good sinologist is quick to assert, the terms of Chinese political thought do not readily translate into Post-Enlightenment European notions of natural law or natural right, and

[63] *The Great Learning* in Chan, p. 93.
[64] Fonvizin, "Discourse" in Raeff, p. 179.
[65] *Ibid*, p. 175.
[66] Fonvizin, "Ta-Hsüeh" in Raeff, 89.

much good history could be written about this process of translation and the ramifications for the European Enlightenment. Fonvizin was relying on a French translation of a text from the very different linguistic universe of twelfth-century China.[67] This study was also seriously hampered by the fact that the 1959 English translation of Fonvizin's *Ta Hsüeh* is lacking in other textual clues like Fonvizin's marginalia, which according to Marc Raeff, survive in the original documents. Raeff neglected to cite, first, whether these are preserved in his complete works and second, where the original manuscript with these explanatory notes can be located.[68]

All disclaimers aside, the cross-cultural origins of Denin Fonvizin's political thought warrants greater study by historians of Russia in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.[69] It is certainly true that, in reaction to Polish attempts to create a reformed constitutional state after 1772 and the assassination of Gustavus III of Sweden, Catherine was all the more reluctant to adopt Fonvizin's reform proposal after 1780, and this effort ultimately failed.[70] Yet, the Russian intellectual historian Andrezsj Walicki has found among the papers of Nikita Panin a document of debatable provenance, but most likely from the hand of Denis Fonvizin (based on form, style, and content), entitled, *A Discourse on the Disappearance in Russia of All Forms of Government and Likewise on the Unstable Position of the Empire and Sovereigns Arising Therefrom.* This may have been Panin's last political testament to Crown Prince Paul. Though this document is obscure, Walicki asserts that it "contains bold demand for constitutional reforms and a warning

[67] The above notwithstanding, the translation of Abbé Cibot was highly sophisticated in its day, and benefited from the Jesuit missionary's close, first-hand experience with Chinese language and culture. Cibot states in the preface to his translation that he relied on the most highly respected linguistic authorities among the Jesuits and Chinese, as well as the most revered commentaries on the *Ta Hsüeh* then current among eighteenth-century Ch'ing Dynasty officials. See Cibot, "Preface to Ta-Hio" in *Mémoires* v. 1 (1776), p. 434.

[68] See Explanatory note in Raeff, p. 88. Regrettably, this author is limited by his area of expertise: Western Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The topic is ripe for further study by Russian Historians of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

[69] As noted previously, even in France where Chinese society was copiously studied for its theological and moral implications, there were seldom (or never?) any creative attempts to synthesize political Confucianism with Western political discourse for concrete political reform programs.

[70] Whittaker, *Russian Monarchy: Eighteenth-Century Rulers and Writers in Political Dialogue*, p. 172.

that rebellion will break out if these are denied."[71] The evidence connecting this rather obscure piece to Fonvizin's writings analyzed above remains inchoate, but if Walicki's summary is accurate, it is a veritable re-statement of points made as long ago as 1779 in Fonvizin's *Discourse on Permanent* Laws, and the *Ta Hsüeh*. The *Discourse on the Disappearance in Russia of All Forms of Government*, moreover, seems found a home among Russian Revolutionaries (the Northern Union of the Decembrists) thanks to General M.A. Fonvizin, a descendant of Denis Ivanovich. Nikita Muraviev adapted it as a pamphlet as early as Alexander I's reign, and it was published, first, from London by Alexander Herzen in 1861 on the eve of Alexander II's emancipation, and again, after the Revolution of 1905.[72]

Having already justified the overthrow and murder of Peter III by Catherine's promise of bureaucratic and conciliar reform, Fonvizin found in the Chinese notion of the Mandate of Heaven a political discourse capable of legitimizing his loyal opposition to the empress, while justifying limited rebellion against the tsar should it prove inevitable and successful after the fact. Without choosing proper occupants of the tsar's inner councils, without a state of fundamental laws, the fatherland (its elites or worse, its peasants) *would* justifiably revolt – inevitably as the driven snow of a Moscow winter. A fuller study of Fonvizin's later appropriation is well beyond the scope of this paper, but apparently more than a few Russian revolutionaries thought Fonvizin's rendering of Chu Hsi to be advice worth taking, and the last of the Russian tsars was tragic proof of the Confucian dictum – that "It is not easy to keep the Mandate of Heaven."[73]

[71] Walicki, p. 33.
[72] *Ibid*, pp. 33-4.
[73] *The Great Learning* in Chan, 92.